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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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FACTORS INFLUENCING U.S.-WEST EUROPEAN 'ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French No. 10 Winter 79/80 pp 147-160

[Article by Denise Artaud*: "Does Atlanticism Have a Future?"]

[Excerpts] The vicissitudes of American policy, its inconsistencies, its weaknesses, have brought forth an outpour of ink. They have also generated many anxieties in Europe, where the question being asked is whether the stability of the American Alliance is being threatened by the American executive crisis. Some, viewing the forthcoming presidential elections as a glimmer in the darkness, have, in the months just ended, established contact with the Republicans. Seen as more realistic and more energetic than their Democratic rivals, there is no doubt they could restore "normalcy," that is, harmony, to U.S.-European relations.

Underlying this hope is the deep-rooted conviction among many Europeans that the identity of civilization on both sides of the Atlantic is such that nothing can permanently alter these relations. This thought has already been expressed by Jean Monnet in chapter 19 of his memoires: "The United States and Europe share the same civilization, rooted in individual freedom, and conduct their political life in accordance with common democratic principles. That is the essential thing. History provides conclusive proofs of this underlying kinship which finds expression in active solidarity during times of danger." Recently, it has gone beyond this. The United States and Europe have been brought together not so much by an external threat, by dangers, as by "the sense of their natural convergences, indeed their spiritual identities," which make of the Atlantic Alliance the a prefiguration of a genuine community.[1] Thus viewed, the Atlantic Alliance, in its initial stage, was characterized by what one might call negative criteria--resistance to an external aggression--but would now be entering a more advanced stage: that of convergences and identities. It would now have, that is, its own personality and its own dynamic and could subsist despite the disappearance of external dangers.

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Europeans and Americans, opposite the ethnic, cultural and national diversities that characterize Asia and Africa, certainly look upon themselves as having the same roots and as being linked by common experiences, and the term "Occidentals" commonly applied to them contains no ambiguities. Yet the future of Atlanticism could nevertheless be open to some question, because, if for no other reason, under detente the peoples of the Atlantic Alliance can no longer be content with communing exclusively on the basis of anti-Sovietism. Rightly or wrongly, external danger no longer seems sufficient to assure the cohesion of the countries that 30 years ago signed the Washington agreement. On the other hand, how solid are these old ties that are being brought forth to shore up the Atlantic community? Are their identity of civilization, the convergence of their destinies, real and profound, or are they only seeming and superficial? More precisely, are the changes that have taken place recently in the United States conducive to a foreign policy that truly accommodates the interests of Europe? And, on this side of the ocean, and notwithstanding the growing Americanization of our life styles, are there not also certain discernible centrifugal forces tending to erode Atlantic cohesion?

To understand the impact that the current evolution of the United States can have on the Atlantic community, one must go back to the origins of this community and recall what, between 1947 and 1950, over and above the Soviet threat, brought about the American commitment in Europe.

But reality as a whole is never simple, and every sociological and political movement automatically generates its counterpart--or its corrective. Thus, it is easy to show that although certain forces are at work to dissociate Europe from the United States, others are working at the same time and, in a sense, more clairvoyantly to bring them together. The "Waterloo of the WASP" was, for the Atlantic community, totally disadvantageous--the WASP viewpoint is in fact an elitist one--and now, egalitarianism is advancing in Europe. An inevitable dissociative force... Similarly, the erstwhile foreign policy consensus was developed at a time when the cold war was at its height and the United States incontestably occupied the dominant position (which explains why this consensus was based on an anticommunist militancy and on a superiority complex bordering on imperialism). Here again, the situation is no longer the same. At all events, during a period of detente and of increased dialog with the Third World, the need to define new attitudes is an imperative.

Let us be thankful, therefore, that beyond the divergences--and at times the cacophonies--of the moment we can see slowly emerging a new consensus based on much more farsighted objectives such as the defense of human rights and the absolute need to avoid an economic, ecological or nuclear catastrophe, or even a major confrontation of conventional weapons.[7] Within this consensus the new elites are seeking to encompass acceptance of diminished American power and, at the same time, an obligation on the part of the United States not to founder in some form of neo-isolationism; for, paraphrasing Brzezinski, capitalism within a single country is a dangerous myth, and America cannot isolate itself from a hostile world.[8] This new consensus, more universalist, closer to the aspirations of the emerging generations, should find widespread support in the United States, far exceeding that of Eastern Establishment circles. It should also encompass, if not more egalitarian, at least more balanced relations with the outside world. From this viewpoint, however, Washington's dialog with the Third World assumes a decisive importance. The inevitable question is: What place will Europe occupy in this new consensus? To what extent can this new consensus accommodate very privileged ties with the Old Continent?

The question can be posed within the terms of reference of the Trilateral Commission, which is in many respects the embodiment of this new consensus. For, on the grounds that problems are no longer confinable to the scope of East-West confrontation but are concerned also with North-South relations, and that these problems are no longer ideological but flow also from economic, ecological and social imperatives, is seeking to concert effective agreement between the elites of the United States and those of Western Europe--with whom those of Japan will aline themselves out of necessity. A convergence of modes of thought and an affirmation of a community of interests are undeniably visible within the ambit of the Trilateral. It is a well known phenomenon, abundantly illustrated in the actions and writings of Jean Monnet: when the leaders of different countries meet within the ambit of an associational institution, their national viewpoints and characteristics tend to merge in the face of a problem that concerns the group and requires an urgent solution. Working under the same rules, the Father of Europe also said, men's natures do not change but little by little their behavior changes. In other words, it is institutions that count, not men.

Both are important, of course, in that the influence that can be exerted by the Trilateral, though considerable, is not institutional, since it does not have the power of decision; it depends rather on the fact that those who are, or have been, members are all in key positions and able to orient national policies in directions that are beneficial to the community as a whole. The countries of the Atlantic Alliance, should therefore, little by little, evolve in the same direction. Their futures should converge.

Another process will probably strengthen and even accelerate this movement. We refer here to the role being played by American universities. By virtue of the number alone of students and researchers they attract annually, especially to their business schools but also to their departments of political science and sociology, they train or influence a large number of those who will eventually hold and manipulate Europe's economic and administrative controls. Numerically, the phenomenon is already significant (more than 10,000 Western European students and researchers in the United States in 1975); but its impact is likely to be even more significant than this figure alone might imply, and for a very simple reason: Once the initial selection barrier is passed--which varies from country to country--cooptation plays the predominant role everywhere in the recruitment of the ruling class. In such a process, the strength of the ties formed in the United States among researchers and students of a given country is not, of course, easy to determine. No study has yet brought it out into the clear. But observations here and there indicate that the phenomenon is far from being negligible. Thus, an elite is being formed in all the Western European countries that participates in the same work of rationalization, and that shares the same training and the same ideology, as the Americans.

This Atlantic elite is being only indirectly and diffusely cemented as yet by the American universities. But the fact remains nonetheless clear that our intellectual fads, or, to call them by a less irreverent name, dominant ideas, have almost all, over the past 15 years, begun to germinate in American universities. And these dominant ideas obviously inspire the mass media. Through these dominant ideas, our cultural achievement is being fostered and fed, and the Atlantic civilization community, in turn, being consolidated. If to this factor we add the liberalization of exchanges and the unification of ways of life that inevitably result from the latter, it becomes clear that on both sides of the Atlantic a convergent movement is taking place that for the moment is more discernible among the elite than among the masses, but that by degrees will probably encompass all Euro-American social strata.

The phenomenon is undeniably dynamic. Atlantic civilization is endowed with considerable power of attraction. The attraction of its universal aspects, of its democratic and humanitarian precepts, reaches far beyond its mere geographic environment and should serve to consolidate its base, indeed to extend it, in step with the progress of economic development.

If this view is accepted, there can be no question that the future of Atlanticism is assured. But is not a certain degree of caution nevertheless in order? Is it not possible that the very convergence of spiritual and political values, necessarily abstract and general as they are, might preclude the need for a specific orientation? Will the Atlantic elites, bearers of the common civilization, continue to be followed by the masses beyond a certain threshold point?

The question warrants addressing in the light of the events that have taken place on the periphery of the Atlantic Alliance, especially in Turkey. The economic and political difficulties of that country are well known and have for a long time been abundantly discussed. This, however, did not prevent the bloody confrontations between Sunnites and Alevis, in which more than 100 persons were killed in December 1978, from raising the acutely disturbing question of whether the Iranian revolution would be the model and the Islamic Republic of Turkey was already in the offing. The response to this question was negative, and with good reason, no doubt, inasmuch as the Islamic structures and organization in the two countries are very different. But that is not the essence of the matter. The latter lies first in the vitality of the religious upsurge taking place in Turkey, which 50 years ago became decidedly laicized and turned toward the West under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal. The number of Turkish pilgrims to Mecca rose from 8,500 in 1950 to 150,000 in 1976. The number of students in schools taught by prayer-leading imams rose from 4,000 in 1960 to 200,000 in 1976! True, the return to Islam was facilitated in the early 1950's by government initiatives: Religious faith seemed indeed an excellent rampart against communism. But that start [illegible] created its own dynamic: The prosaism of republican symbolism did not satisfy the masses, and the latter consequently set about searching, in the resurrection of a traditional community, for compensations to the harshness of human relations in a laicized society. The people also rejected a transnational civilization without deep roots and therefore spiritually impoverishing.

However--and this is the second interesting aspect of the Turkish situation --it was not only the rural and conservative masses that returned to Islam, but also the students. At the same time that. on the one hand, a nationalist movement was developing that exalted Turkish civilization and preached panturanianism, Marxist movements were, on the other hand, developing on the extreme left, with the result that defenders of Western civilization were notably absent from the ideological struggles in the universities and from the bloody confrontations the latter engendered. In Parliament as well, the parties favorable to the West, namely, the center-right of Demarel and the center-left of Ecevit, were not able, until 1978, to constitute stable majorities. The arbiter of the situation was for a long time Erkaban, the leader of the National Salvation Party and the spokesman for the traditionalist and religious viewpoints.

This explains in part the 1974 Cyprus expedition, which was decided by a Ecevit-Erkaban coalition. By unleashing national and religious passions at the time, the government doubtless wanted to mask the economic difficulties that were looming; but it also sought to restore a national consensus that had been impossible to achieve based on the values of Western civilization. And it is perfectly symptomatic that Ecevit, whose traditional support came from the unions and the laicized elites, came to owe much of his popularity to the Cyprus expedition.

Be that as it may, it is not so much Turkey's internal situation that interests us here as its implications for the international political situation and, more specifically, for the Atlantic community. These implications are twofold.

In the first place, despite the establishment of a state of siege in 19 provinces, the Turkish situation is far from being stabilized, and there is reason to fear that new clashes between Sunnites and Alevis (who are closely linked to the Iranian Shiites), or the Kurdish problem, may entail serious difficulties between Turkey and its neighbors. If Turkey were seriously threatened or attacked, what would be the reaction of its partners in the Atlantic Alliance? This cannot be predicted, since Article 5 of the Washington agreement does not provide for automatic aid. On the other hand, certainly if NATO were to intervene it would be for exclusively strategic reasons (defense of the straits or of Turkey's key Middle East position) and not to defend a common civilization, since for the Western Europeans the defense of the Kurds or of the Sunnites would not be a persuasive mobilizing argument...

These brief remarks lead to a preliminary conclusion in the form of a precautionary distinction: Although the Atlantic community draws its strength from a stock of common values and spiritual identities, this community no longer coincides with the Atlantic Alliance. It is smaller in scope than the area defined by the Washington agreement in 1949 and, far from being able to expand, it is, on the contrary, with its religious and national evocations, in constant danger of colliding with solid "buffers" situated at its periphery. This naturally leads us to the second aspect of the question: Will such buffers sooner or later, but in the not too distant future, turn up within countries at the very heart of the Atlantic community? At first glance, this question may seem a perfectly idle one. Neither Germany nor France are comparable with Turkey or Iran. Nationalism has foundered in Western Europe, and the religious renaissance is not characterized by any signs of explosiveness. Nevertheless, a closer look is in order: The ecologists, who, according to Pierre Chaunu, are subconsciously searching for their lost roots, are in revolt against international technocracy; the "new right" in France is seeking to return to the sources of an ancestral past; and at the periphery of Europe, autonomous movements frequently turn to terrorism. There is of course the possibility that the latter may be being manipulated by external forces; but the fact remains that they could not subsist without local connivance and help. The homogenization of culture and of information have in fact not done away with particularisms, or with the need to take root. Thus, a "Roots" phenomenon exists on both sides of the Atlantic, marked by the search for individual roots that separate and remove rather than unite and bring closer.

As this process expands, it could find expression in an ever sharper caesure between the masses in search of their past and their traditions and the Atlantic elites engaged by the future.

This is why the view of Atlanticism's future must be tempered with a degree of circumspection.

Unless the arguments in defense of the concept of convergences of civilizations are aimed solely at masking the inability of governments to define an Atlantic policy in the face of the economic, monetary and strategic problems confronting them. Unless these arguments are mere group therapy designed to evade the necessary and difficult efforts required to respond to the dangers that hover over the Alliance. Unless they are but an illusion of detente...

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. C. Delmas: "Les enracinements historiques de l'Atlantisme" [Historic Roots of Atlanticism], French Association for the Atlantic Community, Paris, 1979.

2. Cf. especially H. S. Commager: "The American Mind," Yale University Press, 1950.

3. Cf. H. Kissinger: Address delivered to the Associated Press Annual Luncheon, New York, 23 April 1973.

4. W. Watts: "Time for Pacific Council," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 14 April 1979.

5. From 1960 to 1975, industrial employment dropped 9 percent and 13 percent respectively in New England and in East Central United States; in the Southeast and Southwest it rose 43 percent and 67 percent respectively.

6. "America in a Hostile World," FOREIGN POLICY No. 23, Spring 1976.

7. On this point, see M. Camps: "The Management of Interdependence," Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1974.

8. "America in a Hostile World," op. cit.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE

WEST EUROPE MISSILE STRATEGY SEEN DEFECTIVE

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Feb 80 pp 5-7

[Article by Maurice Leman]

[Text] So, after much tergiversation, some European member countries of NATO have agreed, not without reservations, to installation upon their territories of a new type of American nuclear weapon. That arsenal, intended to counterbalance the Soviet SS 20 missiles and Backfire bombers, will considerably strengthen the panoply of what is appropriately called the FBS [Forward Based Systems], that is, those weapons which, by virtue of their installation and limited range of less than 5,500 kilometers, have up to now not been taken into account in the SALT negotiations.

By 1983-1985 the United States will be capable of causing, from European territory, the destruction of several hundred objectives in the heart of the Soviet sanctuary. The hesitation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark relating to the deployment of these weapons upon their soil, on the one hand, and the absolute capability for destruction of the second central system (ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missles] launched either from the ground or from submarines and strategic bombers) on the other hand, results in there being raised well founded doubts about adding to that imposing arsenal for the defense of Europe several hundred medium range missiles of the Pershing II type and cruise missiles.

Risks Which Are Not Shared

For the Europeans it is a question of being certain that the presence of Euromissiles upon their soil is necessary for their security and what will be the circumstances which they will be used--or not used--in the event of an aggression by Warsaw Pact forces.

In an armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union where Western Europe would be at stake, it must be well understood that the members of the Alliance run risks which are different in nature and scope. The United States, protected by two oceans, need fear only the destruction of its sanctuary whereas the European countries are threatened with both destruction and invasion. This being so, it is important to know what is the probability, in such an eventuality, of seeing such injuries inflicted.

For our ally across the Atlantic, except to consider that Europe constitutes a vital stake for it and that it would flourish, at a given time in the conflict, the supreme threat and go forward with carrying it out, a quite improbable assumtion for it would mean its condemnation to death from counter-reprisals, the destruction of its sanctuary could only result from a massive preemptive attack upon its territory by the USSR, a suicidal gesture which would as unexorably entrain the posthumous vengeance of the United States. As long as the state of reciprocal deterrence between the two superpowers, due to equilibrium of terror, is maintained, unless there is an irrational and absurd step by one of them, one cannot foresee how they could be led to commit suicide either to gain or retain the European stake. Thus, within the scope of a conflict of this type destruction of the American sanctuary is improbable and will remain so as long as the central systems of the United States and the USSR provide them with the capability of an invulnerable strike.

As for Western Europe, it is an obvious fact that the continuity of the territorial space from one end to the other of the Iron Curtain which connects it with the Euro-Asian continent, weighs heavily upon its destiny. With respect to the ratio of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the question of collapse is not in doubt, that is quick invasion unless the United States proceeds to use its tactical nuclear weapons: we would then witness the destruction of the countries upon whose territory this gigantic battle would take place. Invasion and/or destruction, partial or total: such are, by virtue of the present state of things, the eventualities resulting from a conflict upon our continent. Thus, and so long as the Atlantic Alliance does not have tactical forces sufficient to convince the USSR that its enterprise would be doomed to failure, only the credibility of massive nuclear reprisals against its own territory in response to a conventional aggression is capable of deterring it from launching one.

It is unfortunately easy to show that the Euromissiles cannot confer upon the NATO military system the deterrent virtues that the American central system has lost since abandonment of the doctrine of massive reprisals opposing the threat of invasion of the European member countries of the Alliance.

System of Doubtful Effectiveness

So long as the doctrine of massive reprisals prevailed across the Atlantic, thanks to the American nuclear monopoly, Europe, despite the increasing superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces at the conventional level, rightly considered that its security was assured without there being need for it to mount the number of divisions the United States desired.

Thus the American protectorate over the old world was established, subject to the good will, if not the will, of the great ally and henceforth compelled to ratify decisions in making which it did not participate. It was this tragic renunciation of the most elementary of responsibilities--that of assuming their own defense--which has led its partners to rely ever increasingly upon the questionable solidarity of the United States.

Questionable, because there is not the shadow of a doubt that Europe, not now being able to count upon the totality of its great ally's strategic nuclear potential sees imposed upon itself a system of doubtful effectiveness because it is vulnerable to a preemptive attack that no a postiori punishment is in position to prevent.

When, in 1962, President Kennedy reacted as is well known to the installation of Soviet medium range missiles in Cuba it was because he was aware of the fact that use of those weapons against the terrirory of the United States was probable to the extent that the USSR might believe it would probably not result in a massive counterstrike against its own sanctuary. A pistol was pointed at the heart of America, remotely controlled from Moscow, an unacceptable situation which had no result other than Khrushchev's backing down, that is, the withdrawal of the missiles or preventive neutralization of them, something which could be contemplated since Moscow was not capable of launching a Soviet counterstrike with their intercontinental missiles against American territory. Khrushchev preferred to capitulate on this point and the missiles took the same road, in reverse, as the one by which they had so imprudently been sent to Cuba.

Today the USSR is not in position to oppose the movement of Euromissiles over the territory of our allies; only the threat of total nuclear war waged against the American sanctuary--upon condition that such a threat were credible, which is not the case--could induce the United States to abandon its project. At the same time SALT II, despite the non-avoidance clause of Article 12, leaves the door open to the possibility of deploying cruise missiles after 31 December 1981. Agreements whose ratification by the U.S. Senate has been thrown into question as a result of the USSR intervention in Afghanistan. It is indeed probable that each is going to use to advantage this means of increasing its nuclear potential so as to enter the third phase of SALT negotiations with maximum number of trumps in hand. A diplomatic-military party at which the Europeans are spectators, apparently unaware of the fact that on the morrow they are running the great risk, in the direct line of this implacable logic, of being the victims of a nuclear war wages upon their soil with means they do not control.

Let us imagine in fact--something which is entirely plausible--that a serious international crisis erupts between the two superpowers and in the European theater it comes down to an aggression by the Warsaw Pact forces; the Soviets might be tempted to destroy, by a preemptive attack--they have the capability--the FBS upon the territory of our allies at the beginning of the conflict. Thanks, notably, to their SS 20 missiles, the extreme precision of which is well known (probable circular deviation less than 200 meters), virtually all the American vehicles could be annihilated during one killing salvo, after which Europe would be invaded or devastated in the course of the eventual battle to stop them which was mentioned previously.

An Umbrella That Does Not Protect

Some will oppose this pessemistic scenario with the argument that the Soviets, in preventively striking the American medium range nuclear arsenal, would expose themselves to counterstrikes against their own sanctuary and as a consequence they precluded from taking such a risk. If that were so the security of Europe would be effectively guaranteed to the extent that fear of seeing the Americans end up using their FBS ought to restrain the USSR from launching a conventional aggression. It is permissible to doubt this, as a function of what is known of the doctrine and of the evolution of American strategic thought: it would be only following upon a conventional battle which, with the actual status of the ratio of forces, is doomed in advance to be lost, that one can hope for or rather fear--because coming too late--the tactical nuclear escalation which brings us back to the case of the previous picture.

In any event, and this is the point of greatest importance, it is not psychologically credible that upon surprise attack on its FBS that the United States will retaliate massively with their central system upon the territory of the Soviet Union which, by virtue of its second strike capability, interdicts the suicidal gesture. Actually, the nuclear umbrella on the road to deployment in Europe, because it is not covered by the greater umbrella constituted by the strategic intercontinental arsenal of the United States--the sanctuary--does not guarantee the security of our neighbors. Worse, it represents a mortal danger for those who agree to receive it because of the threat it brings to bear upon the Soviet Union, a threat serious enough to incite the latter to take the first step with impunity.

One may then understand the reluctance of some European countries, inclined to accept being placed under the umbrella while wishing silently not to have the installations upon their soil. After all, the assurance can be had at the lowest cost if only one of them--that one which, by its geographical location, acutely feels the need for it, agrees, indeed demands to subscribe to such a contract. Nothing suprising in that cold realism inspired by the accursed self-interest of states which accommodate somehow or other to the American protectorate since they refuse to devote to their defense the financial effort it involves. In that perspective, since in short it is a matter of making others pay, why not go so far as trying to assure to only one the physical risks if there is some chance, small as it may be, of deriving benefit from it?

Thus, the American decision is ill-omened, not only because it offers no real guarantees, but also because it induces the European countries a little more to renunciation and contributes, besides, to deterioration of an already wavering European solidarity.

Choice of Resignation

That, upon the military level, it is essential to re-equilibrate the ratio of forces in Europe is an obvious necessity upon which it is needless to dwell. Confronted with this serious problem the old world had the choice between two diametrically opposite solutions:

either combine its efforts in order to equip itself with a technically and psychologically credible arsenal, which is within its reach at the economic and financial level, upon condition that a joint political willingness is manifested at last in the face of the hegemony of the superpowers. "In the order of colonialisms it is by not being Americans today that we shall not be Russians tomorrow," wrote Jean Cau in "Pourquoi la France" [Why France?] in 1975;

or else rely even more upon the good will of the United States, that is, go further along the road of political dependence by affirming itself to be the advance base of the new world on this side of the Atlantic and thus lose its freedom of action.

Without conviction Europe chose the second path, the easiest and least certain because it wants, in spite of everything, to believe in a miracle: the "non-decoupling" of two fundamentally different strategies, one specifically regional and European which is to preclude a thrust to the west by the Warsaw Pact forces, and the other aimed at precluding the destruction, from a distance, of the American sanctuary

In 1960 the McNamara doctrine of "flexible response" indicated to Europeans the limits of United States nuclear deterrence. After all, in 1959 did not the Secretary of State, C. Herter, declare, "I cannot imagine a President, whoever he may be, committing himself to all-out nuclear war unless the facts clearly show that we are ourselves in danger of suffering all-out destruction?" That was the time when General de Gaulle, aware of the American nuclear position, already began to provide France with its own nuclear arsenal. Lately Henry Kissinger and General Haig have clearly reminded Europe that its defense must not be confused with defense of the United States.

That is why deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles should not make Europeans dream. This arsenal does not belong to them and the governments of vassal states who would, moreover, no more agree on the occasion for its use at any stage of the conflict than they now agree on the urgency for its installation, would wait for the President of the United States to decide to make use of them or not to, not as a function of the interests of our allies but in a total perspective within which Europe, in the direction of the war, would have an influence only proportional to the weight of its efforts in peacetime.

In truth, in the present and medium term foreseeable international situation, western Europe, located where it is, represents too important a stake not to have its own defense system at all. It would thus be condemned to suffer American guardianship and watch, powerlessly. As grand international affairs governed by the American-Soviet condominium proceed.

Nothing astonishing in that: more than 2,000 years ago did not Pericles declare that Athens need render no accounting to its allies so long as its fleet protected them from the Barbarians? At least, the allies of Athens at that time had the benefit of real protection. Such is not the case today for Europe.

Is France Out of the Play?

Where does France stand in all this? Some will state that its national deterrent strategy places it outside of the European play and that if our allies made a bad choice it is none of our affair. A gross error! Let us suppose that, in fact, at the end of a conflict in Europe the territories of our continental neighbors are invaded, and in part destroyed, and that the Warsaw Pact forces had been deterred from pursuing their aggression by the threat of the President of the Republic to have recourse to anti-city strategic reprisals. France, which has received the remainders of the NATO forces, including the American expeditionary forces, has thus been spared invasion. So be it, but is its future as an independent and sovereign state assured?

Henceforth the Iron curtain is at our gates; we are,due allowances made, in the same situation when Germany was the heriditary enemy, except for the difference that the new Soviet empire bounded by the Rhine south of Strasbourg extends eastward to the Pacific Ocean. Beyond any comparison! At the economic level we are cut off from our former common market partners, those with which our trade relations absorbed a large part of our industrial and agricultural production. Unemployment beyond conception is going to submerge us. As for tourism, a source of foreign exchange, an end to migrations to the Atlantic and Mediterranean of the Dutch, Germans, Belgians, etc. Besieged and asphyxiated, we are going to suffer a social crisis without precedent. What can the political result be?

In reality, if we want to survive, we have hardly any choice: become the ultimate bridgehead, America's redoubt in the old world, by again authorizing installation of military bases upon our soil--and of nuclear missiles, improved Pershing II--why not?--among them.... In other words, even if our deterrence, desired and intended in particular to retain autonomy in policy decision, runs aground!

Whether we wish it or not, geography places us in solidarity with our European allies which are NATO members. Our fates are linked. We are compelled to unite or fall, and for a long time, into one or other of the orbits drawn around the world by the two giants which dominate it. That is why their decisions related to Euromissiles directly concern us and involve our future.

No Weapon, No Matter How Great, Will Help the West....

Euromissiles - for what strategy? Europeans are indeed unable to answer the key question. It is not even certain that the missiles' proprietor has already defined a doctrine for use of these FBS. One can scarcely imagine such abdication, to the benefit of a foreign power, of one of the inalienable responsibilities of the state: its prerogatives in defense matters.

Lacking rules, which are unreliable, knowledge of history nevertheless enables some information to be obtained. Europeans would do well to remember the period of the decline of the Roman Empire starting in the first century A.D. That period was characterized by a severe economic crisis accompanied by inflation. Indeed, it was upon the army, the great expense, that economies were brought to bear at the same time as increase in external perils were being seen. But the fortified boundaries gave the illusion of tranquil security. At the same time, a declining birth rate was rampant in Italy, famine erupted, the young were poorly educated, confusion took hold in the minds of honest men--even the senatorial aristocracy were resigned. "Oh men ready for slavery" cried Tiberius every time he emerged from the curia. Then escape was sought in the Epicurian philosophy with pleasure and notably tourism very much in fasion. Finally, it was a sign of the times, the ranks of the legions deserted by Roman citizens were filled by recruiting Barbarians while Orientals were called upon to perform certain economic tasks considered inferior. Christianity itself; contaminated by its first heresies, entered upon a crisis.

That period, for the Roman Empire, was the beginning of the end.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn certainly did not forget the lesson: in 1978 he declared: "No weapon, no matter how great, will help the West so long as the West has failed to overcome its lack of will." In conclusion, may the people of Europe hear his message and take their destiny in hand.

11,706
CSO: 3100

ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GREETS TIKP CONGRESS

Milan LINEA PROLETARIA in Italian 29 Feb 80 p 6

[Article: "Congress of Turkish Workers and Farmers Party"]

[Excerpts] On 25, 26, and 27 January, a delegation of our party's Central Committee headed by Secretary General Osvaldo Pesce went to Ankara (Turkey) to attend the deliberations of the First Congress of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Party [TIKP]. The delegation was invited by the TIKP. During its stay in Turkey it observed the profound mass ties that unite that party to the masses of the country.

During the visit Comrade Pesce met with TIKP President Dogu Pericek.

During the meeting, which took place in a warm atmosphere of proletarian internationalism, they dealt with questions regarding world peace threatened by the aggression of USSR social imperialism, and an exchange of experiences.

Our Party's Greetings

The PCUd'I [Unified Party of Italy] brings a warm and militant greeting to your congress and particularly recalls all your fallen comrades in the revolutionary cause.

We Italian communists feel the importance of your conference which is being held soon after the aggression of the USSR against Afghanistan and sees Turkey seriously threatened by the expansionism of Soviet social imperialism which is trying desperately to enter the Mediterranean, to cut the sources of energy and raw materials of Europe, to bring about its capitulation and impose its own domination upon it.

The commitment and the serious work with which you have faced this reality makes us certain that your party, in the balance of experience in struggle by the Turkish people and in the historical continuity of the Turkish communists, will know how to place itself in the forefront of the struggle of your people for its own independence and territorial integrity which constitutes, for the development of the situation, and inestimable support to the people of all European nations and joins directly with that of the people of Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Horn of Africa.

We have now entered into a new phase of the development of contradictions.

From this it appears there is the determined struggle against capitulationism. Rather than satisfying Moscow's thirst for expansionism, which is a mortal danger for the people, it encourages and paves the way for a third world war.

For this reason our party, which is committed to the struggle for the United Front for national independence against hegemony, decisively takes the lead in the struggle of the working class and the vast popular masses to unmask the line of Italian revisionists, the so-called Eurocommunists, who appear as mediators between the aggressor and the victim.

Hiding behind sporadic criticism of Moscow for the invasion of Afghanistan, they fight:

a) to continue the supply of grain and technology to the USSR;

b) complete the SALT II agreement and open negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to limit arms; this leads to unilateral disarmament of Western Europe and prevents its independent defense particularly against the already installed SS 20's.

This is concrete support for Moscow.

Today, however, a vast worldwide independence movement has developed. Increasingly the people demonstrate with their struggle the desire to prevent a situation in which the two superpowers will make decisions for them, and to reject the theory of "limited sovereignty." In this struggle, the nations and the peoples of the Third World have an advanced role, and the European nations and peoples must unite with them.

It is possible to develop a great movement for peace against the danger of a third world war.

Comrades, men and women, we are certain that you will be victorious in the revolution for democratic independence, before the end of the 20th century.

Hail the militant friendship between the Turkish and Italian people!

Hail your first congress!

Hail proletarian internationalism!

Hail the Marxist-Leninist thought of Mao Zedong!

Secretary General of the Unified Communist Party of Italy, Osvaldo Pesce

6034
CSO: 3104

TOURIST COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION BEGINS

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 18 Apr 80 p 1

[Text] A big tourist complex of L£ million has been commenced by the Kermia Company at the coastal area of Ayia Napa.

This was announced by the Kermia Co. Ltd. chairman Mr George Christophides at the annual general meeting of shareholders when he presented the accounts and report of activities for 1979.

The Kermia Co. Ltd. realised a profit of £185,264 in 1979 as against £102,806 in the previous year, or an increase of 80 percent, thanks to the rapid expansion of the company's operations, he said.

The meeting approved the payment of a 7 percent dividend on the issued and paid up share capital, and the company by special resolution decided to increase its nominal capital from the present £1 million to £3 million.

The Chairman made a comprehensive review of the economic situation in the island and dwelt in particular on the construction sector where the problem of refugee housing had created problems of raw materials accentuated by the lack of standardisation of certain constructions.

"The end result has been a sharp increase in construction costs, an increase which has since 1974 risen by more than 66%," he said.

77 Bungalows

Referring to the construction activity of the Kermia Company, Mr Christophides announced that work has started for the raising of a large and luxurious tourist complex at Ayia Napa. The project comprises 77 bungalows, a large restaurant, reception areas, swimming pool, desalination unit, tennis courts, parking places and open green spaces in a harmonious environmental area. The whole project covering an extent of 33 and 1/2 donums is expected to cost more than £1 million.

Mr Christophides went on to survey the other activities of the company which extend to all districts in the south and cover several important sectors. Particularly significant is the plan for dividing into building sites of areas adjacent to Nicosia. These sites will be offered for sale as part of the company's effort to contribute to the easing of the housing problem which is one of concern for the wider masses of the people.

After the general meeting approved the payment of a 7% dividend on the issued and paid up share capital (which at 31 Dec. 1979 stood at £1 million), there followed an extraordinary general meeting which approved two resolutions: (a) increase of the nominal capital of the company from £1 million to £3 million and (b) issue of 5,000,000 new shares to run pari passu with the existing shares and which will be offered to all the shareholders.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

TOURISM UP--Tourist arrivals in the first quarter of the current year was 26 percent up compared with the same period last year and Cyprus looks forward to welcoming 350,000 visitors during 1980. During the period January-March this year there were 38,000 arrivals as against 28,000 same period last year. The figures were given by Minister of Commerce and Industry Mr A. Papageorgiou who, however, did not conceal his fears that difficulties are anticipated in view of rising costs. "All efforts must be made to maintain the competitiveness of the tourist product. Prices must be kept down and services standards maintained," the Minister said and explained that the government is helping the measures taken by the Cyprus Tourist Organisation in this direction as well as towards staff training. The Minister was hopeful about activation of the hill resorts in view of the interest shown from Arab countries. [Text] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 18 Apr 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

DEFENSE MINISTER APEL INTERVIEWED ON NATO, BUNDESWEHR AFFAIRS

DW291040 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Apr 80 pp 40-47

[Interview with Federal Defense Minister Hans Apel by editors Dirk Koch and Diethelm Schroeder, at the Defense Ministry in Bonn; date not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Apel, the fear of another war is growing in the Federal Republic. Your friend, the Chancellor, has drawn certain parallels with 1914, the time prior to the outbreak of World War I. Is Bonn's defense minister alarmed?

Apel: We must state in any event that the crisis management mechanisms developed in the past decade are not working as would be desirable. Thereby an essential element of politics has suffered, namely, its predictability.

SPIEGEL: In Europe as well?

Apel: Aggravations outside of Europe may entail aggravations in Europe. This is why every opportunity must be exploited to talk with the other side.

SPIEGEL: The policy of the Western leading power, the United States, is likewise not predictable anymore.

Apel: What matters to me is that predictability is preserved in the crisis region of the world--in the Middle East; because military conflicts in this region can spread. Therefore, it is necessary to warn clearly of any military action.

SPIEGEL: It is hard to imagine that the United States can be involved militarily in the Persian Gulf while we remain aloof.

Apel: We are not at all involved militarily but being an important alliance country we must point out time and again what consequences might emerge from military entanglement in this corner of the world.

SPIEGEL: President Carter has already announced military actions in the event that the economic sanctions come to naught. Then we will be dragged into the conflict. United States' planes are using bases in the Federal Republic, U.S. armed forces will obtain supplies from their logistics depots here.

Apel: After all, what is being threatened and what then is really done are still two different things. I remain convinced that common sense will prevail. Besides, there are clear agreements as to the use of German airports and German bases.

SPIEGEL: Despite our protests the Americans supplied the Israel's in the Yom Kippur War via supply bases in the Federal Republic.

Apel: As a followup to that war agreements were made which will not confront us with surprise situations again.

SPIEGEL: The Chancellor is convinced that economic sanctions against Iran will not lead to the release of the hostages, but that they will merely drive Iran into the embrace of the Soviets. He is afraid that there will be a sort of automatic mechanism toward war. The U.S. President is under compulsions and possibly might become the captive of his own announcements.

Apel: As far as the taking of hostages is concerned, U.S. foreign policy has so far demonstrated incredible dexterity and unbelievable patience. This is also the reason why I am not prepared to answer hypothetical questions hypothetically. There is but one thing to be considered: for nearly 6 months now, 230 million Americans have been under unbelievable pressure. Yet, I assume that a military action is not a point at issue.

SPIEGEL: You are evasive. It was just this week that President Carter again announced military actions. A politician acting responsibly must think developments through to the end. And by his profession a defense minister must reckon with the worst.

Apel: I am not the defense minister of the predominant power, United States, but the defense minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. And, after all, what matters is to liberate the hostages alive, and this is the target by which the policy must be oriented.

SPIEGEL: It is against our conviction that we are joining the economic embargo against Iran, it is against our conviction that we support the boycott of the Olympic Games. Are we the "Finland of the Americans," as a Bonn state secretary once put it? Economically strong, to be sure, yet in the event of a crisis dependent on the United States for better or worse?

Apel: One thing is true in any event: increasing tensions between the two world powers hold the danger that the leeway for action by the medium powers will become smaller. Solidarity among free countries, however, means not to put one's own interests completely in last place. Solidarity needs to have the right of way in both the Iran sanctions as well as in nonparticipation in the Olympic Games.

We have concluded a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union with a duration of 25 years. We remain loyal to the agreement and expect Moscow to do the same. This does not mean that we will be entering into deals which the United States cannot contract, or that we will supply strategic goods.

SPIEGEL: Your statement that wherever one's own interests are touched blind alliance loyalty cannot prevail may well elicit a frown in Washington. After all, we also expect the Americans to sacrifice Boston, if necessary, for the sake of saving Bonn.

Apel: I do not see it this way. President Carter himself has pointed out that a divided country like ours lives under special political conditions. Boston and Bonn stand for one another; this is mutual. The United States is not being defended at the Potomac River but at the Elbe River.

SPIEGEL: But this does not mean anything. The Americans have long had the feeling of being deserted by the Europeans. Do you not see a danger that the current policy of the alliance partners could evoke anti-Europeans, anti-German resentment in the United States?

Apel: I see this with some concern, though with the firm conviction that these resentments are unjustified. There is only one thing that helps here: talking with each other. Besides, we should examine ourselves critically as well. What bothers me is how often I hear anti-American tones in our society. We depend on each other. The Americans must understand this, and so must the Europeans.

SPIEGEL: These anti-American resentments can be heard above all in your party, the SPD.

Apel: This is wrong. They exist everywhere in society, though they are not representative of what our citizens really think.

SPIEGEL: At the SPD security policy congress a delegate said, to strong applause, that the SPD statutes do not say that he is obligated to exercise Nibelungen loyalty toward the United States.

Apel: The passage that Nibelungen loyalty cannot be demanded can be approved, to be sure. Nobody demands Nibelungen loyalty. Alliance of democratic states means: discussion, cooperation and joint action.

SPIEGEL: The Chancellor himself through his constant criticism of the Carter administration has contributed toward anti-American feelings in the Federal Republic.

Apel: I cannot remember any constant criticism by the Chancellor.

SPIEGEL: Should we quote?

Apel: I can recall highly intensive debates in the cabinet and also highly intensive talks with the Americans about the proper course toward insuring peace.

SPIEGEL: The Chancellor and the defense minister openly criticize the fact that the United States will not have enough soldiers in case of hostilities because it abolished general conscription after Vietnam. United States Undersecretary Komer justly replies: You Germans have too little ammunition, your supply depots will be empty before we can bring the first reservist across the Atlantic. It is our conclusion that NATO is "only conditionally ready for defense."

Apel: We have been affiliated with NATO for 25 years now, and in these 25 years so-called NATO crises occurred time and again which in reality were not crises.

SPIEGEL: We did not ask about an anniversary.

Apel: The charge that the ammunition stockpiles of all Europeans, and also of the Americans in Europe, are not enough for all branches of service is appropriate. This is why some more needs to be done in this respect.

SPIEGEL: Will you be getting the money?

Apel: Yes. Money for this purpose will be earmarked in the complementary budget. We are ready and willing to implement all the promises we have made, especially the long-term defense program to NATO. But then, you can work all this only step by step.

SPIEGEL: Whenever the United States in the past introduced general conscription it subsequently participated in wars, as it did in World War I and World War II.

Apel: I do not think that these historical parallels are permissible.

SPIEGEL: Is the Bundeswehr really the "best army in Prussian-German history" as the Chancellor says? Inspector General Juergen Brandt, we hear, this week at a commanding officers' meeting plans to draw a highly critical picture of the state of our army of conscripts.

Apel: It would obviously be wrong if I were to try to convey the impression that everything in the Bundeswehr was pure sunshine. But if we compare the Bundeswehr with other armies, then we make a good showing. But problems do exist, of course.

SPIEGEL: Could you be a bit more specific?

Apel: Surely the service burden is an important subject. In this respect we have allowed ourselves to be saddled with more and more new tasks in the past decades, with the personnel ceiling remaining unchanged. This is over now. As for the frustration and the lack of opportunities for promotion we will, I am sure, find ways of solving these problems in a modest way.

SPIEGEL: But the inspector general feels that these shortcomings increasingly jeopardize the action readiness of the Bundeswehr.

Apel: No, the Bundeswehr's readiness for action is not impaired. Despite great difficulties there is a great deal of idealism and the desire to perform among the soldiers.

SPIEGEL: Although opinion polls show that the conscripts do not know why they have to become soldiers?

Apel: It is indeed so that 90 percent of the conscripts when they are drafted know as good as nothing about defense and the armed forces. We must see to it that the young people who experience the state for the first time in the person of the noncommissioned officer, will not be disappointed. We will prolong and improve the training of noncoms. That will be a contribution, but it will not solve all problems.

SPIEGEL: You always say: We will. When the equipping of the Bundeswehr is involved, you casually list equipment that will be available only in the years to come? "Leopard-2" antitank helicopters, the fighter plane "Tornado," frigates. Do you actually know how these programs running into billions are supposed to be financed? Prices are running away from you.

Apel: When I say "we will," I want to make it clear that there is no static situation in which I could relax and lean back. The arms we have at present are quite modern and efficient....

SPIEGEL: ...The Bundeswehr still has armored personnel carriers and planes of the sixties, such as the disputed HS-30 and the "Starfighter."

Apel: Correct. But what we have at present such as, for example, the "Leopard 1," the new vehicles, the "Phantom," the torpedo boats of the navy, all this is a match for the other side and it is technically superior in part. The Warsaw Pact also does not modernize its equipment all at once. But I admit that the all-round renovation of the Bundeswehr is only now beginning.

SPIEGEL: And the financing?

Apel: We have no problem in paying for the arms systems that have been accepted by the Bundestag. But the planning reserves have become narrower. Some things in the category "nice to have" can no longer be bought.

SPIEGEL: When the troops receive the Leopard-2 the next tank has to be in the blueprint stage.

Apel: Correct. This is why we will discuss critically in the next 12 to 18 months the next arms generation. A simple continuation of the present trend can only end in a financial and military fiasco.

SPIEGEL: Does it mean that a "Leo-2" need not be followed by a "Leo-3." Do you want to bring up basic problems? Maybe it need not be a tank in the nineties but a much cheaper antitank missile, maybe no fighter plane anymore, but rather a missile costing one-tenth the price?

Apel: Since the nineties are involved, we must take the intellectual liberty of thinking in an unbiased way and to call into question everything that has been traditional so far. In saying this I know that it will never work without planes or tanks.

SPIEGEL: So there is still no unbiased thinking?

Apel: Surely, surely there will be. With regard to the next generation of armored personnel carriers, for example, we must discuss whether these armored personnel carriers can be wheeled vehicles because of our narrow network of streets, or whether they must be much more expensive vehicles on tracks. We must find an answer to the question: Do we need a new fighter plane in the nineties? Where will it be built? How will it be financed? Just the development costs of more than 10 billion [currency not mentioned] according to current prices cannot be placed in the defense budget.

SPIEGEL: Where else?

Apel: That belongs to the debate that must be held. If a development is necessary to preserve the military leg of the European aviation industry, it could be only within limits a task within the defense budget.

SPIEGEL: Whatever the government will do, doesn't the purchase of new arms necessarily crank up the arms race?

Apel: It cannot be disputed at all that every new arms generation will achieve a new military quality: more defense ability, more accuracy in hitting the target, more combat strength and more ability to survive....

SPIEGEL: ...And higher costs.

Apel: Unfortunately, it has been like this so far. And you are right in a central point: Arms control policy must try more and more strongly to limit future developments, because otherwise quantitative limitations will become possible but not qualitative ones.

SPIEGEL: You think that negotiations on blueprints will take place?

Apel: Under the assumption of rational further developments of world policy I see two developments. First, both pact systems come closer and closer to the limits of their own economic capabilities. Second, both pact systems will come more and more under pressure of the north-south conflict. So both pact systems will have to deal inevitably with arms control and implement it.

SPIEGEL: The defense minister as an optimist in a phase where world politics are becoming more and more unpredictable.

Apel: I admit that my perspective sounds rather utopian particularly today. But in the final analysis the hope of mankind lies here, otherwise all social systems indeed could be faced with the danger of arming themselves to death, let alone the explosive consequences of an arms race.

SPIEGEL: The Chancellor suggested to the Soviet Union that it not deliver to the troops and deploy the new SS-20 missiles, which are being produced under high pressure. He wants the East-West dialogue to get going again, without which the various hotbeds of crises in the world cannot be calmed down. Where does the Federal Government take the hop from with regard to Soviet insight and Soviet preparedness to compromise?

Apel: The Soviet Union has certainly underrated NATO's preparedness to reestablish a military balance if need be by closing the arms gap. Now we want to recall that we are serious about the offer to negotiate. We have time only until the end of 1983.

SPIEGEL: And then?

Apel: Then, if negotiations are unsuccessful, the new medium-range missiles of the Americans will be stationed in Western Europe. I think that the Soviet Union ought to begin the negotiations.

SPIEGEL: Two parties belong to negotiations; not merely Moscow but also Washington.

Apel: We must, therefore, tell our American friends, please, SALT II must be ratified; that is of central significance for the strategic balance in the world.

SPIEGEL: The question is still open whether the Chancellor has received signals indicating a compromising attitude on the part of the Soviets.

Apel: I know nothing about that.

SPIEGEL: Is the NATO strategy of gradual deterrence still working? Can we rely on the United States also in the future?

Apel: The NATO strategy and the alliance with the United States are not subjects of discussion; the means--military, economic and human means--with which we can fulfill the missions that have been set for us are what is debated.

SPIEGEL: But this is closely connected with strategy.

Apel: It certainly is closely connected with strategy and therefore it reaches into the alliance.

SPIEGEL: If we understand you correctly, you do not want to call into question anything basic. It means that also in the future we will have to march together with the Americans--which we are presently experiencing--and make every about turn together with them.

Apel: NATO's making decisions has changed decisively compared with the fifties. The United States, for example, has widely adhered to European demands in the debate on closing the arms gap, for example. Particularly, our demand has been accepted that an arms control offer be linked to the decision to close the arms gap. Agreement was also achieved on deployment problems and timing. One or two decades ago the United States would have told us what it needed, and the West Europeans would have accepted it. That is different now.

SPIEGEL: And yet over and over again the Americans confront us with accomplished facts, such as the Olympic boycott and the Iranian sanctions. The Americans rap on the table and we must obey.

Apel: That is rather wrong. As regards the Olympic Games, for example, we have always said that the Soviet Union must create the conditions for a peaceful festival of sportsmen.

SPIEGEL: That was not always said by the Federal Government, but only since the American President announced his ultimatum.

Apel: We made our decision when we considered it opportune.

SPIEGEL: Regardless of how you look at it, the matter remains as it is: the decision as to whether Europe will live or die in nuclear fire lies with one single man, the American President.

Apel: The decision with regard to what will become of Europe lies primarily in the hands of many states which will continue detente policy, and thus also in the hand of the Federal Republic of Germany. Second, it lies in our ability to safeguard military balance, and particularly to be conventionally as strong as possible, because conventional deterrence is most credible. And eventually it also lies in relying [rueckgriff] on nuclear deterrence, which indeed must remain in the hands of one man. But also here NATO is practicing new dimensions of European involvement.

SPIEGEL: Can cooperation in target planning at some time become codetermination with regard to action?

Apel: Codetermination with regard to the nuclear policy of the alliance: Yes. Codetermination with regard to the final use of these arms: there are agreed on consultation mechanisms in this respect.

SPIEGEL: Will there be, in the future at least, a veto right so that we will not be hit by the bombs of our own ally?

Apel: These are abstract and hypothetical questions it would not be proper to discuss them in public.

SPIEGEL: Mr Minister, we thank you for this talk.

CSO: 3103

STRAUSS VIEWS PRECARIOUS WORLD SITUATION

DW021125 Munich BAYERNKURIER in German 3 May 80 p 1

[Article by Franz Josef Strauss, CSU chairman, Bavarian minister president, and chancellor candidate of the CDU/CSU: "Time of Crucial Test"]

[Text] Alliances must pass their crucial tests in times of crisis. When the political weather is fine it is simple and without any risk to talk about lasting conformity and harmony in solemn speeches on the occasion of festive meetings, to manifest identity of interests and views, to assure each other how devoid of problems the relations are between one another, the Atlantic Alliance, the political and military core of the free world, at the moment is under the test on the trial stand of the hardest world-political challenge. This is what forms the essence of a working alliance: that all members are challenged if one member is in distress. At the present time this is doubly true for the relationship between the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, North America and Europe, because the endurance test to which the American partner has been subjected also constitutes an endurance test for the European partners.

The United States has taken, for nearly 6 months, the act of violence of Teheran which is at odds with international law. Washington has left no stone unturned to solve the hostage drama through negotiations, to achieve the release of the 50 captives through diplomatic and political measures. In doing so President Carter and his administration demonstrated maximum patience and in their gestures and acts went to the limit of what the United States could be expected to do, and as some people believe, even further than that.

This is why Carter has decided to act, this is why he dared the military liberation attempt. The venture has failed. The U.S. President must bear the heavy responsibility for it. Those who know better now, who have always been the smart alecks, who shake their heads in objection, who chide Carter and criticize--they should ask themselves whether they would not have broken into loudest jubilation of hero veneration if the liberation attempt would have succeeded.

Those who should ask themselves this question most of all in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Europe are the ones who are taking the events in the salt desert of Tabas that led to the cancellation of the rescue mission as a welcome opportunity to let the distance to the alliance partner America grow a bit wider again. The offended tone which the Bonn government spokesman used directly after the abortive mission became known, because the Federal Government had not been informed at all about Carter's intentions, point into this direction.

It would have been at odds with any political and military experience had Carter been supposed to inform the European allies about his plan, or even ask their advice, prior to the U.S. liberation attempt. For one thing, he would have remained without an answer for quite some time, what with the well-known European loss for answers in situations of world-political crisis, and in the end probably would have received a number of respectively contradictory bits of advice; on the other hand, and in this case the probability is much more than mere assumption, planned details could have been derived from the world press in good time, meaning prior to the liberation action.

At this very time Europe, and also the Federal Republic of Germany, has a particularly marked alliance obligation toward the United States, but also toward itself--the violent act of the taking of hostages as well as the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan are not at all solely American problems: they are no less, and by some of their effects even with greater emphasis, European problems. Thus it was just a fatal political shortsightedness which could have induced people to attack Carter now and to indulge in selfrighteous, sardonic and therefore also unjustified criticism. Especially at this time the American people and the U.S. Government need our human and political solidarity.

But in this respect words will not be enough. What we must have in mind in the points in which we can demonstrate solidarity in practice is not a narrowminded advantage of the moment but our long-term community with the United States which is decisive for our survival in freedom.

In these days we have special cause to remind ourselves, and especially also our young generation, of this community. It was 25 years ago that the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO. By this step, which the CDU and the CSU enforced against the embittered resistance of the SPD, our freedom has been insured ever since. The threat, as whose consequence the Western alliance embarged, our decision for a German defense contribution, for the establishment of the Bundeswehr, and for its equipment with modern arms, has not decreased since then.

The times of the West's military preponderance are past. The balance is no longer guaranteed everywhere, a Soviet preponderance taking shape now in militarily decisive sectors. It was not just the occupation of Afghanistan which has proved that Moscow is determined to use its military potential whose offensive components in the ground, air and naval forces have been enhanced during the past decade more rapidly than ever before.

Exaggerated armament [ueber-ruestung] of the Soviet Union, which is as little in accordance with justified Soviet need for security as it is with the economic strength of the country, is being used ruthlessly and intentionally as a means of political pressure and paralyzation vis-a-vis the West.

The monstrous event early this week speaks for itself: the Soviet Union of all states which is present with its arms and its policy everywhere on the globe where there is war and crisis, revolution and aggression, charges the Federal Republic of Germany with "military ambitions!" The aggressor of Afghanistan of all powers dares to make the slanderous statement, disseminated by its state agency NOVOSTI, that "in Western Germany are forces, people and even whole organizations which foster plans like half a century ago to subordinate the neighbor states to themselves, to distribute Europe in a different way and to establish a firm footing in the oil-producing countries."

After this "analysis" which would exactly reflect Moscow's plans if the term "Western Europe" were replaced by Soviet Union, comes the clear threat according to which the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany would be a Soviet target for a nuclear strike in case of a conflict.

As a threadbare pretext for the Soviet armament bristling with arms, which stands in no connection with reality and truth, and the monstrous attempt to exert pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany, Moscow takes the fact that we have in agreement with the other NATO partners decided to close the arms gap, which at least within some time is supposed to establish a military balance in Europe.

The Soviet blackmailing attempt shows the difference between facts and the appearance of a detente policy pursued for a decade by the Brandt and Schmidt government. After 10 years when our people were told day in and day out that only the SPD can make peace more secure, while the union parties are a security risk or even a danger of war, there stands the undisguised Soviet threat of a nuclear strike against the Federal Republic of Germany.

The "peace spokesman" Helmut Schmidt has become the chancellor of a war threat and of talks about a crisis. The SPD still is making the shabby intentional attempt which is contradicted by truth, of presenting itself to the public as the only guarantor of peace, while simultaneously pretending that the union is a war risk. This leads to particularly tasteless election campaign faux pas, where the party of Brandt, Schmidt and Wehner exploited the sad fate of war widows and orphans for election campaign purposes, trying to thus make the perfidious impression that in case of a CDU election victory a similarly mortal fate would threaten Germany. The voter is supposed to be intimidated that way. But it is the wrong socialist detente policy of the Brandt and Schmidt government that leads one into the fatal alternative of capitulation or war.

The Soviet threat has taken place although always greater parts of the SPD, called by the American public for good reason the "Moscow ring," were practicing a policy of chumming up to the Kremlin, of playing down the dangers threatening us, of window dressing Soviet acts of force, which were oriented more by the wishes of Moscow than by following own German or European interests. These are the same SPD forces which, unmolested and not reprimanded by Federal Chancellor Schmidt, for a long time have been pursuing the gradual detachment of the Federal Republic from the United States of America.

With its threat Moscow has brutally demonstrated how it reacts to such submissive approach. The SPD was and is unable to understand the always valid political and historical experience that an imbalance of political and historical experience that an imbalance of political and military power, that is preponderance of the Soviet Union, cannot make peace more secure, that it must make peace insecure. We in the union parties must see to it that German policy will again return to the basis of political reality, that it will be oriented by the standards of historical experience, that it will pursue doggedly and with a long wind those aims which alone can guarantee our survival in security and peace.

This change in European politics is doubly necessary because we must again give new impulses to European policy and the policy of the Atlantic Alliance with regard to a determined policy of safeguarding peace.

The coincidence of both events could not be more obvious and alarming: while the Soviet Union threatens the Federal Republic of Germany and thus the core piece of free Europe with the possible use of nuclear arms, the Luxembourg summit conference of state and government chiefs of the European community member countries fails because one could not agree on agricultural prices, fishery zones and European community contributions.

The West and thus also the Federal Republic of Germany are in a time of dramatic test. A change of thinking is necessary, a new orientation of German and European politics. We want to and we can make our contribution in this respect. The election day this fall will be an important station on that way.

CSO: 3103

BAHR INTERVIEWED ON FRG-GDR RELATIONS

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 20 Mar 80 p 3

[Interview with Egon Bahr, West German foreign minister, by correspondent Guenther Walter; date and place not given]

[Text] When the first German summit meeting took place 10 years ago with the meeting between Willy Brandt and Willi Stoph in Erfurt, an era of negotiations began which, with all its difficulties, led to tangible successes--for both sides. Has "Afghanistan" destroyed the East-West German search for detente?

VORWAERTS: Ten years after the meeting in Erfurt the policy of detente is threatened by a cold front. Does this signify for the two German states that after the policy of small advances the most we can hope for in future is to avoid regression?

Bahr: Ten years after the meeting in Erfurt a situation has arisen in which the two German states are interested in preserving what has been achieved in these years. It's an enormous amount. At that time we had a situation in which we made a start by connecting ten telephone lines from East Berlin to West Berlin. If the current situation is seen from that starting point, we have achieved a tremendous amount. And if East Berlin and Bonn now believe that what has been gained must be preserved, that too is a totally different situation compared with the period we experienced 10 years ago and even afterwards in East Berlin, when there was mistrust, cautiousness and even moves to slow down this development.

If one were to say today that we could be sure of avoiding regression, that would be a great deal; the reason is, of course, that detente as a whole, even between the two German states, depends on the overall climate between the two great powers. I hope that it will be possible to do more than just avoid regression.

VORWAERTS: The signals from the Leipzig Fair probably surprised a number of people. Is that more than just the understandable efforts of the GDR to use the economic interests of the FRG economy for as long as possible for solving its own economic problems?

Bahr: I have indicated with due circumspection that the GDR initiated the developments of the last 10 years with obvious caution and restraint. Now being able to say that the GDR is continuing this policy out of conviction and in its own interests, and that it is no longer an impeding factor, that is a noteworthy change. This means that the GDR has its own interests. It's the most natural thing in the world. Detente as a whole can only work if the interests of both sides are considered. Each side has to get something out of it, and each side has to gain a little. For the GDR it is in large part--but not exclusively--an economic matter; but the GDR has also made great efforts to achieve a balance in intra-German trade. That is in our interest as well, and it has always been the case; even when the wall was being built, the CDU did not say that we had to suspend intra-German trade. There are economic interests on both sides, but political ones as well that go beyond them.

VORWAERTS: The CDU/CSU has declared that clinging to detente is the government's way of maintaining the lie of detent's survival. So, naturally the situation of the two Germanies is at the center of the discussions. Do you think that the impression of detent's survival can still be created in view of the balance of goods and services of the two Germanies in recent years?

Bahr: The Union parties are not very original on this question. They fought against detente and now they claim they want to continue detente in principle, if they could. Except that they want a "slightly different" policy. More realistic, as they put it, although we have pursued a very realistic one, and although Mr Strauss, in his communique after his talks with Mr Ceausescu, talked about a policy of detente without any qualifying adjective. That is not very interesting, especially since it completely omits one point: the Union is ignoring or overlooking the fact that the United States is just as interested as we are in detente, that is, insuring peace, preventing a third World War, and it also wants to continue this policy.

The relations of the two Germanies must be seen in this context as something that has been advantageous to both states, but that has brought one advantage to us in particular. The situation between the two German states cannot be described accurately if one ignores the fact that for the first time a legal basis for German civilian traffic to and from Berlin has resulted from the discussions.

If there are questions about the survival of detente, basically the question being asked is whether anyone is prepared to challenge the Four Power Agreement or the Transit Agreement or to doubt its survival. I hope that the government, coalition and opposition alike, are in agreement on this point--together with the three powers--that there can be no altering it. And if nothing had come of the entire policy of detente other than the above-mentioned agreement in favor of Berlin, it would have been worth it to make the agreement.

VORWAERTS: The relations of the two German states have always been regarded as the test of detente. Consequently as the vulnerable spot. Do you think it is possible that at this "weak" spot a special model for a balance of interests, as it were below the level of superpower discussions, can survive or even develop?

Bahr: It is my impression that interest in continuing detente exists not only between East Berlin and Bonn. I think that the two German states just reflect what can be observed equally well in Paris or Warsaw, in Rome or Budapest. What is new is that the countries in Europe--between the two superpowers, if you like--have developed a special awareness of the positive results of detente, and so they are all interested in continuing it. They are also trying to make this clear to the two leading powers. It must be added that this has been achieved without a questioning of individual loyalties within the respective alliances. This is a great, noteworthy achievement of the last 10 years. There is another unique aspect to the relations between the two Germanies in this situation: what is at stake for the two German states is far more comprehensive and important than for the other countries; they had more catching up to do than the others.

VORWAERTS: You are trying to say that this European special interest has been equally important on both sides?

Bahr: Precisely.

VORWAERTS: Ten years after Erfurt another German summit meeting was scheduled to take place. It was postponed. In your opinion, should it take place under any circumstances, even if nothing very exciting can be expected?

Bahr: In my opinion there has been too much public speculation about this meeting. I think it is right, necessary and natural for it to take place if circumstances permit. The statements about it that have been issued in East Berlin and Bonn show that both participatns see it this way and want it.

VORWAERTS: Experiences in recent weeks have shown--and not for the first time--that the Western Allies' awareness of the unique situation of the Federal Republic is not acute enough to prevent misunderstandings about certain independent actions. Are there gaps in the way they are described or in explaining them adquately?

Bahr: I would prefer not to use the word independent actions, but rather the pursuit of justifiable self-interests--in concert with the allies. We cannot reproach our allies with something that we see happening in our own country. In the FRG there is an idea--one that exists even more strongly among our Western Allies, and perhaps even among many of our Eastern partners--that the FRG is a perfectly normal state. We lead a perfectly normal existence as a state. We even exist as a particularly stable state. Our economy, our currency and our working democracy demonstrate a high degree of stability.

What is ignored is that we are not a normal state in our origins and our history. It is overlooked that the FRG is a result of the East-West conflict, a result of the division of Germany, that a state is involved that still does not have a peace treaty. Without this background, the peculiarities of detente and our special interest in it cannot be understood. To that extent I agree with the question. A few people in the FRG, our friends abroad, have to be reminded occasionally that the FRG leads a normal existence, but that its origins are unique. It will certainly never lose the latter. I hope that it will retain the former.

9581
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SPD SAID TO BE WORRIED ABOUT SUCCESSES OF 'GREENS'

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "The SPD Is Worried About the Success of the Greens. Brandt: A Matter of Importance; G[illegible] Rather Skeptical"]

[Text] my. Bonn, 30 March--Two weeks after the Landtag elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and a week after the Greens' party congress in Saarbruecken, the concern about losses resulting from this new organization is ever more clearly dominating the discussion, especially among Social Democrats. The fear that the Greens will actually show up in more Landtags, or even in the Bonn Parliament, plays much less of a role than the apprehension that a relatively strong vote for the Greens in the Bundestag elections could turn the latter into an "assistance function" for the establishment of a CDU-CSU government under Strauss.

At two Land party congresses last weekend--in Bremen and in the Saarland--the SPD once again declared war on the Greens and undertook new efforts to entice away from them young voters in particular. Without naming the Greens by name, SPD Chairman Brandt admonished "that we attend to those matters of content which help the protest groups along the road to success and which occupy many citizens outside of the organized groups and also determine the way they vote." In an article in the SPD members' periodical SOZIALDEMOKRAT-MAGAZIN, Brandt writes, furthermore, that the SPD does not close its mind to the widespread displeasure about some manifestations of industrial society. "However, our entire responsibility prohibits solutions which are too simple and too onesided. One must not flatter special interest groups merely to gain their votes. But neither must one give up on an important issue because or if it has been brought up by special groups."

Skepticism about the Green movement's views was voiced last weekend by its cofounder, Bundestag deputy Gruhl, who had left the CDU. In a talk with "Radio Bremen," Gruhl who, primarily because of programmatic differences within the organization, declined in Saarbruecken election to the Federal executive committee, posed the question "whether our ecological party, as we call the Greens, did not enter the political arena prematurely." The most recent party congress in Saarbruecken, with its controversies, has undeniably reduced the Greens' chances in the Landtag elections in Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia, which Gruhl also deems as a preliminary decision for the Bundestag elections.

Stoiber Counts on Split Votes

CSU Secretary General Stoiber sees a good chance for a CDU/CSU victory in the Bundestag elections on 5 October, largely because "a greater potential for split votes, from the Greens to the Buergerpartei [Citizens' Party] will have the effect that the absolute plurality of the mandates can be attained with fewer votes than in 1976." Stoiber, who last weekend spoke at an event organized by the Lower Franconia CSU in Hoechberg (Wuerzburg rural district), warned of course also of dangers which he sees if views about the allegedly small differences between the parties were to gain ground.

Bremen's SPD Calls the Greens "One-Eyed."

The Social Democrats in Bremen are paying increasing attention to the Greens who, as they see it, could bring about a change in government in Bonn in the forthcoming Bundestag elections. Looking towards Baden-Wuerttemberg, government chief Koschnick said at a Land party congress that the Greens have not been only an "occupational accident" in Bremen, but also a "citizens' protest movement" with participation of former Social Democrats. The reelected SPD Land chairman Kunick called the Greens "one-eyed" persons who "do not know what unemployment tastes like, who deny the reality of economic relationships" and whose alternative "in reality is named Strauss." Kunick asked the Federal government to implement, over the opposition of the CDU Land governments in Hannover and Kiel, the realization of a joint Federal-Land investment program to solve economic problems. The SPD Land chairman warned his own party members against an "expectation posture" of individual and social groups who have made it "more and more into a philosophy of life," and against an expansion of civil service employees. Within the framework of "solidary redistribution," Kunick welcomed the labor union demands for base-amounts at collective bargaining sessions.

9011
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COMMENTATOR EXPRESSES SKEPTICISM ON PROSPECTS OF GREENS

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "Right After the Beginning, the End?"]

[Text] Has the Green spring, which seemed to have dawned at the Landtag elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, come to an end already? Many professional observers lean towards this view, and they base it on the course of the Saarbruecken party congress. There, the Greens showed what confused individuals they are, and nothing can come of individuals such as these, because nothing should come of them. But why should not a party which wants to be different from the others and proclaims a life style different from the usual one, also hold its party congress in a different manner. Why, for instance, should a party such as the Greens not have a "place of relaxation" ready for delegates who are getting tired, with all kinds of playful tittle-tattle, as it would appear to the conventional observer? The "relaxation centers" at party congresses of the usual kind, which are held in fixed-up beer halls are surely not the only correct form.

The SPD and the FDP, who have plenty of contact with groups whose demands are similar to those decided on by the Greens in Saarbruecken, from economic planning to provocatively total emancipation, are striking up victory songs about the Greens' imminent political demise. This is a commonplace political tactic. It is feared that the Greens might take votes away, especially from the SPD and the FDP. The eruptions of hatred against the Greens, especially on the part of leading SPD politicians, reveal the party's fear for its power and prevent effective struggle against this competition.

Those who want to be "green," see very little difference between Schmidt and Strauss. Even the "leftists" in the Green party, who to a great extent set the tone at the Saarbruecken congress, did not enter into a "Schmidt or Strauss" debate. Even without it, they succeeded in pulling the majority of the party congress over to their side. This can be explained superficially only by the fact that the "multi-colored" and "alternatives" have joined the Greens in large numbers, after open conquest, tried before at the Karlsruhe party congress, had failed. The nonpolitical mind of many Greens, whose leftwing slogans mean nothing because they believe themselves in possession of a higher truth, has furthered the inclination to go along with proposals which can be interpreted as criticism of the system. They know that they must go beyond the narrowly circumscribed sphere of opposition to atomic energy and of ecology, if they want to become a "party." But they do not know how this transformation, viewed by many Greens with apprehension, should manifest itself. Consequently, formulation offers from left-wingers--which is where they usually come from--are gladly accepted. The attempt on the part of farmer, Springmann, and others to lead the party back to the ecological starting point is thus a logical reaction, but one without effect.

Here, the real internal tension of the Greens becomes apparent. When they were getting ready to form a party, they were the political expression of a definite interest. This was elevated to a generality: ecology was to be the answer to all critical problems. Since this obviously was inadequate and also called forth the ridicule of the "old parties," it was as it were specialized into the general; deviation from the usual was enough. Thus came about the in part absurd answers to current political questions: for instance, unilateral disarmament as effective defense against the Soviet threat and "social defense" as a measure, should their own faith in peacefulness not disperse possible Soviet aggressive longings.

Since the peoples' parties are becoming ever less elegant in their slalom race around the little banners of special interests, the Green Party for its part is venturing into an attempt to elevate and alienate its special (and defensible) interest into a generality. In so doing the new party is disrupted, it loses some credibility, and becomes similar to its competitors, without at the same time being endowed with their routine. Over this, the Green "movement," as it calls itself, loses its elan, and so this attempt to break the monopoly of the established parties may also fail once again.

This of course will not come about very fast. However absurd the party program adopted at Saarbruecken may be: the Greens will profit from the aversion also of its followers to read party programs. The Greens thrive from the feeling prevalent particularly among younger people that the world is not as good as the adults, in a state of mutual jubilant back-patting, assure one another it is. This position has moral implications, but is rooted also in satiation and goes hand in hand with matter-of-course acceptance of welfare and security. Denied is the insight that both demand daily repeated efforts. Thus the Greens are getting ready to take a fatal step towards the model of the "people's party," by pushing aside these connections in favor of an ubiquitous progressiveness. In this manner, they are passing by the very readiness to sacrifice from which they emanated. It is this failure, not a chaotic party congress or a ludicrous program, that may be fatal for the Greens.

9011
CSO: 3103

PS CONTROVERSY OVER ROCARD PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

Francois Mitterrand Reaction

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Mar 80 p 23

[Article: "Francois Mitterrand at the 'Forum' Radio Monte Carlo: A Homogeneous Government if We Are Forced into It"]

[Text] Interviewed on Thursday, 28 February 1980, in Bordeaux for the "Forum" of Radio Monte Carlo to be broadcast next day at 1900 hours, Francois Mitterrand spoke of the meeting of the executive committee of the PS [Socialist Party] scheduled for Saturday, 1 March 1980, as well as the declarations of Michel Rocard on Channel 2.

The first secretary of the PS first indicated that Michel Rocard "was free to make his case before his party" and that Rocard has finally considered himself to be released from the promise that he had made in Metz not to run against the first secretary and, according to Mitterrand, "not to declare his candidacy before knowing my own intentions." Then the first secretary mentioned the various factions making up the PS which he had urged in 1971 to rally within a "large mass organization," stressing the inclusion among the factions of "the dissident wing of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] including Michel Rocard." Mitterrand noted: "My own role is to be the one who safeguards all the chances of a far-reaching unity so that the PS may emerge from our country's history as the one who returned socialism to France."

Mentioning the procedure for nominating the Socialist Party candidate, Francois Mitterrand said: "It was decided that the candidate for the presidency of the French Republic would be chosen following consultations among all the activists. If one of the candidates fails to secure an absolute majority, a special national congress will make the decision, it being understood that in any case this special national congress will be held in order to complete the selection and, at the same time, publicize the designation of our candidate. This procedure, which was requested from us at the time by Pierre Mauroy and which I approved, is the one which applies to us today. It would really be a pity for the Socialist Party to have only two good candidates. There is a lot of available talent.

"I exclude completely the hypothesis that the question of the Socialist Party candidacy can be settled on the sly by two or three individuals meeting in a secret caucus, thus replacing the will of the Socialist activists. This alternative is excluded. That a unanimous choice should emerge in the party is possible, but I know nothing about that."

Questioned about the prospect of a single-party government in case of the Socialist candidate's victory, Francois Mitterrand reiterated the Socialist Party's faithfulness to the strategy of the unity of the left. He added: "Only here, when one speaks of unity it is necessary that the others accept the concept. And we have observed that for some time now, a little over 2 years, our prinicpal partner in the unity of the left, the French Communist Party [PCF], has no longer wanted to participate in it. It trampled over this unity before breaking it. Accordingly, it is not possible to do everythink in that respect, considering that it is a nonexistent political condition.

"Thus, answering a question that I was asked (by the newspaper FRANCE-SOIR), I merely said that the strategy of the Socialist Party is the one that I have just mentioned, so our goal is indeed that one, and if the French Communist Party were to turn it down, continued to do so, it is up to that party to answer for it before its voters, before the people of the left. Accordingly, homogeneous government is an alternative that I do not eliminate if we are forced to it. Socialists are not people who back off from the responsibilities that they seek."

On the Basis of Joint Program Choices

Going on the premise of "at least a numerical victory of the left," the first secretary of the PS noted: "Not only do we wish to develop the vast popular rally that is necessary for victory to achieve the goals of the unity of the left but also, in that framework, the Socialist Party will continue at the governmental level to fulfill its responsibility...It is not a matter, then, of envisioning an agreement of a Socialist Party with a minority left and becoming the support of the parties of the right. That is naturally excluded in my mind. When you ask me with whom [we shall form an alliance], I on my part know nothing. In addition, allow me to comment: how immaterial it is, really, to engage in this discussion that I have touched on in the interview. The topic did not even seem important to me."

Francois Mitterrand then asserted that if it found itself in a situation "that it did not desire," the Socialist Party would govern "on the basis of the political choices which were those of the joint program, subject to changes dictated by the passage of time, and which were detailed by the Socialist plan."

After indicating that it would be "very difficult to make a government out of the PS and even [illegible] fficult to make PSU a government," Mitterrand opined that there are "different" political lines within the Socialist Party, adding however that "in the interval between congresses it is completely permissible for each to seek a common line."

Francois Mitterrand then noted that he is the first secretary of the PS, "which means," he added, "that whatever my personal aspirations in 1981, as long as I shall be the first secretary, it will be up to me and no one else to interpret before public opinion the wishes of the Socialist Party, or up to any other individual whom I may designate."

Finally, Mitterrand criticized at length "the failure of the Raymond Barre government" before reproaching the French President "with having made up his mind that the less fuss we have with the Soviet Union the better it is for coming in to the stretch, as it is known in sports contests, that is, the presidential election of 1981." "It angers me that considerations of this type can bear on the presidential election," Mitterrand said.

Anti-Rocard Counter-Offensive

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Mar 80 pp 1, 23

[Article by Jean-Marie Colombani: "Socialist Party Executive Organizes Counter-Offensive Against Michel Rocard"]

[Text] The executive committee of the Socialist Party, meeting on Saturday, 1 March 1980, in Paris should have as its focus the counter-offensive of the leaders of the majority wing of that party following the quasiofficial announcement on Monday evening, 25 February 1980, on Channel 2 of the presidential ambitions of Michel Rocard. By sketching what his own options would be if he were to be nominated, the deputy from Yvelines blew the starting whistle of his campaign in the Socialist Party and public opinion.

On Friday Francois Mitterrand already answered Michel Rocard by questioning, in particular, whether there were only "two possible candidates" in the Socialist Party and by reasserting forcefully his prerogatives as first secretary of the PS. Mitterrand once again mentioned the possibility of a "homogeneous" Socialist government if the French Communist Party persists in refusing unity with the PS.

From the day after the televised interview during which Michel Rocard declared himself to be "ready" to be a candidate in the presidential election of 1981, the heads of the majority faction in the PS have been jubilant over this "clarification." This means that they feel that Rocard having shown his hand, it is now possible for them to counter-attack without fearing discredit within the party. What is involved, once again, is to try to push Rocard to the sidelines and to make it seem that only the first secretary can be a "consensus candidate."

Mitterrand considers on his part that Rocard has "followed the advice" that he [Mitterrand] had given him when, in December 1979, Mitterrand had released Rocard from his promise not to be a candidate against the first secretary. The deputy from Yvelines, however, has mentioned nothing about that, limiting himself to stating that in the Socialist Party there are only two possible candidates, himself and Mitterrand, and not excluding the idea that he is "the more effective" of the two.

The fact that the first secretary has indicated "that there can be, that there will be several candidates" reflects the resolve of the majority faction of the PS to blunt by this means the candidacy of Michel Rocard. In the face of other challengers, it would undoubtedly be difficult for Rocard to obtain the absolute majority of votes required at the conclusion of the balloting by the sections and federations [of the Socialist Party].

This assertion of the first secretary can also reflect a hesitation regarding his chances of being a candidate himself for the third time.

Whatever the case, the heads of the majority faction, bound by common hostility toward Rocard, seem to consider that the path of confrontation is now open. They have three types of arguments likely to fuel a counter-offensive beginning on Saturday before the executive committee. Involved are considerations of procedure as well as elements of an institutional and strategic nature.

The procedure for nominating a candidate anticipates the decisive intervention of the activists (LE MONDE of 28 February 1980). Rocard having declined the idea of primary elections and looked to a "consensus," Lionel Jospin, member of the national secretariat, noted on Thursday, 28 February, in LE MATIN that there could not be a candidate "co-opted" by the elected representatives. Similarly, Mitterrand indicated that there could not be a candidate "nominated on the sly."

More significant has been the institutional discussion. Michel Rocard is reproached with moving away from the traditional analysis of the Socialists on this subject, one favorable to a rebalancing of the branches of government in the direction of parliament and, according to Jospin's expression, "of ratifying the institutions of the Fifth Republic." Especially, the partisans of Mitterrand pointed out that the first secretary has come out in favor of a dissolution of the National Assembly in case of victory of the Socialist candidate. Rocard, invoking the historical precedent represented by the Popular Front and basing himself on "the logic of the institutions," has not favored such a measure, preferring to place his bets on a dynamics of presidential power and on the victory that it would not fail to bring about, according to him, in the legislative elections of 1983. "If that is not a fantasy," Lionel Jospin noted, "it would mean that in the last analysis we could govern jointly with the right." Mitterrand upped the ante by indicating that it is not possible "to make France progress by governing with a center which is the right."

The Two Absurdities

In fact, Rocard who characterized as "nonsense" the idea of a rapprochement with the right is more of the opinion that if he were to propose a series of reforms during the "grace period" that would be available to him the right would be obliged to censure the government, thus provoking a return to the ballots under favorable conditions for the left. According to him it is indeed better to confront the right with the need to reject generous reforms in order to give a more positive twist to the electoral campaign of the left.

The critique of the presidential system, which is based on the idea that government emanates from a parliamentary majority and not from the head of state, and the plan to dissolve the National Assembly in case of victory of the Socialist Party candidate are theses which are common to the partisans of Francois Mitterrand and CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research, and Education]. They will be the strong points of the document which is slated to be discussed on Saturday morning during the meeting of the national secretariat after negotiation between the friends of the first secretary and those of Jean-Pierre Chevenement. The latter are sold on the idea that a Socialist Party president would have as his initial task to organize legislative elections to create the conditions for a government of the unity of the left including the PS and the PCF "with identical rights and duties," according to the formula of the joint program of the left.

The plan adopted in this field is a function of the strategy being advocated. On this score the cleavage between the majority and the minorities is less distinct than the friends of Mitterrand would like, whereas the majority itself is divided.

Lionel Jospin is getting ready to denounce two "absurdities" in his activities report as he has done in LE MATIN. The first originates, according to him, from CERES when it suggests, notable through the voice of Didier Motchane (see LE MONDE of 23 February 1980), that if the PCF turns down all the advances and proposals of the Socialist Party, the latter will have to give up. The other "absurdity" in the eyes of the party's Number Two man consists in excluding as of now the idea that the communists should and can participate in the government. That, according to him, is Michel Rocard's attitude.

In this field the reservations attributed to the minorities override the letter of their positions. But is what is involved, perhaps, if not to mask, then at least to minimize the gradual slide of the "Metz line" toward views closer to those that the members of the minority factions had defended before the congress? The fact remains that Mitterrand confirms that the Socialists would opt for a "homogeneous government" if they were obliged to do so by the attitude of the PCF. Rocard had indicated in substance: "Let's take note of the new line of the PCF and let us get ready to govern with all those who will commit themselves to the options proposed by the Socialist candidate."

On his part Pierre Mauroy hastens to determine that the first secretary is advocating a line heretofore defended by the members of the minority faction. But the mayor of Lille expresses regret that Mitterrand is not prepared to draw from it all the inferences regarding the makeup of the executive. Mandated by his faction, meeting in December 1979 in Epinay-sur-Seine, to secure from this executive, agreement to negotiate a return to the unity of the party, Mauroy is getting ready to concede the failure of his attempts to effect a rally.

In the majority faction a member of the national secretariat dismissed CERES and Michel Rocard. In an interview published on Friday, 29 February 1980, by LA CROIX, the deputy form Paris excluded two moves that he attributed to the deputy from Yvelines: "To govern with the right by sweetening the governing principles of the PS, and envisioning solely the prospect of a single-party government." He also shut out the possibility "of linking in mechanical manner the exercise of power by the Socialist Party to the presence of communist ministers," as according to him Didier Motchane had done. Mr Quiles added that if the Socialist Party candidate won the election, he would owe the PCF "a contract of government." "If the French Communist Party refuses," he added, "we shall govern with all those who find our program congenial."

Other leaders of the party's majority wing such as Jean Poperen admit more explicitly that it is not sufficient to "hold on tight," as the motion approved at the Metz congress indicated. The deputy from Rhone considers that a leaf has been turned, that of the programatic agreement with the PCF. Jean Poperen feels that it is now necessary to set new goals and obtain from the PCF more formal commitments than those that could be underwritten through the joint program in the field of international relations and respect for human rights. And on the subject of elections he also appeals to the notion of a "contract of government" and in a way suggests the preliminaries necessary to any new agreement with the communists.

Two Electoral Concepts

No matter how vague the differences separating the friends of Mitterrand from those of Mauroy and Rocard and despite the reality of the divergences between CERES and some of the heads of the majority wing of the PS, the executive committee should enable this majority to impose a relationship of power favorable to it.

It will distinguish itself from Rocard by noting that in Mitterrand's comments the idea that the Socialists can govern alone appears only as an alternative stemming from the failure of the proposals that a Socialist president should address to the French Communist Party on the day after the elections, whereas Rocard now acts only in terms of this sole prospect and excludes any idea of negotiations with the PCF.

In fact, two electoral ideas confront each other. For Jean Poperen, for example, the divergence with Rocard bears on the need to dispute the field with the communists because the fate of the Socialist candidate will depend first of all on the result of the "trial by strength" in which the PS will engage the PCF before the first round of the balloting and therefore of the gap which will separate the two candidates of the left. This is indeed the attitude of Francois Mitterrand, whose privileged target is now Georges Marchais, as was indicated by the discussion on the motions of Communist and Socialist censure on Wednesday, 27 February 1980, at the National Assembly. The endeavors of the PS committee charged with studying the party's relations with the PCF have incidentally been reactivated with a view to the elaboration of a report slated to better equip the Socialist activists in the present dispute. As for Lionel Jospin's report, it reiterates the "lies" of Georges Marchais.

In contrast, Michel Rocard is less concerned with the communists and refuses to fuel the polemic, explaining that the friends of Georges Marchais themselves excite anticommunism, and seems to favor other targets than the electorate of the PCF, targets in the center left.

In the same vein, the majority wing of the PS and especially CERES assert that it is necessary to reassert a resolve to "break" with capitalism. Mitterrand has noted incidentally that if it has the possiblity, the Socialist Party "will govern on the basis of the political options of the joint program."

The deputy from Yvelines [Rocard] has noted on his part that he "promises little" and stresses the length and breadth of the transformation processes that it is necessary to initiate.

It is obviously possible to note as Mitterrand has done the "immaterial" nature of these discussions. Indeed, few are they who believe today that a Socialist Party victory is possible in 1981. Already now the tactics of all the factions are dominated by the prospect of the post-Mitterrand era. But to present a candidate and act as though he will be nominated seems to be the best way to secure control of the party at the time of the congress which will follow the presidential elections whatever the outcome. Under these conditions the strength and opportunity of Michel Rocard reside in his ability to convince people that if he is the best Socialist candidate, he is also the only one able to attract a sufficiently large number of voters to win in 1981.

Counter-Offensive Commentary

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Mar 80 p 9

[Article by Jean-Marie Colombani: "A Debate of Politics-Fiction"]

[Text] Far from dwindling, the shock wave provoked by the televised speech of Michel Rocard on Monday, 25 February 1980, on Channel 2 has had unexpected effects on the Socialist Party executive committee's meeting of Saturday, 1 March 1980. While the rivalry between the deputy from Yvelines [Rocard] and that from Nievre [Mitterrand] weighed on the substance of the discussions, there was no confrontation between the two men (neither one spoke) any more than there was an outburst at the time of a discussion which was "routine," according to the expression of the first secretary of the PS. It is true that everything had been said on the previous day and the day before that by Francois Mitterrand on Radio Monte Carlo and by Lionel Jospin in LE MATIN (see LE MONDE of 29 February-1 March 1980). It is also true that the basic problems were avoided to the point that a question of "politics-fiction," raised by Mr Fabius, dominated the work of the party's representative body--that of determining under what conditions it will be necessary to dissolve the National Assembly following a victory of the Socialist candidate in the presidential election. Each of the parties involved proved itself to be concerned with avoiding a frontal clash. No one wishes to take the risk of appearing to be the one dividing the party. Each one also seems to be aware of the risks involved for the candidate, whoever he may be in a situation involving a split. Prudence has thus been the rule.

As early as Monday, 25 February 1980 on Channel 2, Michel Rocard had indicated that he seeks a nomination "without a clash" and that he favors development of a consensus within the party. In addition, he placed the problem of the candidacy in the sole field of competitiveness and effectiveness. Designating himself as the best Socialist candidate (it is true that there are numerous public opinion polls pointing in that direction), Rocard has to avoid making too sharp distinctions between himself and Francois Mitterrand within the party while placing his own options before public opinion.

Noting his resolve "not to unleash pointless controversies," Rocard on Saturday greeted favorable the draft resolution of the party's national secretariat which was designed to answer Rocard on three points: The bias favoring presidential power in the institutions which Rocard is charged with endorsing; the dissolution [of the National Assembly] which the majority wing of the PS wishes to be automatic; and self-management, a goal that Rocard seemed to minimize on the occasion of his broadcast "Cards on the Table."

Concerning this last matter, Michel Rocard should be prompted to clarify his thinking. Indicating that he embodies the self-managment group in France, Rocard assigns to the expression that he has used--"responsible socialism"--pedagogical value. As for presidential power, while Rocard stresses the need to lean on the "logic of the institutions" to win, he does not deny that the present exercise of power makes necessary a renewed balance in favor of parliament. At any rate, his friends argue that the positions that Rocard has defended in this field parallel those of Mitterrand during the election campaign in 1974.

While Michel Rocard took a position different from the majority faction only on the question of dissolution, one must grant that this majority has made his task somewhat easier. To be sure, the major elements of the counter-offensive of the party executive are included in the resolution approved by the executive committee. But this counter-offensive has unfolded primarily in the press, and the text drafted by the national secretariat was not likely to provoke a genuine confrontation.

Three Explanations

Three explanations, of unequal importance, can be advanced. The first stems from the resolve of the first secretary and some of his allies not to play up Michel Rocard, polarizing the party's activity around a face-to-face showdown between the head of the Socialists and his rival. Mitterrand thinks that this kind of clash is a creation of the government and that the question of nominating a candidate should not be on the agenda since the party has decided to postpone it to the end of the year.

The second reason flows from the divergencies which separate, within the majority wing, CERES from the friends of Mitterrand. The drafting of the resolution approved by the executive committee was difficult, notable on the question of a possible single-party government. The reference to [the Popular Front in] 1936, which implies that such a government would enjoy the support of the PCF, was obtained by the friends of Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Undoubtedly the latter were also more concerned to challenge Rocard on the matter. "It is necessary to determine whether Francois Mitterrand and his colleagues are choosing the best tactic to fight Michel Rocard's policy," Georges Sarre, one of the heads of CERES, declared at the conslusion of the executive committee's meeting.

The third explanation was advanced by the friends of Rocard: In their eyes the prudence of the leadership before the executive committee contrasting with its attitude in the press signifies that the attacks against their leader "are not well received" within the Socialist party.

The question of candidacy, almost absent from the discussions of the executive committee (rare were those, such as Louis Mermaz, who broached the topic directly), has been at the center of the discussions of the party's general assembly among the faction favorable to Mitterrand. A resolution calling for a candidacy of the first secretary, proposed by Georges Fillioud and Louis Mermaz, did not pass because it seems to be accepted that the party's majority must have its candidate and that this candidate can only be Francois Mitterrand.

However, even if this argument was not used explicitly, some eminent members of this faction are concerned about the consequences of a belated nomination of the candidate. Mitterrand not wishing to state his plans before the end of the year, they feel that Rocard can take advantage of the "vacuum" created in this fashion. They conclude that there is a need for one of their own to occupy the field between now and that time so as to create a situation once again mandating recourse to the party's first secretary.

But on this issue there is dissension: those who, faithful to Mitterrand since the Convention of Republican Institutions, were kept out of the executive at the Metz congress accuse some representatives of the generation which has taken over of being too concerned with their own future. The fact is that the former are perhaps trying to retrieve an important role on the coattails of a new presidential campaign of the party's first secretary.

The only new fact which came through in these two days was finally the attitude of Pierre Mauroy. Whereas the executive has adopted one of the major elements of the motion that he had supported in Metz, the notion of a "contract of government" with the PCF, the major of Lille asserted that the executive refuses to recreate the conditions of a rally of the party. Pierre Mauroy seems decided to suffer the consequences of such refusal. "When the moment has arrived we shall see to it that the candidate who makes a rally possible and is the best hope is that of the party," he asserted. This statement is interpreted as a resolve to place himself now without hesitation in the existing minority faction of the party, once a determination is made of the failure of his attempts at a rally. The next national convention, devoted to international questions, should make it possible to appreciate whether this is indeed so.

Survey of Press Reaction

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Mar 80 p 9

[Article by A. Ch.: "Rocard Is Starting His Campaign"]

[Text] Michel Rocard's statements on Channel 2 authorize the commentators of the weekly press to remove the "if's" and "maybe's" with which they had qualified the former PSU leader's candidacy as the standard-bearer of the Socialist Party in the presidential elections of 1981.

Without broaching certain positions which do not always appear to him to be "in accordance with the party line defined at the Metz congress," Claude Estier, writing in L'UNITE, the Socialist Party weekly, threw some light on the matter. He explained: "This is how he [Rocard] responded to the invitation made to him by Francois Mitterrand in December 1979 not to feel bound by the declaration that he had voiced in Metz in April 1979, namely, that he would not himself be a candidate if the first secretary decided to run. The latter does not for all that wish to hasten his own decision. This is all the more true as at his request--and Rocard recognized that it was a wise decision--the question of the nomination of the Socialist candidate has, by common accord, been postponed to the end of the year. It is therefore much too early to decide, but the fact remains that, on one hand, several candidates rather than just two can legitimately seek that nomination and, on the other, the latter will be the decision of all the party members and not only of a kind of limited [electoral] college whose choice would merely be submitted for ratification."

In LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR Thierry Pfister wrote that "Michel Rocard cannot have any illusions." Pfister added: "He will really impose himself on his party only by winning politically over the present PS executive. The logic of confrontation seems thrown into gear once more. As before the Metz congress, a relentless race for support continues. The primary targets are the elected representatives."

For Claude Jacquemart in VALEURS ACTUELLES, "Michel Rocard strives to promote a strategy of the possible by reassuring the voters of the center, who will make the decision in 1981." Jacquemart noted: "Knowing that he cannot count on the communist votes, he is not unaware any more that if the Socialist Party should make him its candidate he would have to face dissidence. Already Jean-Pierre Chevenement, deputy from Belfort and the head of CERES (the left wing of the Socialist Party), threatens to run too if Francois Mitterrand were to bow out in 1981. Rocard's options are very narrow and this prompts him to come and prospect on the turf of this virtual principal adversary. Thus, their speeches cross each other while Jacques Chirac, determined to define an "alternation in the majority" without offering a victory to the opposition, cultivates his differences while camping on the edge of the Rubicon."

Under the title "The War of the Two Roses," the outcome of which they say it is pointless to anticipate, Andre Chambraud and Daniele Molho wrote in LE POINT: "It may be that Mitterrand will throw in the sponge and retire. It is also possible that dispassionately, methodically, he would want, vis-a-vis and against all comers, to safeguard the unity of the Socialist Party and to put the finishing touch through a victory on the contest that he began 15 years ago with the PCF. To oblige the PCF to change or to reduce its impact was his wager. That of Rocard is to press forward without becoming hypnotized by one problem."

Bernard Stasi, president-delegate of the CDS [Center of Social Democrats], wrote as follows in CDS-ACTUALITES, a twice-monthly informational bulletin of the CDS, about Rocard's comments: "A great flourish to the great leader Mitterrand, a wink of the eye to the left for the communist voters, a wink of the eye to the right for the Gaullist voters, a little step backward on the self-management issue, a little step forward on nationalizations--all of this is somewhat vague, at times contradictory, and undoubtedly fairly clever," he asserted before noting: "But Michel Rocard will need even more skill to explain to us what responsible socialism is," for, he wrote, "if words have meanings, this kind of socialism is exactly the opposite of the irresponsible socialism which Michel Rocard, with all his friends of the unity of the left, wished to impose on our country."

In L'EXPRESS Robert Schneider noted: "By showing his colors 15 months before the elections, Rocard is disrupting the political game in which he is the only novelty and the only unknown factor. Right away he causes concern, not only to the Socialist Party." Thus, after mentioning the PCF and RPR [Rally for the Republic], Robert Schneider added: "In the camp of the Giscardists, too, people are beginning to become worried by the attractiveness that the 'modern left,' embodied by Rocard, has among the centrists and the radicals. In short, Rocard is a disturbing factor. Blows will now fall from all sides. This is all the more true, as gradually and as he gives his speeches, the deputy from Yvelines will have to emerge from the vagueness in which he habitually takes shelter. With his attractiveness impacting over a broad range of the voters, it will be difficult for him to continue to please the reformists disappointed by Valery Giscard d'Estaing as well as the leftists returning from Mao."

In the view of Michel Thomas who signed the editorial in ROUGE, weekly organ of the Revolutionary Communist League (Trotskyite), "The PCF makes out well with Rocard's breakthrough." He explained: "(The PCF) has for months been asserting that it cannot govern with a Socialist Party that reportedly has shifted to the right. The attempt by the Mitterrand-CERES executive not to respond to these charges constrains the PCF to attack daily, using every means, even the most improper ones, against its former allies. Rocard's speech contrariwise outflanks the PS on the right. The PCF can, then, better justify its sectarian isolation, just as the attitude of that party enables the followers of Rocard to present their policy as the only realistic one. Put into effect by means of this game of mirrors, the split enables the PCF and the PS to escape from their common responsibilities--to drive Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre from their positions so as to pursue in the government a policy favorable to the workers and their demands."

The choice which the Socialists will make in order to be represented in the race for the presidency of France can not help being influenced by the opinion which the others, and especially the PCF, will have of the candidates seeking the office.

2662
CSO: 3100

DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING NEUTRAL FOREIGN POLICY IN CHAD

Paris LE MATIN in French 5 Apr 80 p 9

/Article by Joelle Kuntz: "Chad: Difficult French Neutrality The Leaders of the Opposing Factions Fear That Paris Will Finally Choose Sides"]

/Text/ Chad: a single subject of conversation in the corridors at the International conference center on Avenue Kleber, where the preparatory meeting of the forthcoming Franco-African summit meeting in Nice ended yesterday /4 April/. However, the dramatic situation which that country has experienced for the past two weeks was not on the schedule, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Francois-Poncet, was only able to express pious wishes that peace would be re-established at N'Djamena.

The Nice summit meeting next May 8-9 will above all be devoted to economic problems: the re-establishment of exchanges between France and the African continent, the North-South dialogue, and the "trilogue" between Arab, African, and European countries. In this connection, we learned yesterday /4 April/, France has the intention of proposing a "summit" meeting after 1981, bringing together 80 chiefs of state and government to prepare a charter of solidarity in the framework of this "trilogue" between European, Arab, and African countries.

For the past week, a little before 8:00 AM, each morning, the French Ambassador in N'Djamena, Marcel Beaux, crosses the French military base from his quarters to office number 108 of the command post, which serves him as an embassy. A Black chauffeur drives the green Peugeot 504, with its diplomatic license plates, and leaves him in dignified fashion in front of the central building. The simplicity of life on the military base does not stop the last manifestations of diplomatic protocol. The representative of the Elysee Palace holds the political power of France in the place, before which the French military are invited to give way. Moreover, the base commander is only a colonel, Paul Lardry (last year it was General Forest), which no doubt facilitates, in addition to good relations between the diplomat and the military officer, the application of the hierarchical order between the civil power and the power of the Army.

France, since the beginning of the conflict which broke out in N'Djamena two weeks ago, has decided to hold fast to a strict neutrality between the opposing forces, even if, out of respect for the forms, she continues to treat each of the leaders in the conflict according to their rank in the institutions set in place under the Lagos agreements last November. The role of Marcel Beaux therefore consists in assuring humanitarian support for the wounded among the people and the combatants and in seeking mediation whenever that is possible. He telephones or meets the principal Chadian leaders each day, informs himself on their positions, explores their views with regard to Paris, and tirelessly reassures them regarding his neutrality. For, in this war-torn country, where the only effective force would be that of France, if she intervened, the combatants examine with a magnifying glass each text, each declaration, each political and military evaluation coming from the French base, ready to denounce any trace of partiality. They have even become so touchy that Colonel Lardry has been obliged to check more closely everything which goes out over the telex machines of his base. Thus it is that the journalists, within the sight and knowledge of the combatants, work, thanks to the only communications facilities available on the base. In effect, do the parties in conflict risk taking the personal interpretations of the correspondents for the point of view of the military authorities? And thus to prejudge the intentions of Paris?

In any case neutrality is a delicate attitude. The soldiers of the southern Colonel Kamougue, Deputy Prime Minister and chief of the Chad Armed Forces (FAC), who are fighting south of the capital, or those of President Goukouni Oueddei, called the People's Armed Forces (FAP), who hold the northwestern part of N'Djamena and of Chad, still recall the time, not so long ago, when Paris supported Hissene Habre, leader of the armed forces of the North and Minister of Defense. It is therefore difficult to persuade them that France does not intend to lean towards one side or the other. Neutrality at times nourishes suspicion, and suspicion nourishes insecurity and fear.

At Tacaud command post—from the name of the operation carried out by French troops in 1978 to halt the movement of Goukouni Oueddei towards the south—great efforts are being made to avoid annoying mistakes. Marcel Beaux, on his side, has had a circular distributed in which he states that, "It is not for us to express a personal opinion regarding the political situation in Chad." He adds: "There is only one French policy, defined by the President of the Republic. By acting otherwise we would harm the actions of the French Government and would expose our compatriots to reactions."

A sergeant, who had learned the lesson well, kept his mouth shut on Thursday night [3 April] when we were asking him from which side the tracer bullets, then crossing the sky, were coming. He said, "I don't know anything, I'm not involved in politics."

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CSO: 3100

MILITARY PROMOTIONS, ASSIGNMENTS APPROVED

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Feb 80 p 14

[Text] The Council of Ministers of Wednesday 27 February approved the following promotions and assignments submitted by Defense Minister Yvon Bourges:

Air Force: Air Maj Gen Michel Rouyer is promoted to the rank and grade of Air Lieutenant General.

Col Jacques Martinot-Lagarde and Col Jean Marie Failler are promoted to Air Brigadier Generals.

Ground Forces: Col Jacques-Julien de Zelincourt and Col Claude Delpoux are promoted to Brigadier Generals.

Quartermaster General 2d Class Hubert Felix is appointed Quartermaster General of the 2d Army Corps and of the French Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ordinance: General Engineer 2d Class Marcel Louchart is promoted to General Engineer 1st Class; Chief Engineers Jacques Clavier, Jean Segalen, Paul Talboutier and Pierre Capion are promoted to General Engineers 2d Class.

General Engineer 2d Class Henri Vimal du Monteuil is apponted Director of the Bourges Technical Establishment; General Engineer 2d Class Robert Cognee is appointed Director of the Angers Technical Establishment.

Armed Forces Controllers: Armed Forces Controllers Jean Ricalens and Guy Rousseau are promoted to General Armed Forces Controllers.

9399
CSO: 3100

MILITARY PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Mar 80 p 12

[Text] The Council of Ministers of Wednesday 12 March approved the following promotions and appointments submitted by Defense Minister Yvon Bourges:

Ground Forces: Major General Georges Maldan is promoted to the rank and grade of Lieutenant General and is appointed a member of the Ground Forces Army Council.

Brigadier Generals Louis Pitel and Michel Noel du Payrat are promoted to Major Generals; Chief Engineer Maurice Boube is promoted to General Engineer 2d Class; Colonel Pierre Chaquin is promoted to Brigadier General.

Brigadier General Francois Magne is appointed Chief of the Bureau of General Officers; Brigadier General Claude Cochou is appointed Commandant and Director of the III Army Corps Engineers and of the 1st Military Region Engineers; Brigadier General Daniel Clediere is appointed Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, II Army Corps and Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany; Major General Andre Agostini is appointed Central Director of Engineers; Brigadier General Michel Jorant is appointed Director of Military Security.

Air Force: Air Major General Pierre Birden is promoted to the rank and grade of Air Lieutenant General and is appointed Defense Adviser to the Government; Air Major General Paul Huguet is promoted to the rank and grade of Air Lieutenant General.

Air Brigadier General Andre Ortolo is appointed Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff Foreign Relations Division; Air Brigadier General Pierre Lauzeral is appointed Defense Attache, Head of Staff and Air Attache of France in Washington.

Navy: Rear Admiral Rene Chabot is appointed Member of the Navy Council.

9399
CSO: 3100

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND DATA DISSEMINATED

Paris AIR ACTUALITIES in French Feb 80 pp 30-33

[Text] During the recent presentation of the Super Matra 530 air-to-air missile the Air Defense Command gave some very interesting documents to the press. They are reproduced below and give data concerning air defense. AIR ACTUALITIES has added only some subtitles.

Tactical air-to-air missiles

Development of a tactical air-to-air missile relies on three essential fields: aerodynamics, propulsion and guidance.

Aerodynamics

Because a tactical missile always operates in the atmosphere, its aerodynamics are characterized by wing units and classical tail planes insuring bearing and guidance. Several typical positions are used:

- The "duck type" (guidance controls are located on the front)

- The "maneuverable wing type" (controls are located near the heart of the missile and represent the main bearing surfaces);

- The "maneuverable tail plane type" (controls are located at the rear);

- The "jet control type" (the missile is guided by special controls located inside the jet blast pipe.

All of these combinations have advantages and disadvantages, but they are all designed to minimize the drag and allow the highest speed possible and to provide a high enough load safety factor to permit necessary maneuvers in order to hit a target, even if it steals away. Almost all current missiles are equipped with a cruciform aerodynamic structure. This allows guidance in any direction without requiring the missile to be turned around, which diminishes its response efficiency and complicates guidance.

Propulsion

Propulsion is always achieved through rocket engines fed by solid propellants which are simpler to design and to operate than liquid propelled rocket-engines. Chemical bodies are mixed and turned into a single solid cylindrical block, erroneously called a "powder" block. The exothermal reaction of the chemical bodies constitutes the propulsive source.

Combusion may occur on the front (as in a cigarette) or on axial lines. In this latter case, the block is perforated along its length and burns internally.

The laws of propulsion are governed by the profile of perforations. Two phases are usually involved: a short acceleration, meant to provide initial speed, and a cruising propulsion which maintains constant speed during the course of flight. Gases produced by the combusion process expand in a blast pipe to reach necessary speed.

Guidance

All tactical air-to-air missiles are self-guided. Orders given to controls are elaborated aboard and a self-guidance system locates the target in relation to the missile. Several navigation laws may be used.

Pursuit

Pursuit is the simplest system. The guidance is such that the missile speed vector is set in permanence on target. The missile follows a course called "the dog curve." This introduces a permanent turn to the missile's course, which slows it down and extends the length of the course. This can be improved by shifting the direction of the missile speed vector from a constant angle to the direction of the target's speed vector. This is difficult to achieve (it requires the determination in the air of the plan in which the shift must be accomplished and selection of the rate of the shift).

Collision Firing

Collision firing (or pursuit on future targets) suggests that the missile will go in a straight line until the impact point, if the target is stationary (if it moves, the course will have to be corrected). The missile flies with minimum energy and maintains all of its maneuverability ready to respond to any eventual evasion attempts by the target. The application of this feature is difficult, because it requires knowledge of certain characteristics of the probable targets--difficult to obtain at present.

Proportional Navigation

The law involved here serves to mediate between simple chase and pursuit after future targets. It is called the law of proportional navigation. It makes the rotational speed of the missile speed vector proportional to the missile-target's rightward rotational speed.

The early self-guidance systems were located on the missile's axis and allowed only chase navigation. After proportional navigation was adopted, self-guidance systems on all modern missiles became movable in relation to the missile. They include a Cardan shaft head, constantly oriented toward the target no matter what position the missile assumes. Rightward movements of the missile-target are registered by gyrometers and a calculator deduces orders to be given to the controls to obey the law of navigation.

Guidance of the head is done differently, depending on the type of self-guidance system used: active, semi-active or passive. With an active self-guidance system, aiming is done through a small radar device located inside the missile. A semi-active self-guidance system includes only a radar receiver; the broadcaster is the radar on the fighter plane. It is used by the pilot to position himself (capture the target, navigation of field of fire). The radar must light the target during the free flight of the missile, the pilot receives orders from the radar to this effect.

The passive self-guidance system uses the infrared radiation from the target to guide its head. An optical device convected to the head gathers infrared radiation and leads it on a photoelectric cell through a modulator, thus creating a modulation of the characteristic signal of the target's position in relation to the self-guidance system axis. The pilot can then disengage as soon as firing has occurred.

100,000 Hours of Mirage F1 for CAFDA Units

After a short experimental period at Mont-de-Marsan, the Mirage F1 has been introduced to service progressively in the defense air command units.

Three Squadrons

By 1973 the 30th squardron, based in Reims, had received the first planes. They replaced the Vautours, whose manufacture dates back to the 1950's. The squadron has thus far logged 45,000 hours of flight.

In 1974, the 5th squadron based in Orange, was equipped with the Mirage F1, which replaced the Mirage IIIC. To date the 5th has logged 33,000 hours of flight.

Finally, in 1976, the 12th squadron in Cambrai gave up its Super Mystere (SBM2), in service for over 20 years, for the Mirage F1. It has since then completed 22,000 hours of flight.

Achieved in 5 years, the complete outfitting of three fighting squadrons with the Mirage F1 reinforces the defensive potential of the Air Force.

A High Quality Plane

The Mirage F1 is very well adapted to air defense missions. It is equipped with air-to-air Matra 530-550 Magic missiles and now with the Matra S 530. It has undeniable intercepting qualities.

The Mirage F1 is the result of knowledge acquired through the use of over 1,200 Mirage IIIs, and from new technical breakthroughs.

Its use and maintenance rely on automatic tests--also true for its operational equipment.

Its maintenance record is among the highest observed thus far on a fighter plane. Programmed maintenance has evolved very quickly and is extremely low cost. The Mirage F1 is equipped with analysis devices used in the maintenance of civil transport planes. The number of changes made after it became operational is very low, compared with other fighters in this category.

Always Improved

However, the plane has not remained unmodified since its initial conception. Important modifications were made to increase its operational weapon systems capacity. Among these we find:

- Automatic hypersustension tips and flaps, which increase handling during combat and low speeds;

- The pole for in-flight refueling which increases considerably the handling.

- Renovation of navigation and armament systems, which increases performance notably with regard to interception, and makes best use of the new Matra Super 530 missile.

Finally the CAFDA fleet will be improved at the end of 1980, with the Mirage F1 two-seaters. These will be equipped with all the operational equipment of the one-seater and will help pilots at all stages of training.

And ... Active

The Mirage F1, a fighter from the 1970's, has already over 100,000 hours of flight.

This number will probably increase in the future because new units are going to be created and new operational patterns developed. It is obvious that the Mirage F1 will continue to fulfill the needs of the Air Force for many years to come.

Matra Super 530 Missile

In 1968, the Air Force staff office decided on the development of an air-to-air missile. Its goal was to increase the Mirage F1 operational capacity. This Super 530 missile had to have a long firing range, firing capabilities with important contouring and high handling margins. For obvious budgetary reasons, the development of the missile was spread over time. Firing tests took place from 1974 to 1978, and the first missiles were delivered to CAFDA in November 1979.

Stringent Requirements

Conditions imposed on the missile call for precise and fast guidance, despite the great differences in altitude and speed to which it is subjected, and the speed to which it is subjected during its free flight. The conditions the missile must meet are dictated by targets which can disappear with significant load factors and which fly at different altitudes.

It was necessary to model the missile's aerodynamic characteristics so as to have a very brief response lap and to equip it with an adapted propulsion system. The laws of guidance were also studied so as to minimize delays in detecting perturbations which would deviate the missile from its course.

Aerodynamics

The aerodynamic configuration of the Super 530 missile is characterized by "long wings" and maneuverable controls. This combination produces good handling at high altitudes with minimal obstruction under the plane. It also features a disengaging limit far superior to missiles with classical wings and makes it useful in a wide range of applications. The controls have a bigger span than the wings. They are an important part in the bearing system and are very efficient during pitching and looping. Rolling is overcome by a differential leveling of controls.

Propulsion

Progress achieved in the manufacture of propellants have permitted important improvements in the conception of the Super 530 propulsion system in comparison to the Matra 530 missiles.

The propellant is semi-structural. It is loaded with butalane-type composite with a high total impulsion (over 1700 daN at 20 C) to allow contouring firing on targets flying at very high altitudes (over 20,000 meters or 65,000 feet). The shape of the block was chosen so that combustion would provide a two-level optimized thrust curve with an acceleration phase and a cruising phase.

Guidance

The missile is guided during proportional navigation according to a particular law. It takes into consideration the important speed variation noticed during the propulsed phases of the flight.

This law brings under control the load factor gathered by the missile from the rightward missile-target's rotational speed. It works in the following manner:

- a self-guidance system measures the missile-target's rotational speed and elaborates corresponding guidance orders.

- guidance chains bring under control the missile load factor and insure its stability.

The self-guidance system is electromagnetic and associated with the Cyrano 4 radar on board.

Piloting

Guidance chains operating on "all or nothing" guiding principle, compare guidance orders to actual load factor, evaluated by accelerometers, and to angular pitching and looping speeds, evaluated by gyrometers. The controls servo-motors are then ordered in the direction necessary to suppress errors. These chains also insure, through use of the same controls, stabilization of the missile during rolling.

Advantageous Performances

Guidance, propulsion and piloting are insured by three of the four sections which form the missile (self-guidance system, propulsor, equipment). The fourth section called armament, includes the military load, the firing devices (active electromagnetic rocket, impact device, self-destruction timer) and a security box to insure safety for the shooter and ground personnel during handling.

The Super 530 missile has almost the same mass as Matra 530 (245kg compared to 250kg) but shows multiple advantages:

- shorter minimum firing distance
- superior speed gain
- longer missile flight
- high possible contouring at firing time
- lesser technical constraints

It allows destruction of high performance targets and reduces considerably the setback necessary for interception.

Mirage F1

The Mirage F1 is presently part of the equipment in most of the air command units of the Air Force. Its qualities answer perfectly to operational missions of air defense:

- excellent climbing acceleration and speed performance (Mach 2,2);

- remarkable maneuverability, achieved through combat flaps permitting tight evolutions;

- perfect stability even at low altitudes and high speed. It is an excellent firing platform.

The Plane

Performance

- maximum speed: 750kt (1380km/h)
- ceiling at Mach 2: 50,000 feet (15,000m)
- stabilized load factor at Mach 0,9: 7.29 at low altitude
- rolling distance at takeoff: 600m in air defense configuration
- speed impact at landing: 135kt (250km/h)

Engine

The Mirage F1 engine is an ATAR 9k50 Snecma, offering 5,120 daN of thrust without post-combustion and 7,340 daN with post-combustion

Armament

Internal: 2 30 mm DEFA canons (270 shells)

External: seven hookup points offering wide variety for external weapon carrying.

Missiles

- air-to-air infrared Matra 550 Magic
- air-to-air electromagnetic or infrared Matra 530
- air-to-air electromagnetic Matra Super 530
- rockets: rocket carriers M 155 holding 18 68mm SNEB rockets

Bombs

- Smooth 125kg bombs
- Smooth or toothed 250kg or 400kg bombs

Development of other air-to-air ground armaments is currently being studied.

Navigation and Attack System (SNA)

The front multifunction radar Cyrani 4 and a "head up display" viewfinder allow air defense missions on Mirage F1 at any time and allow air-to-ground intervention during good meteorological conditions.

Logistical Support

The ground equipment necessary for operating the plane can be transported entirely by air.

Maintenance costs are very low: 11 hours for 1 hour of flight. The automatic ground repair system (SDAP) insures principally repair of the SNA and maintenance operations on the electrical system. The SDAP counterpart on the second level is the automatic test system for complicated equipment (ATEC) done through CII calculators (20k words). ATEC automatically takes care of all the different test operations for most of the plane's equipment.

Depending on the state of the equipment, principles of maintenance are applied to the engine and electronic equipment.

Principles of preventive maintenance are applied for the engine (periodic checkups after 200 hours), the cell and classical equipment (2 checkups after about 600 hours of operation).

Maintenance on the Mirage F1 is both classical and modern.

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TRADE UNION PROBLEMS EXAMINED 'ON SITE' IN DETAIL

Paris LE MONDE in French 4-7 Mar 80

[Article by Dominique Pouchin: "Crisis in the Unions?"]

[4 Mar 80, pp 1, 44]

[Text] Swept by conflicting movements, the French union movement is attempting to adapt to the multitudinous changes which are affecting the industrial complex in the economic crisis.

This inquiry which begins publication today, aims at describing this delicate adaptation. It was conducted 'in the field' and not--principally at least--in the Paris offices of the various union organizations.

From Longwy to Berre Pool, from Toulouse to Fougeres, passing by Lyon, Caen, Besancon--this inquiry reflects 'slice of life' situations concerning basically the salaried workers in the great industrial centers. This voluntary limitation of viewpoint and the approach to reality which was taken means that we don't claim here to present an exhaustive picture of French unionism, but simply present some of its major difficulties and contradictions.

Part I: "It's the fault of the left...."

To the devil with these Cassandras!

How timid these learned experts have suddenly become, they who yesterday pontificated so freely on the thousand and one ills of "the union movement in crisis."

A sad litany: a despondent leadership, they said, ruminating on dead hopes, on a left defeated and torn; on a wilting rank and file; the faithful doubting. To be sure, some efforts were made to speak a new language, but nothing could cover up the well-worn refrains of yesterday. In brief--the future looked somber, sown with cruel disappointments.

Suddenly, a discordant note! Unexpected, unwelcome: ballot boxes almost filled at the elections for the worker-management boards, a 63.3 percent turnout. The CGT [General Confederation of Labor] held up in spite of some erosion, the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] confirmed its position, the FO [Workers Force] jostled the prognostics, the independents gathered in a few crumbs. A forthright success during a time of defection--that boggles the mind. Our experts, caught on the wrong foot, are lying low.

"Let's not rush into things," Mr Jacques Delors[1] warns, however. "The kind of ties French salaried workers maintain with the unions are such as to dumbfound often the best observers of social relations. The salaried workers display their attachment on certain great occasions: this election is one. But that does nothing to change the present difficulties of union action. Attachment is not commitment.

In fact, management and unions are still questioning the deeper significance of the election results.

Mr Edmond Maire, cries of surprise and joy over with, hastened to bring his world to reason. To one of his assistants, still a bit giddy who blurted out during an office meeting, "So where is your crisis?" he slipped a concise little note: "These elections" he said in substance "have mostly shown the desire of a mass of salaried workers to assure an 'individual' defense. They still have illusions about the efficacy of the board perhaps. But their reaction can only do us good: we favor the 'collective' too much, leaving the 'individual' to the tender mercies of the reformers. In any case, nothing decisive to get us out of the crisis is coming out of this. Our true problems are not being resolved."

Detailed analysis will provide some surprises. A simple example: in Basse-Normandie the CFDT made some of its best scores in plants where unionization had weakened most. In a Bayeux bank it carried most of the personnel who had largely rejected it, being favorable to a staggered hour plan proposed by management and not understanding the obstinate hostility of their union. "So, beware of being triumphant," concluded Mr Guy Robert, the regional representative. "A good many contradictions are still there. Who knows? Perhaps it's only one white loaf among a batch of dark?" As if, finally, these elections had only produced a misty photograph of reality.

A Relic of the Future

The traffic lights are and will remain red. The weakening of the unions, whether or not as a sequel to the past, is far from being stemmed. The CGT, without mentioning figures, admits to an "undeniable shrinking," and CFDT's 1978 final report showed a fall in membership of 2.7 percent. "The decrease persisted in 1979," Mr Edmond Maire added, "and nothing indicates a reversal of this trend." A trough of the wave, not a drama, it's said here and there, a story of being reassuring. Two or 3 percent, that's not Berezina. But the overall figures hide more disquieting trends, more diverse realities. In the field, all of a sudden it's more serious, more clearcut, more surprising.

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[1] Former social counselor of Jacques Chatan-Delmas when he was prime minister, he is today a deputy (Socialist Party) to the European Parliament.

Longwy. Here the air breathes bitterness. They talk only about the past, as if tomorrow had been stuffed and buried under the heaps of slag. "Longwy lives!" Now it's only a washed-out banner, blown by too many contrary winds. "Longwy lives!" It was yesterday's future that cried, shouted, ranged in lines, the better to believe. Today, only banners hold to it. It is a "relic of the future." Longwy rests in gloomy silence at the hour of reckoning.

"An old lesson. These little squalls don't mean a thing. Leave a few feathers, even if the contrary is said in speeches. In effect, the union progresses when things are calm...," Mr Rene Boudot sighs without passion. He's seen a lot, the Old Man as is said aside: 50 years of the CGT, a real ministry. He's called on for rummaging into the past, to understand from a distance. And he tells: "I've known the heights and the depths. After Budapest, the buddies made themselves scarce at the union local. And then, they came back...people forget." But this time it is more serious. "Absolutely. I listen to the losers, those who have filled out their social security file. So I know. They don't follow any more. There's too much hassle perhaps, too much divisiveness, too many quarrels, and a refusal or an incapacity to negotiate, to discuss the economic plan objectively."

In the space of 3 years, the unions have lost between a third and a half of their manpower in the Lorraine iron and steel industry. It's no longer a shrinking, its a hemorrhage! There are always those who leave, a reasonable amount of transfers, retirees, pre-retirees, but that doesn't explain it all. And on top of this eroding away is a reluctance to face reality. "That's normal," Mr Boudot explained. "Among ourselves there are questions that just aren't asked. Attachment to the group generates an almost religious spirit, with all its taboos. Even with me....when I asked our treasurer how we are doing with the stamps, he took me for an inquisitor!"

But the moment will come when the face of reality can no longer be masked: on that day it will no longer be the distant member who forgets to pay his dues, or the shop buddy who balks at a political levy, but the militant, the hard-liner, the one who was in on all the tricks, who begins to doubt, to crack up, to desert. It can't be dodged any more, things are bad. They begin to be legion--these "ex," "former," like Denain, yesterday in the forefront, today found behind the bar, manager of a cafe, skilled craftsman on his own, or simply a subscriber to the ANPE [expansion unknown].

Like so many others...after them, for these hesitated, half ashamed of flight and betrayal...like the others they took their separation pay, a bonus for quitting and renouncing, evening the account with the factory and with the good fight!

Lorraine is not digesting this crisis well. Badly winded, have the unions really measured the extent of the wound? For it's a world to itself, time-honored, with its traditions, its deeds, its landscapes, its culture, which has trembled. And the shock has opened up 1000 hairline cracks. The union movement has been shaken to its foundations: the homogeneity of a class and the unity of its culture, that of the Lorraines, whose grandfathers had one day left Naples or Milan to dedicate themselves, to sell themselves, to the furnaces and the mills, who were tough enough for the job and who were molded to their environment. This was a world which in spite of modernization had not yet lost its cliches: the forge, the master, the workers.

The unity, the homogenous nature of the Lorraine Basin, has now been disjointed. What is there to astonish in stuttering and scattered prounouncements, whether looking to the past and emphasizing productivity a la CGT, or disorganized and sketchy from the CFDT which at Longwy takes on false airs of the 1968 revolutionary spirit. All evidence shows that such communications aren't going over any more. The rank and file balks, the militants are jumping ship.

Militant for What?

"There's certainly nothing to boast about," grumbled one of them found taking the sun on the Cote, doing fill-in work. "But what about it! What else can we do? We did everything to save this rotten country. To be a militant, that looks good, but we have to live too. And militant for what? The top guys spend their time tearing things apart. The Left could have won something, but they didn't want to. Well then--enough!"

A change of scene--far from the closed world of furnaces and slag heaps, the grimy brick mining towns and the children of Germinal, they steam still, but between sea and sun. Here steel is putting its feet in the water and the blue collar uniform is going out of style. No one says "basin" any more, or even "factory": here the word is "site"...Berre, Fos, Lavera. It's no longer Lorraine, buffeted and shaken by restructurizations, but the still green fruit of expansion. There, close to us, just before the crisis. The collective memory hardly dives further than a still warm yesterday. The tradition had just been sketched out. Longwy and its slagheap losing out; Berre and its cracking tower producing: everything is different. Everything, that is, but the spleen of the militants.

They were five, that day, around the table on the second floor of an engineer's villa that had been converted to a union local just a few steps from Naphtachimie. Five CFDT militants from the principal firms of the site were going over the accounts, lists in hand. Not a happy task: in just a few months, the union council lost half of itself. There were 30, now there are no more than 15 at most who come regularly. So-and-so had disappeared completely. Another one has gone into yoga. The last one thinks of nothing but jogging. "No point in sounding the bugle," threw out

Jean-Pierre Baratelli, steward from Naphta. "By repeating 'nothing works any more' the movement out has just been accelerated." Then, rethinking it, "After all, it's just the truth. Why hide it?"

Only 3 or 4 years ago, the assemblies called by the union filled up without any problem. Today, even gathering mobs..."to get the rank and file to move, the militants have to believe!" "And you, do you still believe?" Cut in a youth from Siliner. Baratelli drew back, "not too much," he admitted. "That's been 20 years its been going on. In 1978 it still stuck in my throat. However, I really didn't believe much in the Common Program." For the setbacks of 1978, there was readiness to designate the guilty party. It's not working any more, it's not going any more, the first reflex is: "It's the fault of the Left."

"They" Have Killed the Faith

If militancy is a ministry, still more reason to have faith. But faith--"they" have killed! Jean-Claude Apparicio, permanent secretary of the regional union, got his training here at Naphta. "That was a time," he reminisced, "when there was punch." And, pointing a finger at a poster of Che "Hasta la victoria': "When I put it up in 1970, the guys liked it. What's it got to say to them now?" "Nothing," responded another, "there are sad eyes."

The stewards make their rounds of Naphta's shops rarely these days. "Today--it's the boss who calls meetings of the workers," Baratelli admitted. "Before, for 20 legal hours, we took about 24 in order to go see people regularly. Until one day management fingered two stewards and docked them 2000 F at the end of the month. That was enough. Making the rounds is no longer the custom."

The map of union influence in site plants looks like a picture sprinkled with spots, each one signifying a militant and his zone of influence. When one leaves, is transferred, or more often caught up by the union hierarchy, the spot blurs, disappears.

That's it, one hastens to conclude, thats the source of the trouble. In short: 1978, the setbacks broke hope, deception paralyzed, the militants lowered their arms, the masses followed no longer, having no one to follow.

A deceptive summation. Certainly, more than its European neighbors, French unionism relies on the ties which the militants establish and maintain in their milieu. These ties have been brutally stretched and even broken. But it doesn't stop there. It's more important, more serious. They know, but they keep quiet about it. Proof exists, but they ignore it. In fact, it all began well before the Left opened up the time of dejection.

[5 Mar 80, p 44]

[Text] II. From Evasion to Avowal

Confirming the attachment that the majority of salaried workers have to the workers' confederations, the elections for worker-management councils have apparently confounded the analyses that these last days seem to be agreeing on the decline of the great centrals. But hasn't this given just a misty photograph of reality? Conscious of the difficulties that face them, union leaders at first tried to invoke the bitter demobilization of the militants after the March 1978 setback of the Left. Such an explanation appears notably insufficient (LE MONDE, 4 March).

They held out 2 months, 8 long weeks, before going back with heads held high. Since then, in France they say "the Alsthom" just as one says "the Lip," the aristocracy of battles.

For more than 20 years things have hardly moved at all--except in 1968--simple parenthesis. Then all at once "they" said: Enough is enough! And from Belfort started the come-back, a little slapdash this year without Paris! high mass, this Bastille-Republique of an autumn which usually marks on the social agenda "the growing discontent of the workers before the onslaught of power."

Everything has been said, everything told about their "exemplary strike." From the initial bang to the return to work, elbow to elbow, passing by the conspiracy (thwarted to be sure) and the active sympathy of a population less proud of Alsthom in the end than of the "Alsthomers."

Everything has been said, everything told about except this: in the space of 6 years, the CGT section of the company had lost almost 60 percent of its rank and file! So the hemorrhage had begun in 1974 and so it continued, inexorable, regular: 250 workers each years turned their heads away, politely excused themselves when the "union buddy" came to place his stamps. Fifteen hundred members in 1974, 650 on the eve of conflict. That 150 cards were taken up again in the hottest part of the struggle was not enough to recover lost ground. And the CFDT, of whom less is said here, makes no claims to escape the same fate.

Naphtachimie on Berre Pool: 3000 salaried workers, of whom only half are blue-collar workers. The plant, like the rest of the site, saw the onrush of the "new classes" dear to sociologists at the beginning of the 1960's, eager to substitute a white for a blue collar. The salaried worker is new, but a prize well disposed towards the unions. There was struggle, victory, gains. But since 1973 the CFDT has lost close to 20 points in the professional elections, and in 3 years, half of its manpower, a blood loss of 50 or 60 cardholders each year, beginning in 1975.

SAVIEM, Blainville near Caen: a factory of legend, an epic struggle. A light survey of the post 1968 literature is enough: not a book, not a study, not a brochure, to say nothing of tracts, which does not feel obliged to make a brief detour towards these immense hangars between Orne and the canal where, after the event, the fuse, which, lit in 1968, fired Paris and the rest of the country during a brief spring.

An Almanach de Gotha for the Conscience of a Class

They have been described from all aspects, these workers suddenly thrust into the limelight under the curious eyes of the social scientists. They were typed, labeled, filed: hicks newly proletarianized, too recently to be admitted to the Gotha of the conscience of class, but enough to let their anger burst out without heeding the principles of order written in the great tradition of the workers' movement. In short, with one foot in the fields, the other at the assembly line, they were half Chouans and half communards when the revolt broke out.

The unions were in it, and the audience was strengthened. And them, in 5 years, the CFDT lost more than half its members, from 800 to 300. The CGT saw its strength melt from 700 to 300. In 5 years, that is, since 1974[1].

Alsthom, Naphtachimie, SAVIEM--after all, these are only three factories among a thousand. It's true, the choice is risky. Arbitrary? That is to say--all three figure, coincidence?--in the 30 plants that the CNPF had carefully chosen in order to take the day by day temperature of socialist France. And they were no less carefully followed by the other side: isn't SAVIEM at least one of those factories plugged into the direct line to the Communist Party's Central Committee?

The essential remains: at Belford, at Berre, and at Caen, the hemorrhage had begun 4, 5, or 6 years ago. The dates are more important than the amount, eloquent of loss. For it becomes impossible here to invoke the spleen of the militants, deceived, heartsick at the Left's setbacks. To the contrary, they believed it to be hard as iron, swelling and swelling again from cantonal election to municipal election, even while the floodgates were opening and their base was escaping without their having at the time a clear conscience.

Here is what national headquarters' statistics, honest to be sure, but too comprehensive, were hiding: the general decrease was not registered until 1978, once the defeat on the political terrain had been accomplished. Soon two similar curves were to be traced out, militancy carried along by the hope of change, and unionization. It all hangs together...and is almost reassuring? LAS, a study of more limited scope, but not to be neglected, has been perturbing the diagram and sowing doubts. Applied to some great industrial centers, our two curves diverge from the origin to finally meet, way low!

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[1] During the last 2 years, SAVIEM lost about 20 percent of its manpower, going from 7,600 to 6,100 salaried workers. The Alsthom-Belfort strength went from 9,000 to 7,500 salaried workers in 5 years.

Militant dejection followed rampant disaffection, aggravated it, did not explain it.

Who to blame, then? What devil is to be exorcised? Elementary--the crisis, of course. Didn't it point its nose in 1973-1974? Fateful date, the date when the unions began losing blood. An evident congruence, asserted those closest to the terrain, this time the explanation will take.

How can one get untouched through a crisis which, all brakes off in tune with foreign events, sees management hardening its stance, a crisis which empties the factories, the natural water of the unions, leaving them bled almost dry, sometimes over an entire town? "I was told they were hard fighters here, that they put up a good fight," growled a CGT steward newly arrived at Fougeres. "Was I ever foxed. There's nothing moving here." "And how is it going to move?" retorted an old timer from a corner, "the working classes have disappeared from Fougeres. It's dead with its boots. There's nothing left but paper pushers and petit bourgeois. In the last joints, the guys don't make another move. They saw the others and got the wind up."

Enshrining the Outmoded

The great days of peasants' and workers' revolts--1906, 1932, 1968--seem to be well in the past, only venerated memories, enshrined outmoded tactics. Three thousand jobs have disappeared in less than 10 years: "Yes, and 10 years ago with such a situation the whole town would have been boiling. In January 1968 the Chamber of Commerce was attached because of 300 jobless. Today..." The closing of Renault alone meant 700 cardholders less for the union!

At Bertin's, one of the last of the smithies and metal workers, things are calmer. "When jobs are threatened, the wage earner walks on egg," the owner explained from his place behind a school master's desk, a far cry from the steel and glass favored by trendy managers. "The pamphlet straight from Paris was discussed in committee, where they talked 'shop' and everyone was likely to be reasonable. No problem about overtime if the company needed it. And when Renault closed, appeals for solidarity stopped at the well-understood threshold of company interest."

It is evident that solidarity is "natural," "total," and "unshakeable" in speeches only. In reality, the crisis and what it threatens are stimulating fearful retreat more than collective demands. And when the hour for the carts comes, the union will no longer be the life insurance which so many believe they got when they took the card.

The unions have not been able to maintain ties with the mass of unemployed. The committees set up here and there to regroup and organize them are often just empty forms. "It's difficult," Mr Sarian, secretary of CGT's departmental union of Bouches-du-Rhone, acknowledges, "the unemployed worker withdraws into himself. Cut off from the company, he no longer thinks himself responsible for the others. He feels himself to be powerless, frustrated." Such losses are not made up by the unionization of new hires: at SAVIEM, in more fortunate years, one new hire out of two took the union card, one out of four remained faithful. But the manna dried up, the boss turned the faucet off, again the crisis!

The passivity engendered by the fear of job loss was paralleled by general grousing which occasionally turned against the union itself which was accused of "never getting anything anymore." What good to renew the card, pay off the stamps, if the "contract" is not honored, grumbled a rank and filer more "paying member" than militant. Why put up for more than one steward? "The thing I have against the guys who don't come into the union, it's being always at collecting something, always counting points," protested a young CGTer. But, more calmly, he added with a touch of bitterness, "It's true we're not counting masses of points, the times being what they are. The bosses aren't giving a thing. It's no to everything, even crumbs. The Barre Plan hero, the crisis there, just getting into the shops to negotiate is something, Each time they send us higher up the line, to Paris, to the management associations--and even then it's still no!"

Dangling the Carrot

A deliberate tactic, so it is heard from all sides: management seeks to undermine union credibility, to show them as ineffective, to say one way or another that they are useless! "A couple of years ago," tells Jean-Claude Aparicio, a Naphta old timer who has risen in the union hierarchy, "it was enough to threaten to shut down the cracking towers to shake up management and make them call us. The threat was suspended, negotiations were started, and then we won." But the good times are over. "They don't give us much anymore, unless its a banana peel. We talk 'shortened work hours,' they talk 'better time use' and the guys aren't against it...There are fewer and fewer collective initiatives. There is more 'everyone-for-himself' and management dangling carrots."

With or without carrot, the 'management rhetoric' finds more acceptance than is admitted. How else explain the setback of the last strike at SAVIEM in June 1979: tension grows at the factory, tones rise. The unions, harried by a minority of young OS burning to cross swords, preferred, not without beating about the bush, to go ahead with it rather than lose all control. For several weeks the movement teetered on the head of a pin: the "silent majority," in this case more neutral than hostile, awaited...a setback half-way programmed.

"We find ourselves in struggles where we ourselves haven't clearly defined what is at stake," concluded Guy Robert, a local CFDT leader. "They demand a 35 hour week: result, today they work 42 1/2 hours to make up the lost days!" Are the workers indifferent? Not that so much. Say rather:

aware that our proposals have no weight compared to the arguments of management. Willy-nilly, what they say about joblessness, the crisis, for a lot of guys that's what counts." From a leader willingly critical of Edmond Maire's views, such remarks, (avowals?) take on additional weight. And more so in that they are not so rare.

In abandoning the dodges which in turn puts the fault of its own mortifications on the Left and its quarrels, the crisis, or management and its "nays," will the unions be ready for a purifying mea culpa? At the time, it is still paying the cost of its skid which, the defeat wrapped up by the Left, seems to have left it knocked out on its feet. This skid in effect was due to "electoral wait-and-seeism" (Edmond Maire) to which "everything was subordinated, including to a certain extent the satisfaction of the principal demands." (Georges Seguy).

But such a slide is proving to be more serious than halting speeches, for everything is changing. "A heavy price must be paid in order to get off to a good start again," explained Charles Piaget, who had worked in the half dead, half reviving shops of Lip. "Talking pie-in-the-sky-bye-and-bye is suicide. The union has been getting along through osmosis with a capitalism in expansion. That's over with, but it's hard to admit it: a little like a submarine demanding surface leave when half the planet had exploded. True...20 years of struggle have robotized us."

To History's Oubliettes

The yet timid and hesitant development of another type of rhetoric is encountering serious resistance: do these audacious innovators not dare attack the b-a-b-a- of class analysis? Send the industrial worker, the classical "productive labor" to be forgotten by history in order to set in its place the new avant garde, all this under the pretext of excaping old burdens? Hogwash!

"Certainly there are such considerations," explained Mr Sarrian, CGT leader in Marseilles, "some are counterproductive but others have the intrinsic qualities which have made the French Union Movement the Pugnacious we know. To question what some call the 'classic picture of the worker' will certainly start an abandonment of class unionism. This will be more 'modern' perhaps, but it will also certainly be closer to management!"

This isn't new, it will be said, just a simple case of the never-ending quarrel between the traditionalists and the young moderns, between the orthodox and the revisionists; an old debate, in effect, between Renault's press operator and IBM's technician; the epicenter of class consciousness or the vector model of a revolution which awaits?

Nothing new--if not a trend which if confirmed and accentuated tomorrow chances bringing Billancourt to despair for good. Is it not precisely in the great industrial centers that union losses are most felt? Some field data support this supposition, as do others, more comprehensive. Thus, a study comparing CFDT manpower patterns according to branch of activity shows that the erosion is stronger and earlier in the industrial center. These losses, starting from 1976 and insufficiently compensated for by gains in the service industries and public sector, explain the final negative balance.

Whether they say so or not, the two great confederations must perform a readjustment which, under the mocking eyes of Workers' Force is taking them into their element, the company, and into their territory, the demand. One slogan, "get closer to the workers." And then to be astonished at finding someone has taken advantage of the escapade to occupy the territory. Oh how inconvenient a squatter--management!

[6 Mar 80, pp 36-37]

[Text] III. The Challenge of Management

The worker-management council elections, though confirming the attachment of a majority of salaried workers to the great workers' confederations, nevertheless cannot cover up the difficulties they face.

Conscious that the explanations proposed are insufficient (despondency of the militants, effects of the economic crisis) union leaders are attempting to reframe their rhetoric in terms closer to the workers. But they are encountering a management which seems to be re-orienting itself (LE MONDE, 4-5 March 1980).

The personnel director, not without effort, stifled his impatience as the speech rambled amiably on, half business luncheon, half junior management seminar, in the small lounge of the hotel-club located in the middle of the factory. Nothing but the most ordinary stuff, tame, it could be said. The director shuffled his feet restlessly. The unions, reasonable or not, the stewards, the company committee, the general climate, the mood in the shops, the claims...simple banalities.

The associates, papers clutched under their elbows, responded by habit and obligatory courtesy. Figures and percentages were lined up without further commentary, a story of sacrificing happy hour to the ignorance of the visitor. The neophyte, to be sure, is still in the time of grandpa's "social," the boss on the right, the union on the left--the factory as boxing ring.

Finally the essential appeared, the personnel director breathed more easily. So forget the union, the management committee, the stewards, and all that stuff. Here the "social" is someting else. Everything is in the system.

Peugeot, its lion and its militia, so say malicious tongues, an ugly image still yellowing. Today, say rather, Peugeot, its lion and its DPRS [expansion unknown]. A Department of Personnel and Social Service chock full of gray matter where sociologists, psychologists and communications ph.d.'s innovate like mad to simmer up day by day a 'new deal' in the social relationship. So simple, so very simple....

To begin with; an act of faith. "The most solid cement for the development of the company is its social strategy." And then a cast-iron rule "The dialogue is not with the union, but with the personnel themselves." A mediator, a hierarchy. And a supreme weapon, the Organization, capitalized, to throw a little fear into you! Then an organ note in the shape of "a positive overall balance." No serious strikes, sir, since 1969. In brief, all the charms of social peace.

To Each His Own Recentering

Peugeot is one case, to be sure. An exception? Not so sure. Rather the advance point of a movement more vast. To each his own recentering. Some make a big thing out of it, free to drop the more or less taboo term in mid-course. Management hardly talks about it, but they have taken action. The crisis requires it! Earlier than the others, they sensed this was not a passing wave between two springtimes, that they had to act in time. "It's true," explained Francois Ceyrac, "the crisis has been an excellent schoolmaster, it has given new importance, a decisive dimension, to social relationships. The company heads have held their wake for rapid growth. Now its adaptation time: opt for flexibility in the statutes, resolutely abandon the quantitative in favor of the qualitative, make a group strategy of social relationships.

Ambition for innovation has not yet left any oil stains. For much of management it is still just an attractive window display to present during congress speechmaking. But this movement has already gone beyond the narrow circle of trendy management who have long made "innovation" their favorite hobby. Yesterday's "audacious experiments" are today at the center of management strategy, stamped and guaranteed by the CNPF [National Council of French Employers], who is multiplying its proselytizing efforts, colloquy, and more discreetly, through sessions at its training institute for management candidates.

In reality, the crisis has only hastened the ripening of ideas whose gestation was already well advanced. "The general practice of collective conventions ended up subcontracting social questions to the unions," said Mr Ceyrac. "But it was all a con. Little by little, management and hierarchy found themselves excluded from planning for human relations. The union forces had occupied the territory." It was this fact, among other disquieting matters, which stimulated and oriented the first studies, of more than a dozen years ago, by certain restricted circles. Thus immediately following the OS strike at Renault Lemans (1971), a very discreet working group met under the aegis of the CNPF. The name of its chairman will be kept secret. Was not Bernard Vernier-Paillez, currently president-director general of the Regie, director of the state company

SAVIEM at that time? The first fruits of management's play for the center are in any case written up in the memorandum its commission submitted to the higher levels of the CNPF.

One forceful line: classic Taylorism ought to be reviewed and revised in the name of a viable pay-off. And in the rush, some wise counsels: "The role of the first ranks in establishing the chain of command and the execution of the work is decisive. (...) The foremen should be relieved of many administrative duties in order to be more available. (...) Contact with workers should be through him."

These simple ideas are beginning to nourish CNPF rhetoric which since its 1972 meetings has been giving the green light to innovation. But the first clouds of the crisis created other urgencies: audaciousness would have to wait. Quickly taken up by the so-called modernist wing of management, the idea nevertheless made its way and became more definite. Grosso modo: the "social" is a territory for free competiton, not to be left to company gravediggers. Did they speak out too clearly, too early? The innovators were brought back to reason.

It's just that in 1977 it was better to lure the wolf than hunt it. The Left was at its zenith, what would tomorrow be like? "The unions," explained a young executive, "were then like a small embankment, not the time to set about undermining the base. Carried away by a logic difficult to master, some pushed the cork a little too far. Too eager for competition, they ended up by confiscating the territory."

By 1978, the danger passed, the precautions were no longer put in place. Mr Ceyrac could then vaunt the thousand virtues of the management revolution. But his success presupposes the active complicity of the professionals which is by no means sure. Paradoxically, it is not with their own executive class that management finds the best credit. To be sure, interns and trainees with their on-the-job training and role playing, organized here and there to motivate the upper ranks and transform the foremen into social worker, hardly count anymore. Is that enough? Not evident, but this time all bets are on, all that remains is to win.

It is clear, it is said at the CNPF, that social policy is no longer a one-way street towards the unions. "They must go down as far as the second subbasement," down to the shop where junior management must play the intruder and win the face-to-face with the shop steward. Thus is started a "triad relation" in sociologist jargon. A more or less three-cornered play, where management and union compete for "frustrated and unsatisfied personnel." The top executive has its junior execs for "communicating," the union has its stewards for "contesting." When it's all added up, according to the rules, the dynamic equilibrium of social forces should appear (see box).

A forbidding and abstract sketch? Go back to "Peugeot-city", 40,000 wage earners, the biggest factory in France. Twenty years ago, social relations there were classic, well muscled if need be, one could say. Company agreements, though frowned on by the CGT, sealed in regular periods the semi-cordial understanding between management and unions, balancing "social progress" against "social peace." But little by little it all got unsettled. A sign of the times was the CFDT breaking away from the church, going over to the enemy. "We then became aware of the pernicious effect of our agreements," explained a plant director, "our partners, from then on our adversaries, twisted the provisions arrived at through consensus to serve the cause of the class war."

The Good Luck

After some drifting, management gropingly developed its new 'detour' strategy. The arsenal brought into play aims at mobilizing energies for "the good of the company," to forestall the vague discontent of the base and to latch on to their half formulated aspirations in order to channel them into approved ways. From the old suggestion box in a corner of the shop to opinion sampling a la Gallup, the Organization overlooks nothing.

The suggestion box already seems old hat. Originally for the technical area only, today it is extended to all sorts of common sense ideas for improving working conditions, saving energy, strengthening security. Result: at Lepine the candidates are elbowing each other and the research teams assigned to analyze their findings are always loaded up. The last "inventor" got a 20,000F award. The "house lotto" is all the rage. "And this sort of thing opens up dialogue," emphasized a young DPRS executive.

To keep it going and to expand it, Peugeot is experimenting with GOTC, task force for working conditions. These GOTC, composed of workers appointed by the hierarchy, meet in the shops to study the working environment and to administer a small budget for reforms. Must discussion be formalized further? Peugeot has its DIPO (individual personnel file) to be displayed regularly during any "exchange" between the worker and his superior, "the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] of social relations," the experts say proudly. Once reserved for professionals and executives only, the personnel file technique has been extended to cover all personnel. An astute move, the OS can dream about a 'career profile' just like the higher-up who supervises him.

"Thus the shop steward's vital working area has been reduced," explains a young DPRS executive. "In the eyes of the worker, if he acts less, his power is less. Why go to him if the higher-ups can take care of it instead. Here the union is nothing more than a safety valve, a simple warning light. If it lights up, then there was a lack of sound reaction on the part of the Organization."

"Made in" Peugeot

It suffices to add that there is a sizeable media apparatus--a newspaper, shop newsletters with little stories "just like the communist tracts"--to ensure "fluidity," and thus we get a social system "made in Peugeot." More concretely, in response to a line without mysteries which is expressed as a profession of faith: "Individualize, personalize," and thus counteract "the uniformity created by social protection." They couldn't be more frank!

The unions, routed, seem to hesitate. Such management dispositions are getting them on the wrong foot, are taking over, integrating and digesting the claims that nourished them. Invoke "police methods," repression? But isn't that just prolonging the decline, taking refuge in the kind of rhetoric where they are more at ease and not looking at what is really the trouble?

Not that repression has disappeared. Far from it. The old formulas haven't gone out of style yet. They still beat the bushes for "bad" stewards in the shops of "Peuge." The DPRS, which vaunts itself so for its "innovations," quietly continues to distribute warnings and recommendations and the foreman gets better ratings if he is able to orient his group toward the company union. Yet, without losing efficacity, repression has become more subtle, more selective. It has become just another cog, though certainly not a negligible one, in the wheels of the Peugeot system.

So Mr Pierre Juquin, communist deputy, may well brandish before the assembly tribune that DIPO which files away the workers of Peugeot to make of them "the slaves of modern times, treated by management as meat for profit," (LE MONDE, 4 Dec 1979), his indictment rings false. Is it by chance that the statement voted at the last congress of the CGT-Peugeot made almost no allusion to repression? Even the term failed to appear even once throughout 29 closely spaced pages. And as concerns the DIPO, whose inquisitional character was stressed, the union concluded, bitterly realist, "whether it pleases or not, Peugeot creates the illusion that the worker's opinion counts...and that democracy exists in the factory."

Thus, far from being the attribute of open and modern executives--always welcome as an alibi for inveterate upholders of the good old methods--the new management strategies are today finding a choice field there where, in other times, there had been more inclination for the stick than for the carrot. A simple calculation, doubtless--the objective remains unchanged, but the means, now more sophisticated, are more profitable.

Nothing for it then but to adapt, jump on the moving train, and before a crumbling audience integrate as well as can be management dispositions "to show their limits and contradictions." An urgent and agonizing reappraisal: "Peugeot is now using a scientific approach to counteract our activities," the CGT notes. "It is taking over an area which before was held exclusively by the union...The illusions created are and will be facilitated by our negative attitude which makes us seem to be against everything and which is cutting us off from the workers."

The readjustments thus imposed on the base confronted by the suddenly perceived danger of finding themselves out of the game, have alerted the

Paris offices. But the extent of the phenomenon has not yet been well measured. Long considered secondary, this portfolio was left to the care of the "comrade in charge of working conditions." To be sure, here and there the guys could be heard talking about things like SNIAS at Tarbes "where the workers came out on the weekend to repaint the shop walls," or Naphta (Berre) where "the foremen are told to get the guys together for some informal talk over pastis and peanuts," or Solmer "where management gives after so-called security meetings what had been refused the night before to the ship stewards." But all that is not stirring much unease.

On the basis of a few examples, such "minor" maneuvering is imputed to the active complicity "of those guys at FO who are always willing to play the bosses' game." Without looking further, without asking why even the Workers Force does not show much enthusiasm for such "management openings." (See box). No. All this is just simply dressing up the facade, they think, a coat of paint, a face lift to rejuvenate the well-worn face of the old paternalism. Nothing more!

The awakening is late in coming. "We have ignored the real and privileged management, for capitalism in the abstract," Edmond Maire admits. "In effect, of hundreds of experiments launched by management, hardly any were reported to us by our sections. They hid their difficulties in responding like a shameful disease. From time to time we would learn about what was going on, from the outsiders!"

But there's a lot at stake. Behind a subtly hypocritical rhetoric which recuperates "that which is fundamentally just in a self-governing utopia," is not management playing on a grand scale the integration so spurned by the sacrosanct canons of the class war? "They have simply taken into account the human factor in the flexibility and profitability of business management," affirms Jacques Delors. "The new methods for promoting loyalty to work, an impossible concensus being unavailable, are throwing out a real challenge to the unions who have no time to lose in taking up the gauntlet."

A challenge being carried to the heart of the factory floor, for the union is being touched at its very reason for being. It is being attacked at the very core of its culture and tradition: the sense of the collectivity as the supreme value and the unique path of social progress. Individualization, key to the ideological arch of the management revolution is disarming the unions inasmuch as it answers aspirations the unions have neglected or even opposed. But management's good word does not strike everyone in the same way. Integration, playable and played here, is no more in the regard of some than "the necessary flexibility of the contract provisions" so dear to Mr Ceyrac, already thoroughly rejected--apart from the real provisions!

[Box] FO: It's the Others Who Are Having Trouble

The crisis? What crisis? The Unions? A simple invention of tormented sociologists. At Worker's Force no one bothers much about the scare diagnostics of these "specialists in the social field." "What do they know," Andre Bergeron threw out tranquilly.

From the secretary-general to the rank and file militant, the same serene assurance: the crisis, that's the other side, the others. FO does not feel for them. Better, it is taking advantage of it! Supported by figures, they will show you that one salaried worker in four today relies on the confederation, and above all that its membership has been swelling regularly the last 5 or 6 years, "since the others have been losing." The balance made, the satisfied and somewhat mocking smile of those who see the critics of yesterday forced to an all-out reorientation in order to follow the furrow they themselves now ceased to cultivate.

In fact, FO does seem to be escaping the troubles facing the other two majors, to the point that in describing unionism in crisis there is a tendency to ignore its existence.

Principles and Methods

Yet the FO is there, entrenched in its traditions, stamped by its rhetoric, to a proclaimed reformism serving--according to the time and the speaker--as foil or reference. FO is a little like "what a union would be if there were not the others." An image which much of management holds as the impossible dream of German style unionism and which the other unions hold as the eternal credo that reformism cannot be avowed without treason.

Historically less solidly footed in the industrial sector than its rivals, Mr Bergeron's central office is also at stake in a battle which, at times, reveals a distinct separation between principles and methods.

First of all, living off a policy of contracts, FO can only suffer in seeing it bit by bit narrowed in scope, or dropped, by a management that thinks it has found something better. "A systematic contracts policy is only possible if faced with a single union, a participating union like the German DGB," affirmed Mr Ceyrac. Otherwise said, FO is not, alas, and cannot be, the DGB. Let us look for something else.

Though yet spared by the union movement crisis, FO still risks being affected by management strategy redefinitions. In seeking to bypass the union obstacle through launching rivalry in the social area, management is clearly rejecting the shop steward, whoever he may be, as a privileged party.

This policy, paradoxically, here and there seems to draw support from FO militants. Thus at the SNIAS plant at Toulouse, a few "social correspondants," assigned to the shops by the department of personnel, are former FO stewards. At Merignane, another SNIAS plant, the willingness to play this game has allowed FO, with the support of CGC, to supplant the previously majority group CGT in just a few years.

An exception? "This only happened because there is quality management there, with whom it is a pleasure to deal," Mr Bergeron explained. "Don't draw any general laws from this. In any case, the dominant factor at Marignane still and always is the union. There is no integration."

Principles beware! At FO as elsewhere integration wears a devil's face. "As for me, I don't believe in the big kiss-and-make-up scene," Bergeron answered an executive who was speaking learnedly of "the worker's expression." "There is only one representative on the company premises: the union. Only one way to negotiate the social: the contract."

Must management's new deal find other, better intentioned reforms? But where?

[7 Mar 80, p 32]

[Text] IV. The Breaking Point

Success at the worker-management council elections does not wipe out the difficulties today facing the great workers' confederations. The explanations being invoked currently, despondency of the militants, effects of the economic crisis, are not enough.

The posted aim of "getting closer to the workers" ran into an adroit management strategy which in the major centers put forward individualism, aiming at "integration." But this new rhetoric is not addressed to everyone: the crisis and the industrial restructurization have also deprived a mass of wage earners of real and contract guarantees.

A simple demonstration bared all. It was more than a sign, it was a shock wave.

Everything went wrong. A classic scenario, a sheep-like procession which dispersed, a few hotheads who regrouped. Suddenly a rhubarb. A pale ersatz street fight, 30 windows exploded in fragments. The next day Caen was in turmoil: hooligans are among us. Out of town agitators and Paris-like "z'autonomes." Leaflets rained forth: denunciations, condemnations, disassociations. The usual.

Except for one false note: the CFDT, the majority in the region, is getting uneasy, asking itself questions. Not so fast, they say, it's not so simple. Hooligans? Unquestionably there were some.

But who were the others? All those young ones who had done demonstrations, climbing the sidewalks, jollying them along: "Come on, come on, another 30 turns around the track," they cried out banteringly. They demonstrated for a job. They came. But they were there without being there, neither for nor against, outside it all.

"A real road to Damascus," said a CDTer, "and a hell of a lesson. We know these guys, more or less. They are neighborhood youth, not hoods or gangsters.

No, for the most part they are workers." But not just any kind of worker. Itinerants, apprentices, underground economy workers, jacks of all trades. In brief, unemployed half the time, faithful to the ANPE, marginal workers. All of a sudden the demonstration showed their importance, the margins widened, when wage earners found themselves cut off from the union.

As brutally as it was late, the examination of conscience would totally reorient union activity: a year later, a special assembly for the non-covered, organized by the CFDT's regional union in Basse Normandie, showed how the marginals had well and truly passed...to the center of union preoccupations. A year of in-depth investigation throughout the entire region had given a measure of the size of the gulf created and of the dramatic lack of recognition for the changes that had occurred.

Union leadership, which had asked all company sections to count the young beneficiaries of the "employment contract" (Barre probationers) got back only one response: yes, one had been found, in an office somewhere. There were 15,000 in the region.

The Factory's Not What It Used To Be

The in-depth study of this area would produce more surprises: at SMN (Normandy Metallurgical Company) the militants would enumerate more than fifty subcontractors with "their" workers established quasi-permanently in the factory. Fifty subcontractors, as many executive heads, and as many different employment contracts covering the wage earners, all in the same location. The organization chart, painfully reconstructed, covered an entire wall! The old factory, bastion of a local working class "strong from its battles and traditions" wasn't what it used to be. Nor was the working class. The traditions had been shattered.

These discoveries in Caen were far from being isolated instances. For more than a year, inquiries and debates multiplied within a union structure that sought to encompass and take into account a reality that had escaped classical rhetoric and the spontaneous reflexes of protected wage earners. The crisis and the accelerated restructuralization of the industrial complex brought a profound turmoil into the world of work and brought up short those who, at least at the beginning, had not believed in or who had not wanted to see more than a passing bad moment. "In 10 years, radical transformations affected everything the unions were doing," said a recent brochure from the CFDT eloquently titled: "Has the Working Class Broken Apart?"[1]

True, the crisis has at least developed an industry: temporary employment. Today there are more than a million employees of temporary employment bureaus, and more than 150,000 contracts are negotiated every day. In 3 years, 1975 to 1978, there has been a 50-percent progression. The time of the little typist who filled in for the absent job holders is gone. Yesterday composed mostly of women in their thirties, the troops of temporaries are now composed mainly of two types of industrial workers: About half are under 25 years of age without the least qualification, about a third are paid at SMIC level.

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[1] CFDT AUJOURDHUI (CFDT TODAY), special edition, December 1979.

Management must meet certain conditions in order to use them: that hiring be done each day for fixed time periods. Peugeot has a systematic policy with it "to allow," it was explained at Sochaux, "lay-offs without pain following market fluctuations." Thus 1,200 workers have disappeared from the scene between August and December and no one has said anything. Who even noticed? SNIAS does this too, "and it is impossible to unionize them," a CGT steward from the Toulouse factories says; "they are always hoping their contract will be extended or renewed, or that they'll latch on to a pernament job. So we ourselves don't press them to take the card or to show themselves.

The transformation of subcontracting blackens the picture even more. Used extensively by large companies as much for specialized tasks requiring high qualifications (research groups) as for subordinate jobs (cleaning, security, heavy maintenance), this subcontracting creates a veritable jurisdictional jungle on the work site where multiple collective conventions can be found. It is not rare to find the employees of the mother company almost in the minority in their own factory, knowing little or nothing of the real situation of hundreds of others they work side by side with every day.

Such an explosion in temporary employment systems is breaking the secular ties, fragmenting what seemed soldered, and at the same time shook a unionism which had planted its roots in a movement and clear desire for unification on the part of wage earners. Built on the idea of a class which was homogeneous in life style and working conditions, the union today confronts a thousand difficulties in trying to manage this fragmentation. Not that it is blind, though a little late, it has well understood the manifest interest of management in imposing maximum flexibility in dealing with the workers. But the weight of the past, recent slippages, and the inertia of its structures is braking the adaption, even when the desire for it is evident.

"We are still closed into the factory," grumbled a young steelworker of SOLMER "while for management these frontiers don't exist any more." In fact, similarly cloistered, the unions tend to represent only the central, stable core of the wage earners, whose right are guaranteed. A dangerous slope: aren't they little by little losing sight of the overall production process, soon leaving behind those whose status is most precarious and whose work is least rewarding? "To management policy which plays on flexibility and division, is opposed a rhetoric and rigid structure which poorly mask a tendency to corporatism," CDT directors willingly admit.

Uneasiness increases inasmuch as solutions are not in evidence. Should they favor the better protected workers taking in charge those not covered? This is still just a laudable intention, proclaimed in tracts but forgotten in the shops. For a "victory" such as at Jaeger in Caen, where they unseated those temporaries placed judiciously at the head of the line to set the pace, how many defeats were there in the face of indifference, not to say outright hostility?

"It's very annoying," explained a CFDT steward from a small chemical firm in Lyon, "the temporaries are the first to break the pace we were able to impose. They are the only ones to accept overtime beyond the maximum legal limit. And if fighting for integration into the company is proposed to them, they refuse! So it must be understood: when the stewards asked that they get the same advantages as the others, as granted by the company committee, the guys protested...It's normal!"

The "common front" preached by the unions still seems difficult to realize in continuous process industries. A management policy differentiating manual workers which the petrochemical industries adopted very early, seems to have produced dual working classes: a technically trained group of in-house workers at the control boards on one hand, a mass of subcontracted laborers on the other, given the maintenance, often dangerous, of the installation.

The Other...Is the Arab

This apparent redistribution of jobs hides an in-fact hierarchy, never in writing, but become the custom, which sees operators playing foreman and the others obeying. A relation springing up all the more readily as 9 times out of 10 the other is Arab, especially at Berre.

Thus works a rupture whose evil effects are already affecting the unions. This subcontracting of the harder and more disagreeable jobs is creating among the permanent personnel a "worker's aristocracy," a sentiment which is reinforcing management integration strategy applied in subtle doses to assure adherence to the work and to bypass the union obstacle. "The system of segregating the work force, one of whose functions is to reinforce the integration of permanent workers, has penetrated the personnel deeply," notes Robert Linhard[2] at the end of an inquiry conducted on the sites at Berre Pool.

Put at a disadvantage on one side by the adroit attempts at management integration, ill prepared on the other to receive the mass of uncovered workers with a structure unadapted to his, unionism is managing the crisis and its necessary mutation badly. And this is accentuated even more so by the faltering of the unions' cultural and traditional adherence to work.

Aren't these realities that management and unions alike prefer to hide, even if one or the other in turn finds argument and advantage there: the reality of the temporary at Fos who refuses permanent work offers "because it's better to be free," and as for work "do just what you have to"; the reality of the rolling mill operator at Longwy who "is dying of boredom since he's been working in the control room"; the reality, too, of the OS of SAVIEM who finds "partial unemployment is agreeable since then he can dig in his garden or moonlight."

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[2] Robert Linhart, "Proces de production et division du travail dans l'industrie petrochemique" ("Process of Production and Division of Work in the Petrochemical Industry") Colloque de Dourdan, Editions Galilee.

One says: "That's an exception," another says: "Cliches," according to the case. "Watch out," warns a gray eminence of the CNPF, "it would be wrong to rejoice too soon. Looking at the surface there seems to be a depoliticalization. The unions are losing feathers, the militants are despondent, the Left is moribund. But where will the collective expression natural to all the community of men reappear? And if tomorrow it comes squarely forth to contest work itself? A mortal sin?"

The cost of lost days, absenteeism, is more than 10 times the cost of strikes.

There was a time when anger broke the machines, another--yesterday, today?--when they were protected like a treasure of war in an occupied factory. And if tomorrow they were satisfied just to run away from it?

8860
CSO: 3100

SOVIETS RENEGE ON OIL DELIVERIES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 2 Apr 80 p 1

[Text] The Soviet Union insists on selling us Libyan petroleum, which is more expensive, while at the same time it is offering lower prices than last year for the purchase of Greek wines.

The above issues, in conjunction with the more general development of commercial relations between Greece and the Soviet Union, were discussed yesterday by Minister of Commerce G. Panagiotopoulos and the head of the Soviet commercial delegation here, Mr (Novakofsky).

More specifically, the Soviet representative reiterated to Panagiotopoulos that in addition to the initially offered 1,200,000 tons, his country is also offering to Greece another 700,000 tons of petroleum--but of this amount 400,000 tons are Libyan and the remaining 300,000 tons are Soviet (200,000 tons of crude oil and 100,000 tons of diesel oil).

It should be noted that prices for Libyan petroleum are higher than those of Soviet oil, and they are augmented even more by virtue of the commission which the Soviet Union will collect.

In addition, according to relevant reports a complication has also appeared in the matter of the Soviet Union's purchasing of Greek wines, for which that country is offering prices which are lower than last year's--prices which the Greek side considers unfavorable.

During the meeting of Panagiotopoulos with (Novakofsky), the more general issue was also discussed of exports of Greek products to the Soviet Union, which in recent years have been significantly reduced, particularly with regard to the traditional products. The minister of commerce repeated to the Soviet representative that substantial increases should be made in Soviet imports of traditional products such as tobaccos, citrus fruits, grapes, and so forth.

On the other hand, according to Soviet statistics a significant increase appears in the Soviet Union's purchases of Greek products, but also counted in these purchases are those which were not made directly from Greece, but from third countries--above all, from eastern countries.

In addition, Panagiotopoulos received yesterday the envoy of South Korea, Mr (Hyu-Dok-Hang), with whom he discussed issues connected with the development of commercial relations between the two countries.

12114
CSO: 4908

ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITIES COMPANY PLANNED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 2 Apr 80 p 2

[Text] An investments-portfolio company is being established by the National Bank, for putting to use the reserve funds which the insurance organizations have at their disposal.

The capital stock of the new company, which will bear the name "National Investments Portfolio Company," will come to 2 billion drachmas initially and will be split up into 2 million shares, each with a nominal value of 1,000 drachmas.

Of these shares, the National Bank will take over 1.2 million shares. The remaining shares will be offered to various insurance organizations and to private investors.

It is anticipated that soon the capital stock of the new company will be increased up to the sum of 4 to 5 billion drachmas.

Mr Khristodoulou, the governor of the National Bank, said in this connection that since it is not easy to find the adequate number of securities in which it will be necessary to invest most of the capital of the company, the National Bank will make available to the company shares from its portfolio, whose value is calculated at 25.5 billion drachmas.

The National Bank will have the responsibility for the organization and operation of the new investments-portfolio company.

The operation of the company will be governed by the provisions of Legislative Decree 608/70 "concerning investments-portfolio companies and mutual-funds companies," and it will be managed by an administrative council in which representatives of the insurance organizations--appointed directly by the administrations of these organizations--will also take part.

The relevant ratifying measures have already been taken by the Currency Committee and the Committee for the Capital Market on the formation of the new company, which will contribute, it is anticipated, to the better functioning of the capital market. And it is expected that very soon its articles of association will be published in the EFIMERIS TIS KYVERNISEOS [Official Gazette].

This was announced today to the financial reporters by the management of the National Bank.

The drop which is being seen in the stock-exchange value of the stock of the National Bank was characterized by Khristodoulou as unjustified and speculative, to the detriment of the small stockholders of the bank.

Khristodoulou stated that contrary to what is being rumored, the real value of the stock of the National Bank is 20,000 drachmas. He said further that the total value of the realty of the bank is around 60 billion drachmas, despite the fact that it is presented as worth only 30 billion drachmas.

In concluding he added that in a second phase the National Bank is also going to establish real-estate companies which, aside from other things, will make productive use of various properties on behalf of the insurance organizations and other interested parties.

12114
CSO: 4908

PURCHASE OF TRAFFIC CONTROL COMPUTER PLANNED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 2 Apr 80 p 9

[Text] International bidding for the procurement of a computer which will control vehicle traffic in Athens is going to be proclaimed soon by the Ministry of Public Works. As was learned, a loan of 400 million drachmas has already been requested for the purchasing and installation of this computer.

This "electronic brain" will be located in the buildings of the OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization], and it will be connected to the traffic lights of the capital area, to which it will send traffic-flow signals in accordance with the state of traffic congestion.

A working group from the ministry visited Paris last month and was briefed on how similar computers function. Another group from the Directorate of Signals departed for West Germany in order to learn about its traffic problems.

In a relevant report which the above groups prepared, they state that two different systems can be installed for the proper controlling of the traffic lights. The first system, which is also considered to be the less costly, is to install a computer which will give commands to all the traffic lights of the capital area. The second system which is called "hierarchic" (and which is already in operation in Paris), provides for the installation of local traffic syntonizers or trackers at 30-40 traffic intersections, which will control the traffic, again upon commands which they will receive from the computer. These local syntonizers will give information to the computer on peak hours, and this information will be stored in the "memory" of the computer.

According to reports, the Ministry of Public Works is going to install these local syntonizers on a trial basis at about 350 intersections in downtown Athens (of the 670 which exist in the capital area).

Departmental figures gave assurances that by this means the traffic in the central part of the capital will be relieved significantly, because the traffic lights will be controlled automatically in accordance with the traffic which the street has. As was revealed, the signals service of the ministry has already begun the installation of other traffic lights as well, at 250 intersections which are located in the "residential sections" of Athens.

Traffic Lights With Control Buttons

The efforts being made in connection with the installation of other automatic traffic signals with buttons have been abandoned, after the finding that they cause problems for the traffic. These traffic lights are controlled by a button which the pedestrians operate when they are going to cross the street.

Many of these traffic lights are installed near schools, and the pupils are using them as playthings, the result being that traffic is being impeded. Furthermore, it has been learned that using these signals has resulted in causing certain accidents, and one of these, which occurred in Vouliagmeni, cost the life of a schoolchild.

Citizen Traffic Police

It seems that the plans for the mobilization of citizens, who were to regulate traffic during the hours of transit of the schoolchildren, have also failed. The initiative for this came from the Ministry of Public Works, but the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Coordination, which share in the jurisdiction in this sector, have not displayed any interest up to now. Government figures stated relative to this that something of this nature can be done only by legislative regulation and by a modification of the Traffic Code.

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MAOIST PCUD'I LEADER ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Milan LINEA PROLETARIA in Italian 29 Feb 80 p 3

[Article: "The Broad International Issues as Seen by Comrade Pesce"]

[Text] Worsening of the international situation. The anti-imperialist struggle of the Iranian people. Europe's role in a policy of peace. Our party's tasks.

The Secretary General of our party [PCUd'I--Unified Communist Party of Italy], Comrade Osvaldo Pesce closed the Organizing Conference.

Comrade Pesce made a long speech regarding the international situation. That situation is in coutinuous flux above all because of the invasion of Afghanistan which is a serious danger for Europe itself because it is a social imperialist leap forward in the encirclement of sources of energy and raw materials.

The danger of a third world war has increased and peoples and nations must redouble their vigilance. The nations that for some time have been special targets of Moscow's attention, such as Turkey and the area of the Balkans, certainly will know how to learn lessons from Afghanistan.

Comrade Pesce spoke on the Iranian question, reaffirming our party's support for all the forces that struggle for the independence of the country which is fighting against hegemony and war.

Examining the hegemonic contradictions between the United States and the USSR, Comrade Pesce emphasized that the policy followed by American imperialism in Iran, the provocations against this nation in which the most recent act was the hospitality offered the shah and which provoked the just popular reply, prepared the terrain for the aggression and ambitions of the USSR in regard to Iran.

If the anti-imperialist struggle which the Iranian population is fighting today should remain isolated on the international level and should not receive the support of the revolutionaries and Marxist-Leninists throughout the world, this undoubtedly would mean favoring the hegemonic designs of the Kremlin which wants to take over Iran.

Today the USSR justifies its intervention in Afghanistan as a defense of the "Muslim World" from American policies of imperialism.

The recent developments in the situation, the blockade of the Persian Gulf by Washington, the determined reaction against Soviet social imperialism by Iran, which described the USSR veto in the UN Security Council as a criminal act, urgently placed before us the problem of aid to be given the people [of Iran].

In this regard, Comrade Pesce emphasized, referring to the nations of the Third World, that: "Our party must intensify the development of relationships and ties with liberation movements and with progressive forces. We cannot consider only relations toward nations; we are aware that reactionary regimes, although they take a position of opposition to social imperialism and to hegemonism in general on the international level and therefore become part of the United World Front, domestically implement a repressive policy against the people.

"These regimes are destined to be overturned sooner or later.

"Today on the international scene, we see the powerful development of struggles for democracy, freedom and independence.

"The Soviet Union itself seeks to exploit the situation in order to achieve its hegemonic aims: Thus, while it supports Menghistu in Ethiopia, it tries to keep a foothold even among the Eritrean forces of liberation in an attempt to present itself as a supporter of their cause."

The report stressed the need to concentrate the forces on the side of the Second and Third World against Moscow's hegemony, strengthening the vast United World Antihegemonic Front, depriving U.S. imperialism of room to maneuver. Even though it is on the defensive, the United States is trying to protect its own interests. Therefore a situation cannot be permitted in which the struggle against social imperialism is conditioned by Washington's aims.

"In this regard there is a positive element in the reply of the nations and peoples of the Third World to the social imperialist invasion of Afghanistan. The meeting at Islamabad of the Muslim nations focused on their unity and the will to support the Afghan people's liberation struggle against Moscow's expansionism without being caught up in American attempts to use it as a tool. That country would like to implement a cordon sanitaire excluding certain nations and putting itself in a key position.

"All the conditions exist in Europe to deal with USSR expansionism both on the technological and industrial plane and on that of human potential; the key condition to do this is the leadership of the working class in this struggle.

"From this emerges the role that the Marxist-Leninists must play because without their unity the very process of European unity could not advance and this would be to the advantage of Soviet social imperialism."

Comrade Pesce continued by emphasizing the function and tasks of our party.

"It is necessary to be aware of our tasks, to create a public opinion to stop the supply of technology to the USSR and to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow. We must work to organize the committees for peace and independence against war, trying to unify the existing anti-imperialist committees. We must not neglect even the slightest possibility, intervening on questions of peace and of struggle against war even in individual places of work. A positive example was supplied by Ducati Meccanica of Bologna where in a communique the workers condemned Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan. The order of the day by Stalin at the 14th CPSU Congress is as valid as ever, that the communists must 'raise the banner of democratic freedoms and national independence and sovereignty as authentic patriots.'

"In the policy of construction of the United Front, the party must always maintain its own independence since it represents the interests of the working class. It must know how to increase its own strength by linking itself to the working class and to the masses without ever losing sight of its own nature and its own tasks, and elaborating a strategy and tactic for socialism in our country in full independence."

We have even the negative example of Browder, secretary general of the U.S. Communist Party, who during World War II suppressed any distinction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between capitalism and socialism, thus annihilating the role of leadership that the party should have exercised.

Comrade Pesce then entered into the merits of the situation of the international communist movement, emphasizing the party's will to work to strengthen its unity, particularly with the Chinese Communist Party.

He then dealt with the question of so-called "Eurocommunism." It was firmly emphasized that modern revisionists have abandoned the working class and cannot be the party of national independence. The PCI leaders play the role of mediators between the hegemonic interests of Moscow and the West, trying to involve Europe in social democracy in the hegemonic plans of Moscow concerning Europe.

Today they weakly condemn the invasion of Afghanistan and at the same time try to justify it by repeating the need for a policy of "detante and disarmament" and they again propose the continuation of economic aid to Moscow.

It is the task of the party to unmask the revisionist leaders, in the awareness that today's struggle is the continuation of the struggle against modern revisionism. Anyone who today takes the path of looking for points of common interest with Italian revisionists makes the error of not assessing correctly the nature and overall political line that this party advances.

Supplying an answer to some problems relative to the mass movement of 1968, Comrade Pesce emphasized that: "We must not make the error of making a negative judgment on the large mass movements of 1968. If the Marxist-Leninist party then was shattered, this was because of the erroneous line that was prevailing within it, and because of how it responded to the problems posed. All those who today take a critical attitude regarding 1968, take up the positions of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. The year 1968 was not our Cultural Revolution: even if this exercised a positive influence, the objective conditions for the explosion of struggles existed in Italy.

"We cannot say that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution destroyed the young Marxist-Leninist party in our country. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution remains a positive event because of the great contribution made to antirevisionist and anticapitalist mass movements."

In closing, Comrade Pesce emphasized that our party must know how to protect its own autonomy and independence on all levels, to develop the revolutionary proletarian line, to deal energetically with the great issues that are on the agenda today.

It is necessary to develop a vast political and ideological debate within the party which would involve all phases, which would permit the maximum development of democratic centralism, which would guarantee an assimilation of the development of the line and a verification of its application making it possible to defeat any manifestation of parochialism which is an obstacle to the development and strengthening of the party.

In the present situation the party must know how to achieve two objectives that cannot be renounced: to strengthen the leadership group and to strengthen LINEA PROLETARIA. Attention was called to the need for the entire party to contribute to the support of the publication and to improve its quality so as to guarantee that our central organ is issued regularly and carries out its tasks of informing, agitating and organizing in the worker's battle and in the battle to create a vast movement for peace and independence, against war.

Comrade Pesce welcomed interesting proposals that emerged from the conference, such as preparation of the party conferences on employment, production, and energy development.

6034
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PAJETTA INTERVIEWED ON PCI FOREIGN POLICY

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 23-24 Mar 80 pp II-III (Supplement)

[Interview with PCI foreign policy expert Gian Carlo Pajetta by Alberto Ninotti: "The End of Zimbabwe Fighting Gives Us Hope"; place and date not given]

[Text] Is the Communist Party's international policy about to emerge from a long phase of stagnation? The question is legitimate considering the announcement that next month Enrico Berlinguer will go to China. And this happens right after a meeting, less spectacular but just as important, with Willy Brandt.

It should be recalled that it is true that both these events are not accidental much less improvised: They are the mature fruit at the end of a long political-diplomatic period of preparation. And yet one cannot fail to note the singular coincidence between this revival of the PCI international initiative and the open dissent within the party, in the Central Committee, but still more in the Chamber of Deputies, with the episode of open lack of discipline by a group of parliamentarians--perhaps 30, perhaps a few less. They voted against the foreign policy motion subscribed to by all the groups of the constitutional spectrum, including the communists.

In order to clarify the situation we went directly to the overseer of PCI foreign policy Gian Carlo Pajetta asking him some questions touching on the main issues of the moment.

Question: Let us begin with Berlinguer's trip to China. Let us leave aside his more remote promises, which may go back to the position expressed by Togliatti with the Yalta Memorandum of 1964 opposing the Soviet proposal for a conference to excommunicate Peking. Let us focus on recent years, and on the long negotiations that preceded the Chinese invitation. What brought about the change and this invitation after a long period of waiting?

Answer: You say after so many years of waiting. I say after so many years of polemics, of emphasis on the differences that still exist, on thought, and events throughout the world.

No one suddenly found a magic solution? There was a process which shows that the Chinese comrades look at the world in an entirely new way. They are more open--even though cautious--and on our side there was the consideration, declared solemnly at the congress, of the importance for world progress, for movements of liberation, for social aspirations and for peace, of a great country like China which in the concert of nations is recognized for the weight it has. This means that all sides--and therefore we, too--should strive for normal relations.

Having said this, I want to emphasize that the fact that this trip required long preparation emphasizes the importance of the decision. In addition, to some extent, it distinguishes it from other trips that has the characteristics of meetings, even of political meetings. I do not say that they were only pleasure trips, but that they were not intended as phases of common reflection on the past, on the present and future possibilities. In brief, just to speak clearly: It was much simpler to invite Fanfani, and for Fanfani to accept the invitation, since nothing was to come out of the trip that was new between the Chinese Communist Party and the Italian Christian Democratic Party. Therefore, the fact that we required time and that there was a preparation, demonstrates that it is something important to both sides.

Question: What you say is interesting because Berlinguer's coming visit to China and his meeting with Brandt, are episodes which emphasize if not precisely a revival of Eurocommunism--since one of its principal partners, France, dropped out--certainly the independence of the PCI.

Answer: Even the meeting with Willy Brandt was not without importance. And I hope that soon the same thing will happen with Mitterrand. After all, this already has happened with Soares and with Felipe Gonzalez, when Berlinguer went to Spain and to Portugal. And when Soares came to Rome we met him each time. The meeting with Brandt at this time falls into a line of development of our relations with the great parties of the workers movement, which is not identified either with political identity on every question, nor with a historical matrix such as that of the Third Internationale, nor with ideological identity even though they all are important. I can say that soon we will have meetings with Laborites and Scandinavian Social Democrats, and this will not be by chance.

Question: On the other hand, this spectacular revival of the communist initiative comes at a particularly delicate international moment. You also emphasized at the last communist Central Committee meeting the continuity and consistency of your party's policy. But it is the other political forces and real situations that change: That is, the symmetry in relations of international forces changes. If all this is true, what effect will they have now on the PCI in this historical situation and what is the picture that can emerge from them?

Answer: First of all, when I emphasize the continuity of a process, I do not mean that things always remain as they once were and that if something has changed, it is only because the others have changed. No, continuity of process means to move in a direction, to have looked around us, to have become aware that for quite some time the existence of an international organization of communists, or of a center of direction, are things that belong to the past, it means having become aware that a unity of the workers movement involves having relationships, in different ways, in the confrontation with socialists and social democrats in every country. Furthermore, it means that there is an ongoing process of reflection and rethinking also in those parties, and that therefore our judgment concerning them must be more up to date and must take account of these developments.

The same thing is true regarding the liberation movements, from which it would be absurd for us to ask, in exchange for internationalist cooperation, an ideological identity or even less to go about seeking common historical roots which would be very difficult to find.

We are cooperating today with all liberation movements: The other day we celebrated a demonstration with the small Polasario Front [Fronte Polisario--Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro], and we are making contacts with the Indian Congress Party which is something larger but also quite different and also very much different from us.

We must not confuse internationalism such as cooperation, such as solidarity, such as the search for convergences--which at times can be only on certain specific points, at times entirely accidental--with identity. We do not believe that the Comintern should be rebuilt, nor do we believe that we must belong to a socialist internationale. We have a different view of the processes and we believe that we do not need to contain them or enclose them in organizational terms. Above all, we want to have specific research, original research, research that is independent of anyone: No one offers a plan or hands out membership cards that can be accepted by the others as a condition for cooperation.

Question: I want to ask you another question that comes out of the China problem. In presenting the trip to the Central Committee you explained that it is not against anyone. It was believed that you were referring to the Soviet Union. I thought you were also referring to the rank and file of the Communist Party, or to both. Why this concern, why this explanation?

Answer: Because today there are relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, which are colored by bitter tension, by bitter polemics. We have always desired to avoid condemnation, anathema, excommunications: Every time we have participated in communist conferences we have said this, and we have never signed documents of a certain view. We certainly do not go to Peking because we have become converted to the other church or to excommunicate Moscow. We believe that no one has an exclusive right to hurl anathema. There are positions that we do not share as regards Chinese policy. We have said this. We will speak. We do not go to convert nor are we easy to convert. We go to understand and to be understood. This, after all, is also true for Moscow, as we have always done.

Question: The PCI at present is following a rather delicate line. I believe that one of the symptoms of this delicacy is demonstrated in the attitude, the dissent, that has emerged in the PCI concerning the parliamentary motion on Italian foreign policy. You have described it as an episode of tabloid reporting. You already said something more than the others who tried to minimize it by considering it a sort of incident along the way. Someone instead had a different explanation. There are those who justified the "no" of the dissidents saying that the "game is not worth the candle," and that in practice it insinuated an accusation of opportunism concerning the attitude of the PCI. Others, and I refer to the statement by your assistant leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Alinovi, attach importance to the event and explain that the party had decided to vote yes on the motion, above all warning about the dangers of the attitude of "the worse, the better." Alinovi pretends to answer Magri but in reality he is addressing the dissidents. At this point it is difficult to speak of a limited episode, because a debate has been opened, and above all 30 dissident deputies--I do not say 60, I say 30--are not an episode. Then, can we speak about a "trend" within the PCI, even excluding the problem of the "fringe groups?"

Answer: First of all I want to explain: I do not know how many dissident deputies there are. They certainly numbered more than 1 and certainly less than 60. I believe that they number even less than 30.

When I spoke about tabloid reporting I referred to a vote and therefore to a rupture in the practices of the party, of a moral uprightness. My opinion, which refers to a "mode" of behavior, cannot be set against differences of opinion and even dissent freely expressed, both later in the meetings of parliamentary groups and in the Central Committee. We published everything. Therefore I do not consider that those who expressed their open dissent belong in the field of tabloid reporting. This has nothing to do with a "new" way of voting, and I believe that the thing will not be repeated; it even made the comrades who allowed themselves to be dragged along by their irritation, by their dissent, to reflect.

Certainly, the international situation is difficult and problems are posed, I believe, with connection, that can certainly not be mechanical, with the problems of domestic policy. But the connection, which invites thought, sometimes also leads to simplifications. It would be absurd to deny that in a party like ours, which is made up of people who are concerned with politics--and precisely because it is not a party that is divided up into competing groups, a militant does not know right away that his group leader is right and that the leader of the other group is wrong--there are so many militants, even cadres, above all in the Central Committee, who question themselves, who criticize, or who justify the limits of an action such as that which happened in Parliament. It was an action which basically was a kind of defensive battle which prevented the extremist groups on the right from gaining acceptance for their policy of retaliation, to push forward the question of boycotting the Olympics, of annuling this bright idea of neutrality, which even was a war horse for the foreign minister.

I, for example, did not sign the motion nor did I vote. But I participated in the executive committee of the group to say that, aside from the philological question, I would have signed the motion and in any case I would have voted fully according to my conscience in taking this correct action, and not only in a spirit of discipline.

Question: Let us deal now with a question you are particularly interested in. The Yugoslav question. The attack against Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union, directly or through third parties or nations, is something particularly serious because it is not just any attack: It is an open form of pressure at a delicate time in Yugoslav political life precisely when the post-Tito period is beginning. And there is a problem that I believe also involves the PCI to the degree to which it is tied in a special way to the League of Yugoslav Communists. How do you consider these attacks in this situation?

Answer: I wrote, even recently, that I consider Yugoslavia to have had the great merit of turning to its advantage the difficult situation it was in in 1948 (Expulsion from the Cominform). I say it had the merit of turning it to its advantage in the sense that it sought an original path and demonstrated that there was not a division of the world into two parts. It was expelled also because of our responsibility and by our error, but Yugoslavia nevertheless did not go over to the imperialist camp. It drew from its experience the possibility of being an example and also had the strength to indicate that road of nonalinement, which along with it also was an anti-imperialist road which did not identify with the socialist camp or with the communist parties. And today we see that Yugoslavia has drawn from that experience the power also to look toward a post-Tito period, which can be close, with a certain security.

We consider that if one wants to understand foreign policy and the international situation, complex as it is, through affairs of the Far East to the happy--for the time being--solution of Zimbabwe, a key to understanding this mosaic with all its contradications and at the same time as an element of comfort, can be found by observing and even understanding Yugoslavia. Certainly not by underestimating it or even less attacking it or distorting its position on foreign policy.

We do not have a position on Yugoslavia that is identical on all these questions. We do not want to be identical except with our own positions and to be also capable of changing. However, we are close to Yugoslavia and we consider that essentially its policy is similar to ours.

Question: We come to the last question concerning the Afghanistan crisis. You have already expressed your position on the Afghan crisis. But since that crisis exploded, almost 3 months have passed and in the meantime many things have happened. Among them are some attempts to resolve the problem diplomatically, or politically and diplomatically together. There was also the European proposal of a neutralization of Afghanistan and there was the negative reply from the Soviet Union. Considering this Soviet policy, can we speak of a Moscow "change," and above all, do you still think your old opinion of the USSR as a "nation of socialism with some illiberal traces" is still valid?

Answer: Everything is connected with the Afghanistan crisis, but there is no immediate connection with the problems of Soviet domestic policy, or with its illiberal aspects.

We learned from experience, even bitter experience, that conflicts, even armed conflicts, among socialist nations are possible. Some seem to express great surprise concerning military intervention as though it were the first time, or as though there had been no conflict--fortunately ended within a few weeks--between China and Vietnam, or as though Vietnam had not invaded Cambodia. We are less chidish than some believe.

Having said this, we have considered that intervention as proof that the revolutionary movement in Afghanistan showed it did not have profound roots. We condemned the intervention because of the way it was conducted. Once more--as in other cases, we asked for negotiations: We asked that the independence of the country be guaranteed as an element of peace for all, and therefore we opposed warlike hysteria or retaliation from the other side.

I must say that not much progress has been made. Perhaps there are more possibilities for discussion--I would like to be more optimistic--than some weeks or months ago. I see that hysteria, beginning with the absurdity of boycotting the Olympics, or of praise of economic retaliation seem to be decreasing.

On the other hand, even recently, we saw the publication of statements. We are on the terrain of words--but negotiations begin with words--by the Soviet Union in which there is a repetition of the willingness to negotiate, and it should be recalled that a guarantee of Afghanistan's borders from outside interference was sought. Therefore I believe in an action that tends, not to neutralize Afghanistan--since declaring its neutrality or otherwise is part of the nation's right to independence--but I believe that it would be possible to achieve, through negotiations, the independence of Afghanistan, its condition as a nonalined state. We have looked favorably on any action in this direction.

When we deplored the policies of retaliation, or hysterical manifestations, we did it always explicitly saying that it seemed to us that this represented an obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution: A solution whose premise was--we have always said this--that the Afghans would also be present at the negotiations and that their independence, not only their autonomy, would be guaranteed by all and therefore even by the evacuation of Soviet troops.

If we have been utopian, I point out that recently we saw the end of guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe that lasted more than 10 years, and the heads of an army that had cracked down, attacked and tortured the guerrilla fighters were charged with integration of the partisan forces into the Zimbabwe Army. This was something that could have seemed, I will not say utopian, but absurd. Even though that country is far away, today I feel it closer than any others because it gives us hope that even the most difficult things can be resolved without poisoning conflicts and without expanding them.

6034
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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO COALITION GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French Mar 80 pp 11, 181-195, 275

[Article by Arrigo Levi: "Italy: Its Problems and Its Political Parties." Arrigo Levi was born in Modena in 1926. He has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Bologna. A journalist, he was editor of LA STAMPA until 1978. He contributes regularly to numerous publications, including the TIMES of London and NEWSWEEK. He is the author of many works, notably "Il Potere in Russia" [Power in Russia]; "Viaggio tra gli Economisti" [Travels Among Economists] (1970); and coauthor of "Communismo da Budapest a Praga" (19690 and "Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics" (1969); passages enclosed in slantlines given in Italian]

> [Text] Italy demonstrates a mysterious capacity to survive the trials by which it is beset. Of all the democracies "in crisis," the Italian case differs in the intensity, not the nature, of the tensions which are at play in that country. The reasons for this are in the first place historical and tied to ambitions which exceed their means. The parties have a difficult role, that of absorbing tensions. The PCI [Communist Party of Italy] is an anomaly in political life; it has great capacity for adaptation, while still remaining faithful to itself. The crisis is said to have originated in the fall of 1979, at the time of the world oil crisis. During these difficult years, there have also been positive economic and political actions. The political vitality of the country has remained intact during the years of "emergence." Recent election results may have led other countries to believe that the crisis was over; however, the story of that crisis has not yet ended.

In the West when we speak about the "crisis of the democracies," and we speak about it a great deal, we always come to the point of saying that in certain democracies the crisis is much more serious than in others. The list of endangered democracies has for years always included Italy. Other democracies are experiencing strikes, but none more than Italy. Other democracies are suffering from savage inflation, but none more than Italy.

Other democracies are confronted by terrorism, but none more fiercely than Italy. Other democracies are having difficulty forming majority governments, but in Italy the "crisis of governability" means nothing more nor less than the absence for long periods of all majority government, if not even the impossibility of forming governments, an impossibility accompanied by successive premature dissolutions of Parliament. Finally, and above all, no other democracy combines all these problems in one and the same package, to the same serious degree.

When we speak of "Italy in agony," to borrow a headline from TIME, we always end up by also saying that this extraordinary country demonstrates a mysterious capacity to survive the very serious trials by which it is beset. Unending dangers threaten its political and social equilibrium; no solution at times seems posiible; and, yet, Italy always manages to come out of its crises. Are we in the presence of a new model of "acrobatic democracy?" The "Florentine spirit" of the Italians seems to be an inexhaustible resource, capable of inventing absurd formulas, such as the "parallel convergences" of which Aldo Moro spoke one day, which satisfy everybody and permit the parties to form governments, even when in theory no agreement seems possible.

This anarchic society in conflict has extraordinary vitality. The economic growth of Italy in our time is lower than that of only a very few other countries of the world. Six years after the first great oil crisis, the Italian balance of payments is one of the most solid. Reserves of gold and foreign exchange are among the largest, and this in spite of the fact that Italy has scarcely any energy resources of its own.

During its long history, Italy has rarely demonstrated such vitality; a vitality more pervasive than ever throughout the world, in the form of its literature, its art, its movies, its fashions, its cuisine, but also its industrial design, its great dams, its factories and its industrial products. The Italian contribution to the major cultural and political developments of our times is remarkable; sufficient to this watershed in history is but to name the /updating/ of the Church, and that other /updating/ which bears the name of Eurocommunism. Rome, without a doubt, is the capital of these two movements.

Italian society is a bit anarchic and perhaps ungovernable. However, in spite of these two characteristics, or even because of them, Italian society continues to be a vital and essential part of the Western world. An understanding of the "Italian case" means a better understanding of the West, its qualities and its contradictions, its vices and its virtues, the manifestation of which is perhaps only exaggerated in today's Italy. We must attempt to understand to what degree the fear expressed from time to time is justified: Will Italian democracy survive?

Crisis of Democracy and the Italian Case

It is often said that the crisis of contemporary democracies is the result of the selfsame success of democracy. The requirements for participation, the demand for equality and universal well-being, imposes upon the democratic state a surfeit of tasks which it can never accomplish to the satisfaction of all its citizens. The "rising expectations" of the masses are always frustrated. Individuals and social groups demand the attention of an overburdened state which, being unable to satisfy everybody, finishes by losing its credibility and its authority. Everyone is continually raising his voice to be heard. Social conflicts become inflamed. At the economic level, inflation is the indicator of this state of affairs: Inflation is the measure of the distance separating desires from the possibilities of satisfying them.

That is a typical picture of the contemporary democracies, not just of Italy. If the "Italian case" is different, it is not because of the nature, but the intensity of social relations. Raymond Aron said one day that no society which is the offspring of the French Revolution will ever be able to completely satisfy the promise of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity for all. Every democratic society is, therefore, by its very nature, unstable: Democracy is always "in crisis." However, the instability of contemporary Italian society is quite special and must be explained. It is a society still "mobilized"--according to the definition of the American political scientist, Peter Lange--which is engaged in a dramatic debate with itself on the great problems of justice and democracy, whose interest, moreover, is universal, not just Italian.

What, then, are the basic reasons, within the framework of the crisis of contemporary democracy, for the existence of an "Italian case?" There are several explanations: At times the "Latin character" is brought up; there is a search for the key to the drama in history; there is a demand for an explanation from sociology or economics. The recent history of Italy is somewhat special. Fascism was an Italian creation; it continues to be the model for many totalitarian regimes, which today are typical of the developing countries. What is more, the Italian left, which is an exceptional case in the West, was marked since its origin by characteristics typical of the revolutionary left of Eastern Europe. Fascism and communism are to be found elsewhere in the West; however, nowhere are the two to be found at the same time at this level of power and solidarity in the period of a single generation. Italy is unquestionably European; but it is also unquestionably a border country between the East and West, between the North and South. Even its industrialization and its massive urbanization are clearly lagging behind almost all the other big countries of the West.

Postwar Italy was aware of being behind its new partners, and it was in a hurry to narrow the gap. The major tensions of the new Italian democracy--the result, let us not forget, of an authentic popular movement--seem to be linked with this condition of a country with retarded development, in comparison with its neighbors, and with powerful processes of modernization born of the passionate desire to be "like the others." The great vitality of spontaneous neocapitalism in postwar Italy is the offspring of this psychological condition. In Italy, we have for a long time thought, as in all of the West, that economic growth would provide the answer to all the social and political problems, by making Italy a country "like the others." Today, we know, thanks to rich experience acquired in many countries, that modernization is in fact itself the source of great transformations and, therefore, crises.

Development, by its very nature, is the source of imbalances, not stability. It favors certain regions or certain social strata to the detriment of others; it concentrates power in the hands of those who have the greatest spirit of initiative, or the most power. The poor are in danger of becoming, or thinking that they are, even poorer. Membership in the European Community, by accelerating the growth rate of the Italian economy, has doubtless at the same time accentuated the dualist character of this economy and this society. Sectors which were lagging behind found themselves relatively deprived of resources, and the state's efforts to favor the development of southern Italy have been like the labors of Sisyphus.

An impatient and ambitious society, ever frustrated in its expectations, has ended up becoming more and more in conflict. Perhaps it wished too soon to imitate the example of richer countries which it took for models and partners. Such a society could not be satisfied by its governments, whose authority was increasingly contested. Defiance of the state, which is proper to the Italian tradition, has thus reached pathological levels.

From this viewpoint, the Italian crisis appears to be a "growing pains crisis." However, we may also fear that this crisis will finish by leading this democracy into a fatal decline.

The Italian Communist Party

Between the "Italian case" and the generalized, without being universal, conditions of the "crises of democracies," the differences have deep historical, social and economic roots. If we forget this, we run the risk of posing moralist explanations, which are not false per se, but which are not of much help in understanding the real dimensions of the problems of Italian democracy.

When we endlessly reiterate that the crisis of this democracy is "the fault of the parties," that it is the product of the arrogance of the Christian Democratic Party [DC], of the Sovietism of the PCI, of the indecision of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], we are of course stating truths, but partial truths. We must be aware of the seriousness of the tensions which the parties have to face. The "aggregation" of a society which is so divided and uneasy is asking for difficult compromises, which the parties are realizing, at the risk, however, of reducing the effectiveness and coherence of the political choices. The parties absorb tensions; they partially prevent the tensions from causing explosions in society and expressing themselves in open conflicts, at the price of parliamentary compromises which unfortunately produce much /misrule/.

At the heart of this situation, we find the principal anomaly of Italian political life for the last 30 years, the Communist Party. This political fact is not easily explained by the socioeconomic realities to which it is linked. For a generation, the rapid development of and notable improvement in the standard and quality of life have permitted Italy to draw nearer to the other European countries. Italian society has transformed its customs, its view of life, its habits. The fact that the Communist Party has remained so strong, if not even stronger than ever, is a bit of a mystery. However, we could say the same thing about the French Communist Party. The big parties are resistant organisms, capable of adapting themselves to important changes. The PCI has shown that it has extraordinary capacities for adaptation, while still continuing to be itself.

What are the result and meaning of these changes? Concerning Eurocommunism and the PCI, we can formulate three basic hypotheses: It may have merely modified itself cosmetically; i.e., its tactics for the winning of power. The second hypothesis is that the PCI is in reality a true social-democratic party, without taking its name, and apart from what remains of its ties with Moscow; however, this would merely be a matter of appearances to better get around the proletariat. The first hypothesis is that of the extreme right, the second of the extreme left. Most Italian political observers and thinkers recognize a third hypothesis: The change in the PCI is real and sincere but incomplete and contradictory, of such kind that one might still fear that this "democratic" development will stop and be reversed.

Allowing everyone the freedom to choose between one or the other interpretation, we must, however, emphasize that the Communist Party is seen in all sincerity in different ways by different persons. Each believes in his Communist Party. More than that, the PCI itself has doubts about its own endlessly evolving identity, at least in the conception it has of that identity. The fact that the second largest Italian party, which represents one-third of the electorate, has such a fuzzy identity is in itself extraordinary, almost unique in the contemporary political conjuncture. Of all the peculiarities of Italian society, this fuzziness continues to be the strangest. It is not easy to deal with such a "mysterious object."

Nevertheless, this object exists, is even an essential part of Italian society; and one Italian out of three sees himself in it. Above and beyond the Pirandellian problem of its identity, it continues to be our Communist Party; we recognize quite well its faults and its qualities, its ambiguities and its missions, its dedication and its duplicities, its strengths and its real torments. And we recognize in its troubled identity, midway between the East and West, the troubled identity of Italy at this point in its history, a border country of the democratic world.

We cannot give clear and simple answers to those who might wish them, with Manichaean black and white, concerning the Communist Party, but rather ambiguous and uncertain answers; to do otherwise would be to grossly deceive them. The fact that the Communist Party is supported by one-third of the voters, that its strength is such that it is almost impossible to govern without it--this was the subject of the last major speech given by Aldo Moro before his party in March 1978, a few days before he was kidnaped--notwistanding the failure of most of the other parties to fully accept it as a normal democratic party and as a partner in government. This situation, the essence of the "ungovernability crisis" of Italy, is not the product of the stupidity of the parties: It has its roots in the social and political reality which the parties must take into account.

Even today, we cannot conceive of the complete "normalisation" of the PCI, a condition for the "normalisation" of our democracy, without a prior "normalisation" of society. For the moment, the contradictions continue to be real; and we must admit that contradictions do not easily disappear; one can be contradictory and sincere, ambiguous and real.

However, if the basic problem of Italian politics is not the result of a defective election law nor of the bad will of the parties, if the sources of the political instability of Italian democracy are more profound, that means that the "normalisation" of Italian political life will not be effected easily, neither by a feat of political prestidigitation nor through the charismatic action of a leader. Above and beyond "different" parties, there is a "different" society. Profound changes are needed before Italian democracy comes out of the crisis.

Birthdate of the Crisis

The analysis which we have outlined and which gives more than customary importance to socioeconomic events and less to the actions of parties should not, however, give the impression that the Italian cadre is immobile in time. After all, this same Italy has had stable and strong governments for long periods. The crisis was there, but it remained a "physiological" fact. I believe that we can specify at what moment there was a movement from the physiological to the pathological: The real crisis has a birthdate--which permits the hope that it will come to an end one day. What is that birthdate? Some think that the major watershed in contemporary Italian history should be placed in the Warm Fall of 1969: The rise in worker wages and union power, as well as the development of new movements of the extreme left of student origin, the birthdate of which is to be found in 1967, very nearly date from this period. The "governability" of the Italian economy, the capacity for accumulation and self-financing of companies, received a very heavy blow: Inflation soon began its mad climb.

Personally, however, I prefer to choose a later date as the point of departure of the Italian political crisis, which is still prevalent today. I suggest the date of the fall of 1973, the date of the oil crisis. That event had nothing to do with Italy; however, it brought about a breakdown in the process of Italian economic development and, less directly, the entry of our political system into crisis. During the summer of 1973, a new and ambitious government of the center-left, from the Christian Democrats to the Socialists, could still be formed, the fourth Rumor government. The direction of economic policy and the revival of structural reforms had been entrusted to what was called the "troika" of finance ministers: Colombo, La Malfa and Giolitti, three capable men. Then the oil bomb exploded and the world's economy was soon plunged into the great postwar depression, which hit Italy, a country without energy resources and with an economy closely tied to the health of the world market, in a dramatic way. It was necessary to submit to a stringent policy of monetary stability to keep Italy in the European Community and to maintain its position in the world market. The major reforms, which should have eased the tensions and satisfied the social demand roused by the Warm Fall, had to be abandoned or postponed until later. Before anything else, it was necessary to face up to the "emergence."

In the years which followed, governments were founded on apparently fragile coalitions, still from the center-left until the 1976 elections, with an increasing participation by the communists after that date. These governments managed to adopt austere policies which were crowned with success. However, the consequences were rough for Italian society and the parties: That was the end of the center-left alliance between the Christian Democrats, lay parties and Socialists; that was the crisis of the Christian Democratic Party, which was unpopular as the perennial /government party/ or, as it was said at that time, as the /master race/ and which was involved in a series of scandals; that was the explosion of inflation, violent social conflicts, unemployment; that was the birth of terrorism. All of this dates from that period which falls between the end of 1973 and 1975-1976. Of course, the roots of all these problems were deep; however, it was the great crisis in the world economy which triggered the explosion. The "Italian case," the source of great concern for the entire West, dates from this watershed: The oil crisis cast absurd shadows on the future of Italian democracy.

Positive Actions in the Fact of the Crisis

In the face of such external challenges and growing internal tensions as inflation--the critical indicator of many imbalances--or terrorism, Italian society, in its parties, social organizations, businesses, even its individuals, reacted not just with a hardening of the conflicts, but also with constructive actions, even if at times they proved to be contradictory.

I will limit myself to mentioning in passing a remarkable economic and somewhat mysterious phenomenon, which recently attracted attention: After having built up an elaborate combination of fiscal and union rules and regulations, of /traps and snares/, which slowed down the functioning of productive activities, Italian society skillfully created in the 1970's a "parallel economy" which is a triumph of free initiative and the free market. This less-encumbered economy stepped up the initiatives of a spontaneous and results-producing protocapitalism, capable of finding new openings in world markets and of contributing to the remarkable recovery of trade and the balance of payments. The dividing line between the "official" economy and the "black" economy is quite blurred: On both sides of the line we find the same spirit of initiative. The contribution of the "black" economy to the national product is evaluated at 10 or 25 percent of the official figures.

In the political sector, after 1975, the dominant fact was the increasing participation of the communists in the government, on the periphery and in the center. We can speak of "rampant historical compromise," but not without specifying that this involves a failed compromise, in the sense that it had not led to the participation of the PCI in the national government, as the leaders of the party wished. However, between 1976 and 1979, there was a partial political compromise. The Communist Party, at first by abstention and then as a recognized member of the majority, supported the governments which counted on the support of all the parties, with the sole exception of the MSI (Neofascist Party). The programs and acts of these governments were the product of close official collaboration between the "democratic" parties and the Communist Party, collaboration judged necessary to face up to the "emergence." The Communist Party participated in the government, at local levels, from municipalities to regions, and parliament, by obtaining the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, which it retains, and a proportional number of presidencies in powerful parliamentary committees, which it lost in 1979. Its participation was essential to permit the "national solidarity" governments, which followed one another in those difficult years and which were presided over by Mr Andreotti, to carry out a policy of economic austerity without arousing the opposition of the unions.

In fact, there was a uniquely Italian "social pact," which produced positive economic results and assured the Republic of the loyalty of the great majority of citizens in the face of the terrorist offensive: Economic crisis and terrorism, such were the two pivotal points of the emergence. Terrorism was the revolt of a narrow revolutionary minority disappointed by the historical and political compromise of national solidarity which was made necessary by the crisis.

However, terrorism revealed the existence in Italy of social tensions and psychological malaises which, at this level of intensity, are unparalleled in the West. Therefore, we must go back to the origin of terrorism, as it is analyzed in Italy. The Communist Party bears a great share of the responsibility. From the beginning, terrorism used the same revolutionary "family lexicon" and took up the expressions of Rossana Rossanda (one of the leaders of the manifesto) which the PCI had used for a long time. We can attribute a second, less obvious responsibility to the PCI: For an entire generation, the PCI made impossible the emergence of an alternative majority, a majority of the left, by cutting itself off from the other parties because of its ties to the Soviet Union and because of its Leninist doctrines. That is what Italian political commentators have called "factor

K," which fatally weakened the left and imposed the maintenance in the government, for too long a period, of a single party and a single social class. The party principally responsible for Italian /imperfect bipartisanism/ was certainly the PCI.

In the meantime, it was the Christian Democratic Party which remained in power all that while, and it is, therefore, to it and its allies that we must impute the decline in the authority of the state, malgovernance, acts of corruption, poor management of public property, exploitation of public enterprises for the interests of the party. It is against this system of government, against this "party of occupation," that a wave of protest swept out of broad sectors of the social corps, including a mad minority which degenerated into terrorism.

Terrorism never succeeded in becoming the detonator of a vast explosion. The measures taken to combat it remained within the limits of democratic legality, to the point of tolerating for too long a time the incessant acts of violence in the universities and factories and the open preaching of terrorist violence. Without being uprooted and isolated, as in West Germany, terrorism has not succeeded in becoming a real revolutionary movement. Because of that also, we must acknowledge that some credit is due the leaders of the Communist Party who wholeheartedly supported the policy of the Christian Democratic governments and gave their entire support to the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party during the tragic days of the kidnaping of Aldo Moro. If the government did not yield to the backmail of the terrorists, we also owe this to the firmness of the secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, Mr Zaccagnini, and his friends. The support of a great dying Pope, whose troubled conscience at the time had moments of sublime illumination, was also decisive.

Vitality of Political Life

In often dramatic, at times even tragic, circumstances, the Italy of these so-called years of "emergence" experienced, in spite of everything, an unprecedented period of political vitality. Major debates, such as those caused by the referendums on divorce, powers of the police and public financing of parties, continually occupied a society which was studying and criticizing itself without pity. And it is a fact that the most advanced points of view always carried the day. During these same years, new institutions were inaugurated, particularly regional institutions. Increasingly iconoclastic media gave the image of a country of debates for which nothing any longer was sacred. It was not only the Palace; i.e., the Christian Democratic Party and the entire establishment, as advanced by Pasolini, the writer, which was subjected to a veritable trial, but society as a whole.

The results at the electoral level were unexpected. An electorate up to that time immobile which, for dozens of years, had evolved with geological slowness, suddenly acquired a new dynamism. At this point I present a table of the results of Italian elections, limited to the three big parties. I have added the 1979 European Parliamentary elections to the list and one administrative election, that of 1975, which signaled an electoral watershed and marked the maximum rapprochement between the two largest parties. All the other results are for elections to the Chamber of Deputies.

Electoral Table

Years	DC	PCI	PSI	Difference Between DC and PCI
1946[1]	35.2	18.9	20.7	16.3
1948[2]	48.5		31.1	--
1953	40.0	22.6	12.7	17.4
1958	42.4	22.7	14.3	19.7
1963	38.3	25.3	13.9	13.0
1968[3]	39.1	27.0	14.5	12.1
1972	38.7	27.2	9.6	11.5
1975[4]	35.0	33.7	12.0	1.4
1976	38.7	34.4	9.6	4.3
1979[5]	38.3	30.4	9.8	9.9
1979[6]	36.5	29.6	11.0	6.9

1. Socialists and Social Democrats were still united.

2. In 1948, the PCI and Socialist Party formed the unified "National Front" slate.

3. In 1968, the Socialists and Social Democrats had recently united, only to separate again after these elections.

4. Votes were cast in 15 regions: The fact that administrative elections were being held surely had an impact on the results, to the advantage of the PCI.

5. Parliamentary elections.

6. Elections for the European Parliament.

We might well ask outselves whether the 1975 administrative elections did not save the Christian Democratic Party from what in 1976 could have been a veritable electoral debacle. At the time of the 1976 elections, under the influence of the great fear which had taken hold of the Italian middle class, the fear of the /takeover/--it was really thought that the communists could defeat the Christian Democrats in crisis all the more so because they had been behind them by only 1.4 percentage points in 1975--part of the lay electorate of the center abandoned the small parties, particularly the Social Democrats and liberals, to come to the aid of the Christian Democratic Party, by voting for it as the last rampart against communism. The DC was helped because it was in crisis, even though it was thought to have earned that crisis. The slogan of the GIORNALE of Montanelli was: "Hold your nose and vote for the DC."

No takeover occurred; however, these elections marked the end of the center-left alliance: The PSI demanded that it participate in the governmental responsibilities of the PCI and refused to continue sacrificing itself for the DC. What we might call the "Compromise Parliament" or the "national solidarity" parliament to effect "emergence" had only lasted 3 months, during which the PCI had succeeded in having itself accepted as a member of a government coalition, in the fourth Andreotti government, which was formed on 11 March 1978 and which obtained a crushing majority following the kidnaping of Aldo Moro, the principal craftsman of this entente. However, the PCI did not succeed in being accepted as a full partner in the government.

Pressed by the discontent of its rank and file who say the "great revolutionary party" as nothing more than the last in a long list of "water carriers" for the Christian Democratic Party, the PCI finished by addressing an ultimatum to the DC: Accept it in the government or find it in the opposition. After several hesitations--Fanfani himself had at one point considered accepting admission of the PCI into the government to help fight for the "emergence", but Aldo Moro contented himself with theorizing on the impossibility of governing the country in crisis without and against the communists--the DC once again pronounced its non possumus. Acceptance of the communists in the government would have caused a fatal schism within the party. The Christian Democratic Party also refused to yield the presidency of the council to a lay party member, Ugo La Malfa, of the Republican Party, as had been proposed by the president of the republic, Socialist Sandro Pertini, successor to Christian Democrat Giovanni Leone, who had to resign following a rough press campaign (he was accused of having committed indiscretions).

Thus, for the second time, the point had been reached of an early dissolution of Parliament. The 1979 elections found an Italy economically stronger but a country in which terrorism was still raging. The DC had recovered a certain amount of confidence in itself, thanks to the successes of the Andreotti government and the popularity of its head, the /honest man/, Zaccagnini. The Communist Party was disappointed by its recent experiences, Eurocommunism, and its quasi-participation in the government. The Socialist Party seemed to have recovered its confidence in its future, under a rejuvenated leadership, and thanks to the rapprochement with the large European Social Democratic parties, desired by its new secretary, Craxi.

Story Up to Now

Each of the three large parties called upon the electorate to strengthen its support: The DC to form a government which could forego the support of the communists; the PCI to impose its participation on the government;

the Socialists to place themselves in a position of arbiter of the situation. The electorate's answer was more sibylline than Solomonic: It said "no" to everything. The PCI lost ground, for the first time since the war, instead of gaining ground as was hoped. However, its voters did not all strengthen the DC or the Socialists; they gave their votes to a new party movement, the Radical Party, which was against everything and everyone, something that was not to make the situation more manageable. One week after the parliamentary elections, the voters returned to the polling places for the European Parliament: The electorate, "in a holiday mood," punished the two large parties even more severely.

We cannot reproach the parties for not having given the voters a clear choice. But the voters did not make a choice. The most serious setback was suffered by the PCI, which with one fell swoop lost almost all the ground gained at the time of the spectacular leap forward in 1975-1976. The "long march toward power" of the PCI, which had seemed to be inexorable, was brutally halted, just when the end seemed in sight.

After those elections, the communist challenge, therefore, lost its acuity. Added to the apparent running out of wind of terrorism and the good condition of finances, this event gave the entire world the impression that the greatest danger to Italian democracy was moving off. I do not wish to give the lie to these hopes; however, I must make it clear that the Italians themselves still have the impression that they are face-to-face with a political crisis, namely the participation of the communists in government. It has also refused, up to now, to yield the presidency of the council to the Socialist Party or to a member of a smaller party. It seems incapable of choosing between the "communist line" advocated principally by Mr Andreotti and the "socialist line" of which Mr Fanfani has made himself the champion.

The Socialists refuse to support a return of the center-left, unless they are given the presidency of the council. For Mr Berlinguer's party, nothing seems to have changed. However, its immobilism as regards the strategy of the "historical compromise" and the "philo-Soviet Atlantism"--if I may be permitted this neologism which seems to me to define best the party's international policy--does not make it more popular in the country. The party is experiencing a certain amount of malaise, and polemics are beginning within its ranks, the most violent of which was unleashed by one of the historical leaders, Mr Amendola, who represents the liberal, but not anti-Soviet wing of the party; he would like to see the PCI moderate its attitude as regards economic policy and harden it with respect to the leftists. On the other hand, he does not speak of the party's ties with the Soviet Union which continues to be one of the essential elements of "factor K" in spite of everything.

The exigencies of the political dialectic are progressively pushing the PCI into an increasingly intransigent opposition. However, the bonds of national solidarity have not been entirely broken, neither by the PCI nor the

Christian Democratic Party. All the contradictions, therefore, persist, all the knots of the Italian situation still in a tangle. We are expecting a congress of the Christian Democratic Party, perhaps in February 1980, during which the big choice probably will be made: At the time of this article's completion, on the eve of the New Year, the least difficult choice for the DC seems to be acceptance of a Socialist president of the council. Such a choice could lead to a new conception of "national solidarity," namely to a Socialist-Christian Democratic government from which the communists would be excluded, who nonetheless would support or at least tolerate the government.

It is still possible to find in this blocked legislation a governmental majority, even if up to now it seems not to exist--despite a coalition of center-left abstentions--which for the moment permits the minority government of Mr Cossiga which I might add, is rich in men of quality, to survive. The hesitations of the parties reflect the decisions of the electorate, which is more ready to punish than reward those who demonstrate courage.

The parties are aware that a third early election would advance the crisis even further along the road of the Weimar or the Fourth Republic. Happily, there is no Hitler on the horizon; unfortunately, however, there is no General de Gaulle to invent a new form of Democratic Republic. Therefore, the game continues to be dangerous; and, in the face of this danger, the parties and electorate share the responsibilities.

The history of the Italian democratic crisis is still an unfinished story, even if our foreign friends are manifestly concerning themselves less about it and are thinking that once again "the Italians" will indeed find a way out. We can imagine that the solution will come one day or another from the voters: The existence of a fluctuating electorate in Italy today leaves the door open to all kinds of surprises. Or we can also imagine that it will be the parties, and first and foremost the Communist Party, which will change their strategies. In my opinion, it is less easy to envisage a solution coming from institutional reforms, of which there is much talk without any result being produced. The fact remains that, in the difficult conditions being experienced today by Italy, the influence of the president of the republic seems to be growing.

What will be the outcome of this crisis? I do not know. However, I believe it will end well, in one way or another, provided the European unification process continues to progress. In this regard, admittedly, this is my profession of faith. However, this affirmation is based on good reasons. The European context is permitting the Socialists to regain the confidence they had lost. In this context, and as long as it continues to broaden, the PCI will be subjected to continual pressures, all of which will be oriented in the direction of its Westernization. The Europeanization of Italy will not come about without profound changes, which will impact on the very identity of our country, our parties, our political movements. We already see certain signs of evolution; however, the destination is still far away.

The reinforcement and development of European institutions, therefore, continue to be an absolute priority, for those who have an eye on the Italian crisis in all of its complexity and depth. All the Italian parties, even the communists who are not devoid of discretion, are in agreement on this point.

A more stable international economic order, in our eyes, also is of priority importance. We have already paid too dearly for the first world crisis in 1974-1975: Can we permit a second world crisis? There is reason to doubt it.

I have no shame whatever in ending this analysis of the Italian crisis, following many others, with this statement of European, Atlantist and internationalist faith, convinced as I am that a solid international framework could be a decisive factor in the development of our history. This does not prevent us from continuing to have full freedom ourselves to choose between the good road and the bad road.

Postscript

The first few weeks of 1980 have introduced new factors which do not, however, resolve the Italian political crisis.

The Socialist Party, after a crisis which culminated in a meeting of the Central Committee, which is "more important than a Congress," has hardened its positions. It is threatening to precipitate a governmental crisis by refusing, after the next Christian Democratic congress, to support the Cossiga government and by proposing, as the sole solution, a government with communist participation. The hypothesis of an intermediate solution (a government without the PCI but with a socialist president of the council) seems unlikely if not out of the question. However, the compromise which Mr Craxi, who is still secretary of the PSI, is offering to his adversaries of the left is not without ambiguity. The PSI confirms that it does not wish to precipitate /"a crisis in obscurity"/ and that it wishes at any price to avoid new early elections. The communists have taken a firmly anti-Soviet position with regard to the Afghan crisis: It is evident that they do not wish to be excluded from the Italian Government's dialectic. However, the majority of the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals refuse to accept them as partners in the government.

It is not easy to know the outcome of this impasse whose resolution is becoming urgent: The terrorist danger continues to be serious (the "revelations" of a terrorist, Fiorini, perhaps explain the historical relations existing between the "68," the extremists, the revolutionaries of "Autonomia," and the terrorists; however, these explanations have not enabled the authorities to prevent new acts of terrorism).

The economy, after a very favorable year, is experiencing a new period of crisis. The so-called years of "emergence" are still not ended; and it is against this that we must measure the Italian political class. Emergence and ungovernability still characterise the Italian situation at the beginning of the "dangerous" 1980's in a world which seems to be headed toward a new period of "Cold War," aggravated by the world energy crisis.

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TERMS, ADVANTAGES OF ALFA-NISSAN ACCORD

Rome IL FIORINO in Italian 26 Mar 80 p 5

[Text] In a statement released yesterday, Alfa Romeo fiercely defended its agreement with Nissan, claiming it is essential to Alfa's recovery and will be a boon to the Italian industry.

The basis of the Alfa Romeo-Nissan agreement is forthright in its industrial content and binds both parties to a common undertaking; it is essential to Alfa Romeo's restoration to health, and will also prove a good thing to the Italian auto industry.

These are the conclusions set forth in the statement released yesterday by the Italian auto company, through IRI, to refute all the objections voiced against the deal.

In fact, according to Alfa, to turn down the deal would run counter to the national interests and would in no way help to halt or even slow the Japanese auto industry's penetration of the European and Italian market. Rejecting it would mean an abrupt and very serious decline in Alfa Romeo's credibility at the international level.

Before getting to the heart of the issues, the document recounts in great detail all the background perliminaries that led to the agreement. On the basis of a projection of the future of the automobile industry conducted as part of the basis for elaborating a strategy for Alfa, it was found that the crucial problem was Alfa-Sud, whose saturation level is too low to make profitable management possible.

With the redimensioning options discarded a priori, extensive action was undertaken to assess the chances of practical collaboration with other companies. Alfa's sounding-out operations eventually involved almost every automobile maker in Europe, America, and Japan. Many of the feelers came to nothing, owing to lack of interest on the other side. Negotiations with Japan's Nissan, though, swiftly turned serious, and wound up in a solid, clear-cut agreement, although it took some time to overcome Nissan's tendency to view the Alfa approach as merely directed at Italian-based assembly of cars containing Japanese components.

And with that out of the way, we come at last to the content and the predictable consequences of the deal, as presented by Alfa Romeo.

Terms of the Agreement

The agreement, says Alfa's release, /is strictly confined/ to the production in Italy of 60,000 cars, all equipped with Alfa engines and transmission components, using body units from Nissan for a new body designed by Nissan with Alfa Romeo input. There is no loss of identity entailed: on the contrary, thanks to this agreement Alfa will get a new start internationally, and the deal will make all the difference in solving the economic and productivity problems that have plagued Alfa-Sud.

The salient points of the basis for agreement are these:

1. joint design, experimentation, and testing of a medium-size car, with styling consonant with Alfa Romeo's sports-car image;

2. steady annual production of 60,000 cars, half of which will be sold in Italy and half abroad;

3. Italian components and labor will account for 80 percent of the car's cost;

4. a corporation will be formed to handle the joint venture in Naples, with Alfa Romeo and Nissan holding equal interests, but with responsibility for operational management going to Alfa Romeo;

5. the corporation will build a plant at a site somewhere in Campania at a distance technically and economically compatible with the Alfa Sud plant, and will employ around 1,500 people.

6. the investment required for all this, to be shared equally by Alfa Romeo and Nissan, will come to something like 30 billion;

7. the new corporation, in addition to procuring engines and transmissions from Alfa-Sud, will also use Alfa-Sud for final

assembly and finishing, operations estimated to require the labor of some 2,000 workers.

Advantages to Alfa Romeo

Summarized, these would be:

better utilization of the Alfa-Sud facilities; they could, given limited additional investment, turn out 50 to 60 percent more engines, drive systems, and assembly jobs than they do today;

a contribution that will make all the difference in the economic recovery of Alfa-Sud and of the entire Alfa Romeo group;

the availability of the new Alfa-Nissan car will give Alfa time to design a "second-generation" Alfa-Sud car that will move up into a higher range in its share of the market;

realistic possibilities of better utilization of Alfa-Sud's existing manpower;

considerable polish for Alfa Romeo's image; the Japanese partner already is considered one of the top automakers, but operational management of the joint-venture corporation is to rest with Alfa Romeo;

substantial strengthening to Alfa Romeo's market position;

feasibility, as already mentioned, of additional new jobs -- about 1,500 of them in the new plant; Alfa also predicts that a good share of the 2,000 workers who will be needed at Alfa-Sud to handle the additional production will be newly hired.

Impact on the Italian Automobile Industry

Italian automakers turn out 1.5 million cars a year, and export 650,000 of them. There are about 1.4 million cars with Italian licence tags, including foreign-built cars, and since the new company plans to market only half the cars it builds here in Italy (30,000), the impact it could have on the domestic market is minimal, to say the least (2 percent). The remaining 30,000 cars are earmarked for export and will thus be providing a boost to our balance of payments to the tune of better than 100 billion lire each year.

Nissan's supplying some body components works out to imports of about 10 million tons of steel per year; to set that figure in its proper context, though, one must realize that Italy's steel output comes to around 25 million tons a year, and that its imports are well over 5 million tons (120,000 tons of which already come from Japan).

Effect on the European Automobile Industry

In the European Community countries -- the Alfa statement says -- some 10 million cars are produced each year; the European market as a whole is open to imports of foreign-built cars, although only Great Britain and Italy have foreign-car registrations in excess of 35 percent.

Total EEC imports of automobiles from non-Community countries in 1979 were about 1.3 million, 630,000 of them from Japan. US exports to the EEC are practically non-existent; however, it should be remembered that American subsidiaries produce more than 2.5 million cars a year in Europe (2.3 million in the EEC alone).

The Alfa Romeo-Nissan deal, viewed from this angle, clearly entails no market impact problems. The "irrelevance" of the Alfa-Nissan deal in this context is further confirmed even if we consider the future of the European automobile industry as a whole.

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CSO: 3104

NEW REGIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA

Milan IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 3 Apr 80 p 6

[Article by C. Gio.]

[Text] Trieste, 2 April -- After a lengthy crisis which practically brought all political and government activity to a halt for 4 months, Friuli-Venezia Giulia has a new regional government. The new junta, elected this morning, includes eight Christian Democrats, three Socialists, and one Republican. Christian Democrat Antonio Comelli, of Udine, was re-elected to the presidency of the executive board, which until 8 January of this year was composed exclusively of Christian Democrats, who ran things with the outside support of the other democratic parties.

The new regional slate got 31 votes from the 57 councilmen presemt (three had valid reasons for being absent). After many months of discussion and lengthy meetings, the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Republicans finally signed the political agreement document. According to what could be learned at the end of the session, the DC will get the following departments [assessorati]: Budget and Planning to Coloni, of Trieste; Local Governments to Tripani, of Gorizia; Agriculture to Mizzau, of Udine; Tourism and Trade to Bomben, of Pordenone; Public Works to Biasutti, of Udine; Health and Sanitation to Antonini, of Pordenone, and Transport, Traffic, and Highways to Rinaldi, of Trieste.

The new Department of Reconstruction will go to another DC man, Varisco, of Udine, as soon as legislation establishing it is passed. Named as deputy chairman of the regional council is the former head of Agriculture, and still another Friulian: Del Gobbo. The PSI will get three departments: Industry and Trades goes to De Carli, of Pordenone, Finance to Zanfagnini. of Udine, and Labor, Welfare, and Emigration to Renzulli, of Udine. The lone Republican, Dario Barnaba, of Udine, will head the Department of Education, Culture, and Vocational Training.

It should be noted that there were two members from Trieste, five from Udine, two from Gorizia, and three from Pordenone in the last regional government. The new distribution by provinces runs this way: two for Trieste, eight for Udine (including the president of the junta and the vice president of the regional council), three for Pordenone, and one for Gorizia. Isonzo province thus -- for what mysterious political alchemy no one can say -- has lost a seat in the junta. Gino Cocianni (he was Transport Assessor in the previous legislature) will go back to Trieste on the councilmen's bench, his place at the head of the department of Local Governments taken by former Finance chief Antonio Tripani. Isonzo's Christian Democrats, who lost their spokesmen in parliament in the political elections, will now be without a representative in regional government as well.

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MYSTERY SUB FOULS NETS, SPARKS SPECULATION IN FISHING FLEET

Naples IL MATTINO in Italian 16 Mar 80 p 11

[Article by Mario Obole]

[Text] Freed by the Sicilian fishermen whose nets had caught it, the submarine vanished into the depths.

The likeliest guess is that it was a Russian submarine that got itself all fouled up Friday afternoon in the nets dropped by the fishing trawler Socrates, in international waters 22 miles to the south of the island of Lampedusa. When, after repeated fruitless efforts to escape, the submarine finally managed to break free -- around 0530 yesterday morning -- it made off at top speed without surfacing, leaving its nationality officially unknown. Several of the Socrates' crewmen, though, as well as her captain, Vito Campo, were fairly sure that the language they heard from the very first moment of the vessel's frantic radio communications was Russian.

That is hardly a baseless assumption, though, when you recall that the Russians these days maintain a sizable fleet in the Mediterrannean, with more than 50 units including warships, support vessels, submarines, and eavesdropping craft equipped with the most sophisticated gear. Some of the crew apparently heard a Russian plane flying over the part of the sea where the submarine was trapped, while the vessel was struggling to free itself.

The whole drama, a real-life adventure for the crew of the Socrates and a pretty fearful ordeal for the crew of the submarine, began on Friday just at sundown. The Socrates, of 86 tons displacement, sails out of Mazara del Vallo, and carries a crew of six, counting her captain who, with his brother, is co-owner of the Socrates. The crew had just dropped their nets and were moving carefully to get them fully spread open, when they felt a very strong, sudden jerk, and noticed that something was pulling the Socrates off her course. When the first shock of surprise was over and they had finally got up power enough to offset the pull of the mysterious vector, it did not take them long to figure out what had happened. This time the hunter bagging the big game, in spite of itself, had been the little fishing trawler, one of the fishing craft too often caught unawares, halted, searched, and towed with their crews and catches into some Libyan, Maltese, Tunisian port or other by one of the countries that are -- or believe they are -- masters of every fish that swims in the Mediterranean.

Radio signals went out in short order, and in no time there was a military craft standing by -- this one usually busy monitoring traffic in the Strait of Messina -- as well as several fishing vessels, including the Benedetto I, owned by the same Campo brothers. On both sides the laborious task of untangling the luckless catch began, and meanwhile other navy craft arrived, including the frigate Todaro and the minesweeper Sgombro, despatched from Marisicilia (solely as a precaution -- they told us at headquarters -- in case somebody should need help), and helicopters buzzed back and forth overhead.

They seemed to be making headway when one of the two steel cables securing the nets gave way. Even so, the submarine could not break out of the dreadful grasp that held it. It finally made it yesterday morning, after more than 12 hours in durance vile.

Quite apart from this particular case, the occurrence demonstrates once more that the Mediterranean these days is becoming an increasingly busy and difficult sea, and not just for fishing, either. This is not the first time something of this sort has happened: in 1978 another trawler out of Mazara del Vallo rescued the pilot of a Libyan aircraft, and recovered his copilot's body.

The best known of such incidents, however, and the one that touched off a real hullaballoo, was the one involving a libyan submarine and still another trawler from Mazara del Vallo, the Eschilo. It occurred just off Misuraca. The Eschilo was busy with fishing operations when suddenly a dark shape without any identifying markings appeared alongside her. Two fishermen who were cousins, Bartolomeo and Matteo Gargiola, were taken off her and carried off to Tripoli, where they were held for several months, then released.

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SARDINIANS PROTEST PLANNED MILITARY BASE ON ISLAND

Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 20 Mar 80 p 7

[Article by Antonio Masala]

[Text] "We've had to put up with too many barons in our time, and we don't want the military here now!"

Cabras, 19 March -- After a 2-day wait, four army helicopters set down at the foot of the Sinis mesa. The members of the defense committee of the Chamber of Deputies had scarcely time to glance around the proposed site for the controversial base when the rain started falling thick and fast, as the chill tramontana blowing up from the splendid beaches of Moimones and Is Aruttas sent all the bathers and baskers scurrying for cover.

On hand to greet the committee were Prefect Pietro De Luca, Carabinieri GCDR Scarano, Cabras Mayor Cesare Carta, San Vero Milis Mayor Antonio Ledda, Solarussa Mayor Gianni Deidda, Bauladu Mayor Italo Ortu, regional councilman Antonio Uras (PCI), and a good many Cabras city councilmen. After a hasty exchange of greetings, the party hurriedly repaired to Ramon's, a saloon that enjoyed a season or two of celebrity thanks to a couple of Westerns shot here by daring (and unlucky) filmmakers.

It was a scant few minutes before noon. As things turned out, though, it was not to be a proper "High Noon," despite what all the choreography and the issue at stake might have portended. The committee listened to all the expected angry "No's!" to the prospect of military radar installations, all the arguments put forth by the political parties (ranging from the MSI to the PSI), and finally to the outraged protests of local dignitaries at more of the high-handed tactics guaranteed to raise hackles here.

"We shall bear fully in mind," promised committee chairman Vito Angelini (PCI),"all your representations, and insofar as is feasible and insofar as military requirements permit, we shall express our opinion." They went no further, and probably that was just about as far as they could go. This openmindedness, coupled with scraps of sentences from a couple of commission members ("We might even consider some other alternative solution..."), while it hardly delighted anyone there, did at least rekindle hopes.

"We're not going to settle for postponement," declared Mayor Cesare Carta. "We don't like all this dragging things out. What we are asking, as we have said repeatedly, is that this base not be built, and that at last we can write off a matter that has been dragging on for years, now."

Opening the discussion, Cesare Carta told the committeemen that their personal tour of the site for the proposed installation would certainly enable them to form more accurate and informed judgments. "Taking this land," said the mayor, "would compromise any sort of development, and for us development is the sole alternative to a depression that has squeezed us for years, and which means stagnation [for] agriculture, tourism, services, and structures."

Alberto Deiala (PSI) touched off a quick but sturdy round of questions from the floor. "We've had our fill of barons," said Deiala, "and the people are fed up with them: they don't want another set of them. The people would find it very hard to understand this takeover, and for the nth time, it would be enslavement to them."

"We are protesting," broke in Mario Pinna (DC), "at the whole approach to this matter. Cabras doesn't need the military, or all the billion lire they tell us they would bring in: give us tin, and the place will be richer. But the Cabras military zone," said Pinna, "must be cancelled."

That high-handed approach drew lengthy protests from the mayors of Solarussa, Bauladu, and San Vero Milis. "It's always best to ask local government people for their opinion," said Deidda, mayor of Solarussa, "because things like these take planning." "Sardinians," complained Italo Ortu, mayor of Bauladu," are always having things rammed down their throats. From Maddalena to Capo Teulada, the whole island is an occupied zone. You will hear strong protest from Cabras, more like a rebellion."

"You cannot just go over the heads of local governments like this," warned Antonio Ledda, mayor of San Vero Milis. You can't handle such important problems this way."

Antonio Uras, PCI member of the regional council, dwelt at length on the need for establishing a different relationship between civilians and the military. "We don't want to declare war on the armed forces: on the contrary, we sincerely want to collaborate. But to do that, you have to create the right conditions." Uras advised the committee to give full weight to the state of tension prevailing among the people of the Gulf of Oristano area, outraged at this further invasion. Understandably, anticipation ran high as all awaited the reply of commission chairman Vito Angelini.

"That telegram postponing the occupation did not come from the defense committee," he began. That was to avoid raising any mistaken notion that the committee can shift dates around or adopt solutions of a particular type, as it likes. The credit for that goes to the joint commission and to the prefect of Oristano. Angelini went on to say that he admired the conduct of the mayors who, while never losing sight of defense requirements, have initiated the dialogue required under the law to adapt the needs of local populations to those of the armed forces. "That," the committee chairman admitted,"is the kind of planning that has not been thoroughly done in Sardinia. This is why we must always insist on participation by the people, and why we must establish conditions that will let the people understand the reasons for taking this or that piece of land."

Chairman Angelini dwelt at some length on this question of participation and thorough knowledge of all the issues involved, fully accepting the complaints on these counts that had been fired at him by all the mayors. "You have made us aware of your dissatisfaction," he said, "of your thirst for participation. Each of you must now play his part so that all citizens may have a say in the decision-making process." With these remarks the meeting in Ramon's bar was adjourned. Immediately afterwards the committeemen climbed aboard their helicopters and flew back to Elmas.

Meanwhile, over in Cabras, the mobilization is still under way. "All the political parties are unanimous," recalled Angelo Bonesu. "We don't want a repetition of what happened in 1976, when the issue was postponed, but never settled satisfactorily." "As early as this evening groups of citizens will be camping out on the San Salvatore foothills. They will sleep there and keep watch. They will be mounting guard which will not be needed for at least a month yet, but which will help swell this chorus from Cabras, shouting 'No!' to the military radar. Early tomorrow morning there will be a peace march organized by the commune. At around 1000 Mayor Cesare Carta will make a speech at San Salvatore, after which the demonstrators will march the 3 kilometers from the town to the top of the hills."

"They say it will be a silent march, calm, but firm. It will reflect the way this issue is being dealt with in political quarters: in perfect accord, without rhetoric and with the clear-cut objective of warding off, once and for all, what everyone agrees would be "a great calamity for all of Sinis."

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PAPER NOTES QUESTIONING OF LABOR PARTY'S DEFENSE CREDIBILITY

LD010735 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense and Credibility"]

[Text] An overwhelming majority from all parties in the Defense Commission, which the Bratteli government appointed in 1974 and which has had both the present primeminister and the transport minister as its chairman, states that it is a matter of urgency that we make the effort to modernize our defense forces and to stop the gaps that developments in technology have revealed. In fact, we are here dealing with insufficiencies of such a fundamental nature that there is every justification for asking whether Norway will be in a position to defend Norwegian territory for long enough without help.

Even if the collective defense system in the West works according to plan, we cannot run away from our own obligation to ensure that we have a reasonable defense capability--and avoid being taken by surprise. The defense of Norway is a basic national responsibility which means at the very least that we must be able to offer resistance for at least as long as it takes for help to arrive. Effective help to Norway in a war situation is totally dependent on the fact that when we adopt national defense measures we make it possible to make use of such help. Thus, a crucial requirement is that we acquire the air defense material necessary to make our airports safe, not only for allied troop movements, but also for the transport of our own forces and for Norwegian and allied military capacity in the air.

Norway's great and special defense requirements are often blamed on, among other things, circumstances over which we ourselves have no control: the country's geographical location in the area of tension between the two superpowers and its close proximity to the Soviet Union's extensive military activities in the north. We cannot ignore the fact that our defense requirements have become even clearer since the commission published its findings. And when the commission describes its own proposals as a minimum solution, we must give further emphasis to this in the light of more recent developments. And this also applies to the proposal for an annual rate of growth of 4 percent in the next few years.

All the authorities in the field who have expressed their views on the Defense Commission's findings have given unanimous support to the commission's recommendations and they agree that these recommendations represent a minimum future action. Even the Defense Ministry agrees. When the Storting debated the Defense Commission's findings and the 1979-1983 main outlines for defense planning yesterday, both government and labor party spokesman in the Storting made the assurance that a definite decision has been made to implement the commission's targets and intentions. But--they are just not going to grant the money! They just do not want to make the economic effort which the commission and the nonsocialist parties say is the minimum requirement for the achievement of the proposed objectives.

So it is perhaps not so strange that individuals have begun to question the political willingness of the labor party to ensure a credible defense system. For, as the Defense Commission chairman put it: what gives our defenses credibility is not our proclamations of agreement or of patriotism and our readiness to defend ourselves. Credibility is created by our actions.

CSO: 3108

PCP, SOCIALISTS REACT NEGATIVELY TO PM'S TV INTERVIEW

PCP's Pato Scores Premier

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 21 Mar 80 p 5

[Commentary by Octavio Pato]

[Text] The prerecorded piece of theater broadcast over television last 16 March with the prime minister as its star did not produce the desired effects. Neither the quality of the actors nor the staging succeeded in concealing or making people forget the lack of content, veracity, and conviction.

When a head of government, speaking before thousands upon thousands of Portuguese, tries to silence the corruption, arbitrariness, and cronyism of one of his ministries--the MAP [Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries]--with the unbelievable argument that he "does not believe it" and becomes that ministry's accomplice by reaffirming his support for the officials responsible for those derangements that are now beginning to look like one of the nation's greatest scandals, not only in this country but also internationally;

When a head of government--in power only 3 months and with elections 6 months away--needs television cameras to malign the opposition forces and the workers, to whom he attributes his own intentions of destabilization and confrontation;

When a head of government, for manifestly electoral purposes, discloses measures that he does not explain and tries to make people believe that purchasing power increases in direct proportion to the rise in prices;

When a head of government states publicly that he owes political solidarity only to the parliamentary majority that supports him and owes nothing to the opposition or the other organs of sovereignty, specifically the CR [Council of the Revolution] and the PR [President of the Republic] (whom he even insults);

And when he is in fact the head of a government that threatens the workers with article 174 of the Penal Code, accusing them of "incitement to political struggle through violence" when they, in the full exercise of their constitutional rights, are defending the revolution's greatest achievement--agrarian reform--and then on the other hand refuses to proceed with an investigation called for by the president of the republic into the lies and rumors concerning a supposed military pronunciamento that are being spread by the fascist-leaning press, the clear objective being political and military destabilization and confrontation among the organs of sovereignty, the latter in clear violation of article 174, points 1 and 3, which provide a penalty for:

1. "Those who disseminate, in writing or in public, false or tendentious news likely to cause alarm or public unrest" and:

2. "Those who attempt to provoke animosity among the military forces or between those forces and the civilian institutions";

Then it is not difficult to discern the dictatorial vocation of that government and that prime minister, and it is not difficult to discover the ideology and policy inspiring them.

Defending the Indefensible

With the feeling that we had stepped back several years in time and were attending a "family talk," it was not difficult for the Portuguese, 6 years after 25 April [1974], to see the intentions hidden behind the words and juggling act of this new prestidigitator. They are, as was stated last 25 January by the PCP Central Committee, "to destroy the achievements of the revolution, restore the economic and political power of big capital (in association with imperialism) and the large landowners, subvert the democratic system and, in the short or medium term, restore a new dictatorship," specifically by:

1. Worsening the living conditions of the workers and middle classes;

2. Restricting freedoms and establishing the monopoly of the reactionary forces on the media;

3. Destroying agrarian reform, nationalizations, and management control;

4. Having the Assembly of the Republic approve antidemocratic and anticonstitutional laws;

5. Preparing a new election law which, in antidemocratic conditions, will assure him of a continued majority among the deputies;

6. Unconstitutionally approving a "basic referendum law" permitting them to revise the constitution with no need for a two-thirds majority and without the restrictions laid down in article 290, and;

7. Confronting the PR and the CR in an attempt to create an institutional impasse with a view to producing a coup d'etat if his "legislative" intentions do not materialize.

But another inference can be drawn from the prime minister's arrogance and threats before the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System] cameras. It is that his government is already a discredited government that needs to send its ministers constantly before the television cameras to defend indefensible measures and to praise a government foundering in an endless stream of words that make evident the uselessness of a funeral eulogy.

Concentrating his fire on the workers and the PCP, the chief guarantors of the defense of democracy, he tried to make it appear that they are the only ones opposing the antidemocratic plans of the AD [Democratic Alliance].

That is not the way things are. Other democratic parties, specifically the PS [Socialist Party] and the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement], and forces from all political and ideological camps, as well as increasingly broad sectors of the population--peasants, small and medium-sized businessmen and industrialists, intellectuals, young people, and women--are currently in clear opposition to and growing struggle against a government now clearly identified with the forces of oppression and big capital. As a matter of fact, all one has to do is take stock of the struggles that have been developing over the past month in the most diverse sectors of national life.

Harmful Policy

What is happening in agrarian reform, for example, is beyond description.

It is the institutionalization of arbitrariness, violence, and corruption. It is the illegal transfer of reserved lands (but so far for "sentimental" reasons). It is the wasting of the assets of the UCP's [expansion unknown]. It is the stealing of thousands of head of livestock, tractors, and implements. It is the inordinate violence that prevails. It is the criminal assault on the national economy and on the freedom and rights of the workers.

The prime minister calls the MAP's gangsterism compliance with the law, but the intransigent defense of the constitution by the workers he calls subversion. Those are the merits of the AD government. That is the policy that is beginning to make itself felt in all sectors and at all levels of national life.

Sa Carneiro pretends to be unaware that the current government does not represent the majority of the voters but in fact his own minority. It is a government which has a narrow and precarious parliamentary majority and which, in addition to having had the majority of the voters against it, is now facing increasingly the opposition of many who voted for the AD 3 months ago.

The Sa Carneiro-F. Amaral government is, therefore, a government with the ground disappearing beneath its feet. It is a government with a condemned policy. Its policy of subversion is colliding with the interests and yearnings of the workers and the most varied sectors of the population. It is a policy of subversion that conflicts with the political, economic, and social structures constituted after 25 April and with the organs of sovereignty themselves, which it tries to ignore, discredit, or eliminate.

The policy of the Sa Carneiro government is, therefore, profoundly harmful to the national interests and threatens the country's democracy, freedoms, and independence. It is a policy that violates the laws and the constitution, has recourse to repression and arbitrariness, and foments or conceals corruption. For all those reasons, it is urgent to put an end to the current policy of the Sa Carneiro government.

The vigor and unity of the workers movement, made clear and strengthened at the Third Congress of the CGTP-IN [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical], and the powerful rise of the struggle that is now occurring are conclusive proof that the workers and many other social sectors will firmly oppose the AD government's intention of destroying democracy.

The upcoming commemorations marking the anniversary of the constitution, the April Revolution, and Workers Day will also be powerful actions by the masses that the government will not be able to ignore. They will make clear, we are sure, the unshakable will of the working classes and of broad middle sectors of the population to prevent a return to the past and the subversion of the system--to defend April--and of their certainty of doing so.

Soares: Premier's Responses 'Fuzzy'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 21 Mar 80 p 4

[Written interview with Mario Soares, secretary general of the Socialist Party; date and place not given]

> [Text] How have the main party forces reacted to Sa Carneiro's televised interview?
>
> The secretary general of the PS responded in writing to a number of questions put to him on that subject by O JORNAL. From the PCP (and in the absence of Alvaro Cunhal), we obtained a statement from Octavio Pato, while Goncalo Ribeiro Teles conveyed to us the opinion of the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party], a party which, as is known, is in the government as part of the Democratic Alliance.

O JORNAL: What general evaluation should be made of the recent interview on the RTP by the prime minister?

Mario Soares: Frankly, I found the interview dull and uninteresting. In my opinion, it was far from meeting expectations, all the more since it was the first time that the prime minister as such had appeared on the television screen to speak directly to the Portuguese.

He appeared rigid and too tense, giving an excessively formal and distant tone to what one might have hoped would be a lively and down-to-earth talk--so that the television viewers could participate in it. That prevented the establishment of effective communication.

As for the content, it was an interview that presented nothing new, was filled with long repetitive monologs, and contained explanations that were perhaps too long-winded and confused concerning, for example, the definition of the government's economic and financial policy.

Question: There was much notice of the fact that in referring to the opposition, Dr Sa Carneiro never spoke of the Socialist Party but always identified it with the Communists. How do you interpret that attitude?

Answer: There was nothing new about that, either. Anticommunism has always been an excellent argument in trying to neutralize the opposition. The Portuguese have not forgotten how that expedient of false propaganda has been obsessively repeated over the past few decades--with the results that we all know. To come along now and say that everything outside the AD is polarized, orchestrated, or dominated by the CP sounds perfectly ridiculous. And false besides. The PS, the forces of labor, independent journalists, PSD [Social Democratic Party] dissidents, those purged from the AD government, Catholics with problems of conscience in view of the indisputable advance by the right, a sizable portion of the UGT [expansion unknown], businessmen alarmed by the political and social instability which is dangerously establishing itself again in this country, certain organs of sovereignty such as the Council of the Revolution or even the president of the republic, and all those who feel they must defend the rights contained in the constitution and the institutions arising out of 25 April--to pretend that all of that, which adds up to a great many people and a large electoral, social, and political force, not to mention the diffuse movements of discontent and frustration felt by the electorate in relation to the AD (although currently in latent form)--to pretend that all of that, as I was saying, is obeying the hidden wand of the CP or following its recommendations, even though reluctantly, reflects a Manichaeistic view that is entirely false. It is surprising that it can again be used in today's Portugal by someone with special responsibilities.

Dr Sa Carneiro knows only too well that the only credible and valid alternative to an AD government is one polarized around the PS in a manner totally autonomous and independent of the PCP. And because he knows it and fears it, he denies it or yields to the easy temptation (easy, but dangerous for the country and the stability of institutions) to try to identify it with the Communist opposition. In so doing, he is attempting to scare the voters, and the clear objective is to obstruct the normal functioning of the rules of democratic alternation, seeing that he is implicitly repeating the worn-out argument that was so often used in the past: "us, the Communists, or chaos."

Traditional Recourse to Communist Bugaboo

Question: Do you feel, therefore, that Sa Carneiro is entirely wrong?

Answer: The country knows that that is not how it is. The reality of parliamentary opposition and even extraparliamentary opposition (to use a term that Sa Carneiro employed with visible delight) gives the lie every day to his simplistic and intentionally simplifying outline. Discontent with the AD government is very widespread today and is growing as disillusionment with the failure to keep so many imprudently made promises increases. Very broad sectors of the population are beginning to realize the full meaning of the promised change, which in the long run has nothing to do with the solution of their basic problems.

In the face of crying cases of outrages, persecution, and political purges, in the face of official incompetence--clearly demonstrated already in so many cases--in the face of well-founded accusations (that need to be investigated thoroughly) of scandalous patronage and political favoritism at the administrative level, and in the face of the increasingly probable hypothesis that the deliberate intention is to provoke a generalized institutional confrontation which, if it were to occur, would plunge the country once again into a phase of extremely dangerous political and social instability, millions of Portuguese will think: "It's not my fault; I didn't vote for the AD." But there are many other disillusioned Portuguese who voted for the AD in perfect good faith and who are also beginning to ask themselves: "Did I vote for the AD just to have things turn out like this?" and "What chance of hope, security, well-being, or tranquillity does the AD government offer me?"

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the AD itself is beginning to be eroded by irreparable internal contradictions--concerning the meaning and limits of constitutional revision, the choice of a presidential candidate, the rightwing hegemony increasingly exercised over the Alliance by the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] in clear submission to pressure groups that are also extraparliamentary, and so many other urgent choices during this difficult year for Portuguese democracy that 1980 is.

In view of all these uncertainties, it is understandable that the prime minister should try to minimize the alternative that the PS and its partners and political and social allies are attempting to bring into being, completely independent of or, if you wish, impervious to the PCP, because that is the only alternative that can eclipse him and break up and beat the very rightwing majority that he heads. That explains the traditional recourse to the communist bugaboo. It is understandable. But it does not reveal much imagination.

Attempt To Orchestrate the Armed Forces as in 1975

Question: What comments are you prompted to make concerning the prime minister's references to a nonidentification of the Armed Forces with the Council of the Revolution, the attack on certain members of that organ of sovereignty, and the lack of political solidarity shown toward the president of the republic?

Answer: The attacks on the Council of the Revolution are in keeping with the orientation I have been commenting on, and here again, there is nothing new about this. They are looking for a weak spot where they can provoke a break and insure the polarization of the Armed Forces--the same polarization that they are trying to bring about in civilian society. The "big lie" fabricated 2 weeks ago by certain media in the service of the AD and foolishly approved later by the government is part of the same basic strategy. The simple truth is that exacerbating the divisions within the Armed Forces may have consequences even more serious than those resulting from the deep divisions being created and encouraged in Portuguese society.

Moreover, it has been said and repeated (and first of all by the council itself) that the Council of the Revolution is a temporary body that will disappear naturally as a result of the upcoming revision of the constitution.

As is known, the parties making up the AD signed the MFA [Armed Forces Movement]-Party Pact, which was the source of the definition of that organ of sovereignty in the constitution. Since they are, therefore, coresponsible for the existence of the Council of the Revolution, it seems very artificial that they have not tried to dramatize its action (which, incidentally, is much more discreet today than it was in other political phases) until now, at the precise moment when the Council of the Revolution is approaching its natural end.

It can be seen, therefore, that such behavior involves electoral motives and that an attempt is being made, through the attacks on the Council of the Revolution, to reach the president of the republic as the basic target, with the additional intention of perhaps creating difficulties for him with certain sectors of the Armed Forces.

For my part, I will say that the unity of the Armed Forces--their cohesion, discipline, and political mentality--are factors of vital interest for the country's political stability. For that reason, it is extremely risky and reprehensible to try to widen the cleavages within the Armed Forces, especially in terms of political interests that are completely foreign to them. The attempt to use the Armed Forces politically in the service of a totalitarian scheme, which we witnessed in 1975, cannot now be repeated in an operation which is very similar to it although in the opposite direction. Because such an "operation," which is beginning to be detectable today, is, in political and national terms--and regardless of its objectives--equally reprehensible and inappropriate in men who claim to be democrats.

Government Bases its Entire Policy on Elections

Question: What do you think of the prime minister's defense of government policy?

Answer: I do not believe that Sa Carneiro made a very clear defense of the AD government's policy in his interview. He stressed a number of promises and announced "pious intentions" which might please this or that sector of public opinion but which lie in the uncertain zone of the future. He tried to defend himself and shot a few poison arrows at possible opponents inside and outside the AD. But he did not clearly delineate a coherent policy. For example, he said that the government had a coherent economic policy. But there is a wide gap between that statement and the demonstration of it, and the prime minister declined to bridge that gap. Although he said he was not concerned with the elections, an obvious vote-getting preoccupation was evident in his words--so much so that one can say without exaggeration that the government is thinking of nothing else and is shaping its entire policy with a view to the legislative and presidential elections at the end of this year. That is very serious for the future of the country. Everything is being held in abeyance until the upcoming elections. The country is continuing to be "deferred," as Sa Carneiro used to say when he was in the opposition.

A number of promises that he restated, certain veiled threats, omissions relative to important sectors and problems--and even certain initiatives that he left implied--cannot be understood outside the electoral context, which is the government's dominant preoccupation. The result is that no one was able to extract from the prime minister's words any positive indications of an actual improvement in well-being or the quality of life, the guarantee of employment, improved housing conditions, the rationalization and improved productivity of services, increased production, greater social peace and tranquillity or, lastly, a greater assurance as to the future both for the workers and for the businessmen. In that respect, everything was left unsaid. And it was too bad, because that is what the Portuguese wanted him to talk to them about. Most of the interview was taken up with "hot" political issues whose underlying and dominant preoccupation was the elections--in other words, the best way for the government to place itself in a position to win those elections. The real country--placed on "hold"--was left for a more appropriate time. In his interview, the prime minister gave the television viewers the true impression that he indeed presides over an "interim government."

11798
CSO: 3101

EAST BLOC PARTIES GREET PCE ON PARTY'S ANNIVERSARY

LD291037 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 16 Apr 80 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Greetings From Communist Parties of World on Occasion of PCE's 60th Anniversary"]

[Excerpts] Romanian Communist Party

"There are strong international ties of fraternal close friendship and solidarity between the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and the PCE and between their leaders," the Romanian communists' leadership states in its greetings telegram. "We take this opportunity," the message adds, "to express our conviction that the relations of esteem and mutual respect and of active solidarity between our parties will be increasingly developed to the benefit of the two peoples and for the cause of international peace and understanding. The RCP Central Committee wholeheartedly wishes the PCE Central Committee and all Spanish communists further successes in their noble activity for the building of a free, democratic and independent Spain and for progress and peace in Europe and throughout the world."

Polish United Workers Party

"Linked by international ties of solidarity," the Polish communists' message states, "we wish you many successes in your activity for the benefit of the workers and in the service of peace, security and social progress in Europe and the world. Linked by the common history of struggle for the freedom of the Spanish republic--an instance of unity between the communists and the progressive forces--we express our conviction that the tribute on the PCE's 60th anniversary will help strengthen the communists' positions among the working class and other social forces and help set up a joint front of leftwing forces."

Hungarian Socialist Workers Party

"The Hungarian communists have followed and continued to follow with sympathy and international solidarity the Spanish communists' struggle for the elimination of fascism and their country's transformation and social progress," the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party's message states, while wishing the PCE "further successes in the struggle for Spain's socialist future and the strengthening of peace and security." "We hope that your democratic and socialist aims will be realized as soon as possible."

CSO: 3110

POLL SHOWS SOCIALISTS LOSE YOUTH SUPPORT TO LEFT PARTY-COMMUNISTS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander: "Majority of Young People Favors Social Democrats + Left Party-Communists"]

[Text] The Social Democrats are in a weaker position among young voters than in the electorate as a whole. Overall, the socialist bloc has a majority, however, because one person out of nine votes for the VPK [Left Party-Communists].

This is shown by a SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] study commissioned by the SVENSKA DAGBLADET. The study shows the following party choice by voters between 18 and 24 years, with the distribution over the entire electorate, according to the latest SIFO measurement, in parentheses:

Conservatives	23.5 percent	(24)
Liberal Party	9.5 percent	(8.5)
Center Party	14.5 percent	(16)
Social Democrats	39.5 percent	(43.5)
VPK	11.5 percent	(7)
Christian Democratic Union	1.0 percent	(0.5)
Others	0.5 percent	(0.5)

Among young voters 6.5 percent have no party preference, as compared to 4.0 percent in the whole electorate.

The greatest differences are thus for the VPK and the Social Democrats. Totally, the socialist bloc has 51.0 percent, half a percentage point more than in the "big" SIFO study.

The poll does not confirm that the Center Party has attracted young voters on the basis of its resistance to nuclear power and also does not confirm the opinion that the Conservatives are high and the Liberal Party low in the preference of young people.

Students



The diagram shows the change in party preference over a 12-year period for young people who study.

Key: 1) Conservative Party
2) Center Party
3) Liberal Party
4) Social Democrats
5) VPK

The SIFO/SVENSKA DAGBLADET poll also surveyed young voters about the national referendum on nuclear power. It turns out that alternative 3 is well placed among young voters.

Alternative 1	24 percent	(25)
Alternative 2	28 percent	(31)
Alternative 3	42 percent	(36)
no opinion	5 percent	(8)

The study further includes party sympathies among children aged 12-17 years. Here it turns out that the differences are very small as compared to the electorate.

The percentage for the Conservatives is 1.5 units above the corresponding figure in the latest poll of the electorate. The Liberal Party is 2 units below, the Social Democrats 2 units above and the VPK 1.5 units below, while the Center Party, Christian Democratic Union and others show exactly the same figures among the children as among adults. Only 12.5 percent of the children state that they lack party preference.

Different Background

A fourth link included in the poll applies to differences in party sympathy between employed youth and students. SIFO points out that these figures

Gainfully Employed



The curves for employed young people show that the Social Democrats are ahead with 45 percent. The Conservatives and the VPK are gaining.

Key: 1) Conservative Party
2) Center Party
3) Liberal Party
4) Social Democrats
5) VPK

must be regarded with great caution, since the material for the poll becomes rather small when dividing the group this far. The number of students aged 18 to 24 years, for example, is 210.

With this reservation it can be noted that the Social Democrats have 45 percent of the working young people among their voters, as compared to 17 percent for the Conservatives, 15 for the Center Party, 12 for the Liberal Party and 10 for the VPK.

Among students 42 percent choose the Conservatives, 10 the Social Democrats, 15 the VPK, 13 the Center Party and 8 percent the Liberal Party.

Conservatives Gain

An equivalent poll has been made each year since 1968. In comparison with last year's figures the Conservatives show a very sharp increase among both students and working young people. The Social Democrats record a decreasing trend in both groups. The Liberal Party decreases in the student group and now has 60 percent of its young voters among the gainfully employed. In the VPK the situation is reversed -- 60 percent of the students -- but the situation has equalized in the last polls.

In the majority of the polls during the 1970's the Conservatives were the fourth party among the employed. Now it is only the Social Democrats who have a higher proportion.

During all of the 1970's the differences between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats have been relatively small, up to 1976 with the Social Democrats as the dominating party and after that with changing majority.

The Conservatives are now shown to have more than twice as many voters as the Social Democrats among students between the ages of 18 and 24.

11949
CSO: 3109

COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR VOTE STAND INCREASES SOCIALIST, LIBERAL TIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Mar 80 p 7

/Interview by unnamed TT correspondent: "Chairman of FPU: 'Energy Cooperation Has Opened the Door Between the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats'"/

/Text/ There are a number of points of contact between Social Democracy and the Liberal Party. The cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party for alternative 2 opens the door to future politics, says Peter Orn, chairman of the Liberal Youth Association (FPU) in a TT /Press Wire Service, Inc./ interview.

Orn is disappointed that last fall the Liberal Party joined a government which included the Conservatives. A government with only the Liberal Party and the Center Party could have become stronger and have had greater opportunities for seeking support across the bloc boundaries.

The FPU chairman does not agree with Liberal Party member Nils Hallerby's criticism of Ola Ullsten for choosing the post of foreign minister, but Orn states that Hallerby put his finger on many problems. Earlier this year Orn sharply criticized the Liberal Party leader's South Africa policy.

"If it turns out that the law prohibiting new investments in South Africa has no effect the government should see to it that all Swedish investments should be withdrawn."

He is also disappointed that the government has not increased the aid appropriation some more, and he repeats the demands of the Youth Association for aid to the underdeveloped countries amounting to 5 percent of the GNP by the end of the 1980's.

"There is risk that we forget the underdeveloped countries in a deteriorated economic situation. The future society must be adjusted to a new world economic system and this is a task for the young generation."

It was wrong for the Liberal Party to agree to the expansion of parental insurance by another 3 months, which does not provide full compensation for the loss of income. Compensation of only 37 crowns per day keeps the women at home, in Orn's opinion.

"When parental leave is increased it should take place at such a rate that the loss of income can be fully replaced."

Orn emphasized that the most important thing is to expand the care of children and the elderly. He regards the proposal for a division of the municipal tax reform over 2 years as a serious blow to expansion of the daycare centers.

How, then, is the Liberal Party to shape its future policies?

The FPU chairman is optimistic and believes in a future for the party, but he admits that right now the situation is troublesome. However, he sees Ullsten's various speeches in the last few weeks as new signals for the future and for a stronger party.

What is most important is that the party finds its liberal identity and recombines the daily issues pursued by the party with a liberal vision of what the future society should look like. It is important that the Liberal Party is felt to be an independent liberal party. The issue of any future cooperation partner must come second; first, the party must find its political and ideological soul.

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PAPER COMMENTS ON INCREASED PARTY POLARIZATION IN POLLS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial by TWt: "Victim of Polarization: The Liberal Party"]

[Text] Nearly every month nowadays one or more election polls are published predicting both the result of an election held right now and the way in which the nuclear power referendum seems to be heading. It is unfortunately quite clear that in the final stretch old party loyalties influence the outcome of the referendum. But many believe they also see an effect in the other direction: Those who strongly dislike their party's policy on the energy issue often switch to support another party on general political issues as well. This is presumably an essential part of the explanation for the increasing polarization, that is to say the steady gains of the Conservatives and the VPK [Left Party-Communists]. In 2 weeks the other parties will face a couple of problems which are acute and hard to solve:

1) How can the result of the referendum be interpreted in practice so that the course will be clear and at the same time bitterness and cooperation difficulties can be softened?

2) How can new, unifying appeals and courses of action, which simultaneously have sharp contours and appeal to more voters than the party already has, rapidly be found for the party in question?

The situation is worst for the Liberal Party. Not because half a percentage fewer voters than last month would be a catastrophe, but because the downward trend has been so stable and sustained. Many advisers now say that "with a wiser policy" the situation would have been better: Sometimes it sounds as if a party leadership always ought to change its views according to the way the winds of opinion blow. Fortunately, one has to play with the cards -- or viewpoints -- one already has. There is perhaps agreement right now in Liberal Party ranks that the liberal profile ought to be more defined, but some people interpret that to mean sharper attacks on Social Democracy, others believe in cooperation in that direction instead of with the present government colleagues. In order to make the whole thing even more complicated, it is not always that the desire for cooperation in a certain direction means that politically one is leaning more toward that direction than others; the reasons may be entirely strategic.

There is no lack of seductive calls from the Social Democrats aimed at Ullsten and others. Typical is what the SODERHAMNSKURIREN -- with former election strategist Soren Thunell (Social Democrat) -- tries to sound: "a radical-liberal alternative with the front aimed against the demands of the conservative forces," with voters "in the border zone between the two political blocs." The Liberal Party is supposed to confirm such a new attitude by allowing Olof Palme to form a minority government after the referendum until the next election.

That hook is obviously too poorly baited to get a rise. On both the socialist and the conservative side people are trying to make it appear as if the Liberal Party (and to some extent the Center Party) actually have only to "choose sides:" "If you join us in everything essential you are good liberals," both sides seem to say. If the Liberal Party has a sense of its distinctive liberal character it should keep a cool head no matter what the figures may look like and not change government partners or principal goals for its policies as one changes party leaders.

The decisive reason as to why a liberal party in Sweden, with the present relationships of parliamentary strength, can scarcely govern jointly with the Social Democrats is not the distance to this party compared with that to the Conservatives or the Center Party. It is instead the fact that the Social Democrats together with the VPK are right on the 50-percent line and are not quite prepared to conduct a policy which can be accepted by the Liberal Party. On the other hand, this is what the other two parties have to do, who alone have never even had a chance for a majority, and in which situation the Center Party furthermore in no way pulls "to the right" seen from a general point of view; this varies greatly from issue to issue. The situation isprecisely the opposite in the FRG, where cooperation between liberals-Social Democrats has become quite natural and frictionless. There, a conservative party is the big alternative on the verge of a majority of its own. If a relatively small center party wants to do its own ideology justice it must not allow itself to be swallowed up. In every situation it must therefore prefer cooperation with those who for reasons of mathematical necessity of through generosity accept the greatest dose of liberalism or at any rate do not force through the opposite. The election results draw the main frontline differently in the FRG and in Sweden. But the situation could be different in 10 years.

The Liberal Party should nevertheless enjoy the most natural contacts with the Center Party, but the energy policy has obviously had a divisive effect. That the Liberal Party has lost voters over that issue depends on the fact that opinion at the member level, and even more at the voter level, has been evenly divided between the three alternatives, while the party leadership and the parliamentary group with a few exceptions have backed alternative 2. A liberal party is usually a little less inclined to follow authorities than other parties; here the pressure from above has possibly led to a drain rather than to an open split.

The issue of party leader should not be exaggerated. Since the time of Bertil Ohlin no one has succeeded in combining the intellectual brilliance and familiarity with everyday life that are usually required to an almost superhuman degree of Liberal Party leaders in particular. On the other hand, the Liberal Party would profit more than others from the change in Swedish politics from one-man shows to a broader line of faces from every camp.

Many former liberal profile issues -- for example the issues of family doctor and equality between sexes -- are now being pursued by cabinet members from other parties. For that reason not all cats have to seem grey. If the Liberal Party leadership can find the common denominators and the distinctly liberal accents all over the country, it will have a greater pool of not exactly allergic voters to turn to than any other party. This should make that really deep, dark pessimism impossible.

11949
CSO: 3109

BOHMAN ATTACKS VPK'S WERNER FOR NUCLEAR STAND, OPPRESSION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Mar 80 p 8

/Article by Dick Ljungberg: "Bohman Against Werner: 'A Seducer of Young People'"/

/Text/ Lund, Wednesday--At a student evening at the Academic Union in Lund on Wednesday Economics Minister Gosta Bohman made a broad attack on the Left Party-Communists /VPK/. "Do not let the energy debate cause the Communists to be regarded as more or less housebroken from a democratic point of view," he appealed.

It was no accident that during his southern Swedish tour Gosta Bohman took up the issue of communists precisely in Lund. In the latest election the Lund VPK received 11 percent and is just as well represented on the municipal council as the Liberal Party.

It was based on the presentation of the abolition plan for alternative 3 that Bohman began to attack the VPK and its leader Lars Werner.

"It is no accident that alternative 3 is not capable of showing how abolition of nuclear power is to take place within 10 years," in Bohman's opinion. And one of the reasons for that is a fundamental opposition within the group supporting alternative 3 between those who regard a centrally governed low-energy society as the Marxist utopia and the decentralization supporters of the countryside romantics -- meaning the Center Party.

Oppression

Bohman questioned whether it is really concern for people's security which is the basis of the VPK's rejection of nuclear power. Instead he believed that it is the opportunities for creating an entirely different Sweden -- some kind of Soviet-Sweden, with a rigid central government -- that governs the actions of the VPK.

"The VPK is not a democratic party. Wherever its ideology has been put into practice the result has become oppression and involuntariness," Bohman warned.

"The communist advance is extraordinarily serious. What is happening now ought to cause a gathering of ideological strength in democratic parties for the struggle against the antidemocratic doctrines represented by the communists," he believes.

"They have managed to gain a following among many young voters, and even worse, at our universities and advanced schools, which in the West have traditionally been strongholds of intellectual freedom. The uncompromising search for truth, which is completely foreign to the communist ideology, constitutes a foundation for scientific and technological progress."

"Let me therefore state with great emphasis that the communist advance constitutes a threat to the intellectual climate in our country," Bohman continued.

"Our Swedish environment cannot possibly be so isolated, so cozy and so peaceful that the young people can allow themselves to be fooled by the call of the extreme left. Allow themselves to be led and seduced by Lars Werner just because he looks good-natured and sometimes even confidence-inspiring."

Bohman believed that it is, among other things, the Social Democrats' unwillingness to aim the struggle against the left for which they now have to suffer. The false legitimacy which the VPK has managed to earn in the struggle on the energy barricades has weakened the Social Democrats' attack positions. But Bohman thought Olof Palme had improved lately in this respect.

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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN

DEFENSE POLICY REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF ECONOMY, WORLD SITUATION

LD011413 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "National Defense"]

[Text] The difficult economic position of the defense forces has worsened and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer as stable as they were. It is the view of the government that the defense commission must take these matters into consideration...

This is how a TYDNINGARUAS TELEGRAMBYRA report summarizes the crucial problems behind the supplementary directive which has now been given to the defense commission.

The contradiction inherent in the phrasing of the directive speaks volumes.

As Defense Minister Erik Kronmark notes in the directive it has not even been possible to carry out in full the defense resolution which the Riksdag passed in 1977. At the same time, the tense international situation requires a defense force which can meet the demands placed on it by state authorities.

How is this conflict situation to be solved?

In recent years a number of units have been disbanded at the same time as manning levels have been reduced. Despite this, running costs have become so high that they have claimed an ever greater share of defense costs. The result has been shorter training for conscripts, at the same time as the suspension of military refresher courses has weakened our defense capability.

It is obvious that things cannot be allowed to go on like this.

The supplementary directive states that the nation's economic problems make it necessary to consider wide-ranging rationalizations.

There must, however, be a correspondence between the goals which the state authorities formulate for our defense forces and the resources which are placed at their disposal. The philosophy rationalization which is applied to other national activities cannot be applied to the defense forces in the same way.

It is also true that the defense commission cannot disregard economic realities. The defense forces must be able to make the best use of those resources apportioned to them.

According to the defense minister it would be too difficult and too expensive to carry out rationalizations within the current framework. It will therefore be necessary to change it. It is obvious that a particular form of organization is not something fixed for all time--Sweden's defenses have undergone various changes in organization and many units have been disbanded.

The most controversial point in the new directive is the suggested review of the draft. Sweden's military defense is still to be founded on universal conscription, even if some conscripts can receive shorter training, some able-bodied men are exempted from military service and some conscripts are directly trained for civil defense.

There is a tradition of strong popular support for the draft. And part of the concept is that each and every citizen shall contribute to the defense of the nation. Following the new directives the social democrats on the defense commission have not been slow to warn of the danger that "the conscription system could soon become a hollow shell."

In fact earlier defense resolutions have hollowed out conscription by reductions in length of training. But the time is past when defense competence was measured in the number of men marching on the parade ground. National defense is maintained today in the most diverse fields with totally different requirements. Certain functions can require lengthy training, others less; but what use is this training if effective modern weaspons are not placed at the disposal of the armed forces?

Even military experts have conflicting opinions on how conscription ought to be organized. It is not possible for the executive authorities to reach a decision until the question has been researched in detail. Particularly in view of the solid foundation that national service has, persuasive arguments will be needed to make change possible.

On one point a clear response is needed. The defense committee will in the future continue to base its reasoning on the assumption that defense capabilities will be directed against surprise attacks and will be concentrated in northern Norrland and the southern part of Sweden. The commission advocates study of the military science academy recommendations on the committee's first report, in which it is noted that the central parts of Sweden, with their concentration of capital city, governing bodies, population, industrial and commercial activity and communications, needs a defense force of great capacity.

CSO: 3109

LO CHIEF NILSSON SUGGEST COMPROMISE OVER WAGE EARNERS' FUND

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Feb 80 p 2

/Article by unnamed: "Gunnar Nilsson on Wage Earners' Funds: 'We Are Prepared to Compromise'"/

/Text/ The LO /Swedish Federation of Trade Unions/ is open to compromises on the issue of wage earners' funds. There does not seem to be any possibilities within the foreseeable future of gaining approval for the fund proposal we have presented, in the opinion of LO chairman Gunnar Nilsson.

"In the LO we must without preconditions draft new models in which the basic characteristics remain but for which we may technically have to reduce our demands."

"Over the years we have obstinately fought for our proposals in debate. But it is something of the strength in the Swedish trade union movement that despite having had a difficult time gaining approval we have not gotten stuck in dead-end alleys but have continued," Gunnar Nilsson says in a statement to the trade and industry press service.

Gunnar Nilsson takes a pessimistic view of the 1980's. The economic prospects are gloomy. Inflation threatens to further erode the purchasing power of the wage earners. Insufficient profitability and lack of willingness to invest in the companies is threatening jobs, at the same time as the government seems incapable of undertaking the measures needed, in his opinion.

No Excess Profits

Regarding the recent union demands for temporary funds in order to deal with "excess profits" during 1980 and to facilitate collective bargaining, Gunnar Nilsson says:

"In general there are no excess profits in trade and industry. But that does not mean that profit peaks should be without problems. The sliding scale effect often becomes great in highly profitable companies and it is therefore psychologically important to have excess profit funds. In 1974 the local wage demands could be softened by means of the environmental funds.

Gunnar Nilsson admits that it is difficult to define what excess profits are. It is not least a question of how the profits are used, he believes.

Moral Evaluation

It is necessary to make a moral evaluation. Excess profit is not only an expression of the fact that profits are unusually great but also of how they are used, whether they are used for short-sighted speculation or used to create a secure future and new jobs.

Finding a solution for the manner in which to arrange the supply of capital to trade and industry for the 1980's is urgent, he continues. Merely greater profits does not take care of the need for investments. The unions and trade and industry must come to terms regarding the capital supply of tomorrow.

But it is still the collective fund model of the LO congress which must be the guiding light. And even if a future compromise is conceivable, the LO cannot abandon the demands that the concentration of wealth must be broken up, that the profit distribution must be brought into the picture, the joint wage policy must be kept and the growth of capital must be safeguarded, Gunnar Nilsson explains.

11949
CSO: 3109

BRIEFS

RESIGNATION DEMAND--The two Center Party cabinet members Karin Soder and Nils G. Asling should leave the bourgeois three-party government if alternatives 1 or 2 win in the national referendum. Hints to that effect were dropped by Conservative leader Gosta Bohman in a television interview during his trip to southern Sweden. Bohman is incensed about the letters containing "scare propaganda" written by Social Minister Soder and Industry Minister Asling to the nation's parents and small businessmen. "The government agreed that the cabinet members should not appear in the energy campaign as such. Soder and Asling have violated this and that is regrettable. It limits their opportunities to be entrusted with a yes-decision after the referendum," Bohman says to the TT [Press Wire Service, Inc.]. 11949 [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Mar 80 p 8]

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WEST EUROPE REPORT
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WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

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